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Timely

SUMMARY: Petitioner Nixon, represented by private counsel,
moves for expedited consideration of his petition· for
certiorari.

The petition presents the issue whether a President

is absolutely immune from civil damage liability.
1 Judge Robb was on the panel, but did not participate.

FACTS: The facts as set forth in the petition are as
follows: In 1968, respondent Fitzgerald blew the whistle on
cost overruns in the C-5A transport program.
civil service status was terminated.

Thereafter, his

These events occurred

during the closing days of the Johnson administration.

A year

later, respondent's employment with the government was
terminated as part of a general reorganization.

Mr. Nixon was

questioned about the matter at a press conference and promised
to look

into ~ it.

He then requested that respondent be given a

Bureau of the Budget position.

The BOB director, howeve 0

counselled against such an appointment because respondent was a
"pipeline to Senator Proxmire."

Nixon did not push the matter,

but requested his staff to pursue other alternatives.
found.

(

None was

In 1970 respondent left the government. 2

In 1973 respondent was ordered reinstated by the civil
service commission and awarded back pay.

In 1974 he commenced

this civil action against various federal officials, claiming
(1) that his First Amendment rights v1ere violated by the
dismissal and (2) under implied causes of action pursuant to

~

federal statutes protecting Congressional witnesses. See 5
U.S.C. § 7211; 18

l

wvvf ·

u.s.c.

§ 1505.

The suit was dismissed as

TRespondent--paints the President as an active con..s Elrator,
citing this taped statements:
I said get rid of that son of a bitch. You know 'cause he
is, he is doin' this two or three times.
Mr. Nixon says that he had some other person (a Mr. Gordon Rule
who had criticized Roy Ash) in mind when he made this statement.
The district court found "genuine issues of fact as to the
scope of each defendant's responsibilities."

time barred.

On appeal CADC reversed as to White House

personnel concluding that prior to 1973 respondent had no
reason to know of White House involvement in the dismissal. 553
F. 2d 220 (1977).

On remand, respondent amended his complaint

to add Nixon as a defendant.
HOLDINGS

BELO~:

Following his joinder, Nixon moved to

dismiss on grounds of absolute immunity and qualified immunity.
The District Court (Gessell) denied the absolute immunity
motion on the authority of Halperin v. Kissinger, No. 79-880,
and the qualified immunity request because of disputed facts.
Nixon appealed as to absolute immunity.

Respondent then moved

to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or in the
alternative for summary affirmance.

By order, CADC granted the

motion to dismiss.
CONTENTIONS: Nixon raises two issues: (1) that he is
entitled to absolute immunity for the reasons stated by the SG
in Halperin and (2) that the district court's order was an
appealable collateral order.

He moves for expedited

consideration of his petition advising the Court that trial is
scheduled in this case for June 4 and that the District Court
has "already refused to stay proceedings below even until this
Court announces its action with regard to
Kissinger."

[Hal~in

v.]

He argues that this case provides an excellent

example of the perils of applying Butz to a President: it

-/
I

\
~

I

arises "out of the kind of activities that confronts a
President daily

...

and demonstrates that mistaken judgments on

what may seem a trivial matter

-- indeed, an internal executive

branch personnel dispute -- can later threaten a President's
personal estate."

Finally, he asserts, correctly, that the

decision on appealability is directly contrary to Mitchell v.
g~l§toski

Forsyth, 79-1120 (CA 3}, and in tension with
Meanor---

u.s. ---

v.

(1979}.

RESPONSE: The response argues that CADC correctly decided
the appealability question and that in any event the petition
should be denied because: ( 1}

But~.

is controlling; ( 2} even if

the President is absolutely immune on the constituional issues,
the statutory claims will go to trial; and (3} this motion is
filed solely as a delay-tactic.
DISCUSSION: I would grant Mr. Nixon's motion for expedited
consideration.

And if

H~~rin

petition should be held. 3

is

gran~ed,

It is important to recognize that

the principal issue here is appealability.

-appeal;

I would think this

it did not summarily affirm.

may have been strongly colored by

CADC dismissed the

CADC's decision, however,

Hal~in.

A circuit that

does not recognize presidential claims of absolute immunity is
not likely to look kindly on interlocutory appeals of such
claims. See Community Broadc9.sti!!9. v.

F.c.g. ~,

546 F. 2d 1022,

1025 (D.C. Cir. 1976} (one criterion for appealibility is
presence of "a serious and unsettled question"} . . Hence, if
Halperin were reversed and this case remanded in its light,
CADC might alter its ruling.

This Court's decision in

Helstoski provides strong precedent for appealability: absolute

(
o..../

immunity like the speech-or-debate-clause privilege protects
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results but
also from the burdens of defending."
On the immunity issue, I continue to believe that Butz
makes this a very hard case for the President to win.
\"'"h.e~ c.

·~

o.... 'reta ~~~e.

Shechtman

order in petn.

3 Some argument could be made for granting this petition with
Halperin. Nixon has private counsel in this case who may raise
points not made by the SG; and the conduct here arguably is
less egregious than the !lalper in wiretapping. (Though
retaliation against a congressional witness is quite a serious
charge.) A grant, however, would complicate matters by putting
appeaJ.ability in issue.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

October Term, 1979

No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON,
Petitioner,

v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD,
Respondent.

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES

Petitioner Richard Nixon and respondent A. Ernest
Fitzgerald, by their undersigned counsel, jointly submit this
statement to inform the Court concerning certain matters that
have been the subject of erroneous news reports, which may have
come to this Court's attention, and which concern the status of
this case.

The parties have learned that, following the

announcement of this Court's May 19, 1980, action grapting
the petition for writ of certiorari in Halperin v. Kissinger,
No. 79-880, some news agencies speculated that the instant
action had been settled.

This is incorrect.

The parties

continue vigorously to dispute whether the petitioner can be
held liable to respondent in this case, a question presented

-2-

to this Court by 'the instant petition.

The parties have

agreed at this stage to fix the amount of payments to which
respondent would be entitled in this case, but the amount of
payment depends upon this Court's disposition of the instant
petition and subsequent proceedings in the District Court.
Therefore, the case has not been settled and is not moot.
Respectfully submitted,

Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin
2555 M Street, N. W., Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20037
(202) 293-6400
Counsel for Petitioner
Richard Nixon

Peter Raven-Hansen
Hogan & Hartson
815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006
(202) 331-4500
Counsel for Respondent
A. Ernest Fitzgerald
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 2, 1981
79-880 Kissinger v. Halperin
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
This refers to Thurgood's memorandum of May 27,
and to what action the Court should take in this important
case •

. ,j

We now are deadlocked 4-4 on the centra¥' issue of
presidential immunity. Having completed his review of the
historical evidence, Thurgood no longer would accord
absolute immunity to a President. Nor would he hold that a
President is immune from a Bivens-type action.
Thurgood could "join a majority" to grant
reargument, consolidated with Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow
v. Fitz~erald. For the reasons indicated in my memorandum
of May 6, I do not think reargument would serve a useful
purpose.
With the exception of the Nixon Tapes Case, I have
taken part in no case that has received as careful and
exhaustive (and exhausting!) consideration as this one.
Between us, Byron and I have circulated, and several times
revised and recirculated, memoranda that now total nearly
100 printed pages in their latest versions. Historical
research also has been thorough, with Thurgood completing
his only recently. The careful consideration we have given
this case was against the background of lengthy opinions by
the DC and CADC, and thorough briefing by competent counsel.
I think it fair to say that the only realistic
chance of resolving the present deadlock is to have a full
Court. Bill Rehnquist's memo of May 27 reaffirms that
Mitchell's presence as a party in the Kissinger case is the
only reason he has been a "bystander". Presumably, he
therefore would be able to participate in the Fitzferald
cases, as Mitchell is not involved in either. On he other
hand, I assume - unless Bill advises us to the contrary that if we set Kissinger for reargument and also granted the
Fitzgerald cases, Bill still would be "out" - at least with

~

..•

~

..

2.

respect to any issue that might affect Mitchell. We
therefore in all probability would find ourselves again
without a full Court. Also we would have assumed the
unnecessary burden of a reargument and the parties would
bear the burden of the consequent delay.
Although no course of action is without some
negatives, I recommend that we affirm CADC by our present
4-4 vote, and at the same time grant certiorari in the two
Fitzgerald cases. As Mitchell no longer will be a party
before this Court, Bill Rehnquist could sit and thereby give
us a full Court.
An affirmance would result, I suppose, in the
Kissinger case being remanded to the District Court for
trial on the basis of CADC's opinion - the reasoning of
which has not been fully accepted either in Byron ~§
memorandum or mine. This is not a desirable situation, but
there are several possibilities. The Kissinger case may not
come to trial in the DC before we decide the Fitzgerald
cases. If the DC case is tried to judgment, we can only
speculate as to the outcome. Depending on the evidence, it
could be mooted. In any event, it seems to me that we would
be free to decide the Fitzgerald cases without regard to a
case that no longer was pending before this Court.
I have had my clerk, Paul Smith, review carefully
the Fitzgerald cases to make sure that we could reach the
merits, and that some - if not all - of the major questions
presented in Kissinger are squarely presented. As the
enclosed memorandum indicates, there is no serious
procedural question - at least none for me. The issues with
respect to the President - both absolute immunity and Bivens
- are clearly presented. With respect to Harlow and
Butterfield, we also could decide whether a Bivens suit lies
against them, and the type of immunity available. The Title
III issue is not presented, as these are not wiretapping
cases. That issue may now be less important because the new
1978 Act would control in future cases involving foreign
intelligence. In any event, in Fitzgerald we should be able
to address and decide the more fundamental questions.

ss

06/02/81

I
Memo re:

The Fitzgerald Cases:

Nos. 79-1738, and 80-945

Background
In 1968, Fitzgerald, a Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force,

testified before Congress concerning the

cost overruns accompanying manufacture of the C5A aircraft.
About a

year

later,

his employment was

terminated

in what

was described as a reorganization at the Department of the
Air Force.

He obtained reinstatement administratively, but

is seeking damages in court under the First Amendment, some
federal

statutes,

and

D.C.

common

law.

The

Air

Force

defendants were dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds,
but

the

White

Butterfield)

were

House
not.

defendants

(Nixon,

The CADC reasoned

Harlow

and

that Fitzgerald

had no reason to know of White House involvement for several
years, and the statute therefore was tolled .

..

2.

..

·~

The

allegations made

by Fitzgerald

are

based on

the argument that he was terminated in retaliation for his
~: /

'

·Y··
....

1

,,,

testimony

.t

before Congress.

He

alleges

was made in the White House itself.
'

that

this decision

41

In addition to a First

''

·. ~

Amendment claim, he asserts implied rights of action under 5

',:·.J

U.S.C. § 7211 (employees' right to petition Congress) and 18

r ,.

u.s.c.

1505

§

congressional

•

claims:

(criminalizing

the

act

of

well

as

two

common-law

infliction

of

mental

witness),

intentional

as

injuring

a

tort

dis~ess

and

intentional inteference wiht economic advantage.
Defendants'

motions

for

summary

judgment

immunity grounds were denied by Judge Gesell.
absolute

immunity on the authority of

Kissinger.
immunity

He

refused

grounds,

to

finding

grant

disputed

He rejected

the CADC opinion

judgment

on

issues of

on

in

qualified-

fact.

Petrs

brought an immediate appeal to the CADC, which dismissed the
appeal.

Petrs then sought cert in this Court.

Possible Procedural Problems
The

petitions

in

these

cases

were

timely.

The

only possible procedural problem involves the appealability
of

the

DC's

immediate

denial

appeals

on

of

summary

the

theory

judgment.
that

the

Petrs

brought

availability of

absolute immunity is a collateral issue that may be appealed
as soon as

it is decided.

They argue that the purpose of

absolute immunity would be disserved if they were forced to

.

~~

'.

<i
3.

go

through

a

trial

before

appealing.

u.s.

Helstoski v. Meanor, 442

They

point

to

500 (1979), in which the Court

held that a Congressman may bring an immediate appeal from
denial of a

motion

to dismiss

Debate Clause grounds.
Abney

v.

United

an

indictment on Speech or

The Court relied on an analogy to

States,

u.s.

431

651

(1977)

(immediate

appeals of denials of double jeopardy motions) , holding that
the

..

immunity of

the

Speech or

Debate

Clause

includes

right to avoid undergoing a trial.

the

/

Helstoski provides strong support for petitioners'
right to appeal from the denial of their motion for summary
judgment on grounds of absolute

immunity.

A Third Circuit

decision, also being held for Kissinger, supports this view.
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1208-09 (1979), cert.
pending sub nom. Mitchell v. Forsyth, No. 79-1120.
has

recently

similar

denied

situation.

a

motion

Clark v.

to

dismiss

an

United States,

The CA2

appeal

in

a

624 F.2d 3,

4

(1980).
In
concluded

that

sufficiently
render

the

absolute

dismissing

appeal

in

this

Court.

after

of
its

frivolous.
could

not have

the DC Circuit,

erroneously

appeal,

issue

settled

immunity

even

the

the

Thus,
dismissed

the
the

as

long

Court

CADC

absolute

may

have

immunity

was

decision

in

Kissinger

to

But

availability

of

the

been cons ide red
as

can

appeal.

the

Kissinger

settled,

remained

decide

that

Although

it

in

the

CADC

could

then

'

··'

.

4.

remand for a decision on the merits of the immunity defense,
there

..

would

be

no

requirement

that

it

do

so.

The

CADC

dismissed the appeal--presumably based on its view that it
presented

no

corrected

substantial

by

this

Court

issue.

in

the

This

present

view

could

be

I

no

cases.

see

reason why the Court could not reach the merits.
The

only

other

argument

against

granting

cases would be that they are at a pretrial stage,

•

there

is

absolute

little

factual

development.

immunity does not require

But

findings

these

so that

the ; claim
of

fact.

of
The

Court could assume the truth of Fitzgerald's allegations and
decide the immunity question on that basis.

Issues Presented
These
Court
Nixon

sought
has

statutes,

cases

would

to decide
been

and

sued

common

therefore raises the

In

under

Presidential
implied under
Court
U.S.

'·

the

The

basic

issues

the

plus several others.
Constitution,

First

federal

Amendment

claim

issue whether a Bivens action can be
It also presents the issue of

immunity

Nixon

immunity

from

common-law

(1959)--held

that

from

constitutional

case

involves

suits

under

federal statutes.

to discuss
564

the

law.

Presidential

addition,

the

in Kissinger,

brought against a President.
absolute

present

the

suits.

scope

of

the common law and

The last decision of this

immunity--Barr
federal

v.

officials

Matteo,

360

performing

.

.,}

..

,, .

·""' '

'·'

,t.

5.

their official duties are absolutely immune from state tort
,,

·..... t

claims.

~

,,

Harlow

~

'" ;" t
•t

•' .)'"

'

derivative

of

the

and

Butterfield

President's,

claim

and

common to one presented in Kissinger.
~· ·~

'

...

thus

absolute
this

immunity

quest ion

The issue of absolute

immunity for national security actions does not appear to be

I

~,.

presented •

I

,''

is

•.'
')

June 15, 1981
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
B0-9a~ Harlow v. Fitzgerald
I•'

Chief:
In light of our discussion of the Kissinger case
last Thursday, I will draft and send to the Justices a brief
Per Curiam that we can approve finally at next Thursday's
Conference.
Meanwhile, with your approval, I am requesting Al
Stevas to put the two Fitzgerald cases on the list for next
Thursday.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
:J:

lfp/ss
cc:

Mr. Justice Stevens
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas

.

'

'••.
''!,

''

,,

.I

),.

"

Ct-!AM BERS 0 F

I

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 16, 1981

~~~~.

~thu..~~c:
J

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald

If, as is quite likely, certiorari is granted in these
two cases, it is possible that there will be different
rulings
with
respect
to
the President and
the other
petitioners, i.e., it may be that the President will be held
to have absolute immunity but the advisors only qualified
immuity. Under their third question presented, the advisors
assert that even if they are entitled to only qualified
immunity, they should not have been sent to trial.
I write this memorandum to indicate that I remain of
the view expressed in the early circulations in Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), that qualified immunity in
cases like this should turn on objective factors, rather
than
malice
or
bad
faith,
whatever
these
latter
considerations may involve.
If when the challenged act ion
is taken, it did not contravene a settled law -- that is, it
was reasonable for the official to believe that his action
was within the law -- I would hold the official immune,
whether state or federal, absent some congressional guidance
mandating a different result . Turning immunity on objective
factors would make far better sense and would go far to
avoid needless trials and possibly inaccurate results .
Perhaps this issue is subsumed in the third questipn in
Harlow and Butterfield's pe!:ff1on out it might be advisable
to address the question .

y
M~

q

~

6/16/81

79-880 KISSINGER v. HALPERIN

PER CURIAM

The judgment with respect to petitioners,
Kissinger, Nixon and Mitchell is affirmed by an equally
divided Court.

With respect to petitioner Haldeman, the

writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case .

.

PS 06/16/81

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Paul Smith
Re:

Nos. 79-1738, 80-945 (Fitzgeral

I

do

not

see

necessary to frame a

why

Justice

White

separate question for

would

find

it

the parties in

order to reach his view of the nature of qualified immunity.
The t!;j.rd ques~n presented in No.

80-945

is whether

the

lower courts have "in routinely requii ing a trial upon the
defense

of

defense

and

Economou."

qualified
thwarted
Thus

the

immunity,
this
issue

thereby

Court's
of

the

vitiated

decision
nature

in

Butz

3 ,...-/

6J

the
v.

of

~~

qualified
~~e.~
immunity as applied to Harlow and Butterfield is presented.
With respect to the issues you wish to decide, it

is

unnecessary

to

absolute immunity.

frame

any

new question with

Question 1 in No.

respect

to

79-1738 asks whether

2.

"a

President

is

absolutely

immune

from

civil

damage

liability for actions taken, or for failures to act, while
President of the United States."
asks

whether

"petitioners

Question 2 in No. 80-945

[Harlow

and

Butterfield],

as

senior adviers to the President of the United States, should
be subject to the risk of trial and civil damages from a
person claiming injury from an adverse personnel decision of
a federal executive department."
As
pose

a

action.

you suggest,

question

regarding

The Court could

however,
the

it might be useful to

availability

as~the par~ies

of

a

Bivens

to address whether

"a right of action for damages exists against a President of
the United States and his senior advisers
violation of First Amendment rights."

for

an alleged

Perhaps you should

press this point only if Justice White already has convinced
the Conference to pose a question for him.

,,

~
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PS 07/17/81

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Paul Smith
Re:

Immunity Issues in Fitzgerald and Kissinger

In

Justice

White's

opinions

in

Kissinger,

he

criticized our proposed disposition with respect to Mitchell
and

Kissinger

on

the

ground

that

absolute

national security actions was

"absolute"

argued

depended

that

this

immunity

immunity

for

in name only.

He

on

a

subjective purpose on the part of a defendant,
little different from a qualified
premises

liability

on

a

showing

objectively unreasonable conduct.

showing

of

and thus is

immunity standard--which
of

subjective

malice

or

As you remember, Justice

Stevens had the same basic object ion to the proposed rule,
but was unable to produce an alternate proposal that would
offer

protection

for

national

security

actions

without

2.

immunizing officials like Kissinger and Mitchell across the
board, regardless of the purpose of their actions.
In

his

opinion,

Version

II,

2d

draft,

at

35,

Justice White suggests that he has argued in the past for a
purely

objective standard

standard would grant

for

qualified

immunity unless

immunity.

it can

be

Such a

said

that

conduct viola ted clearly established constitutional rights
of which an official should have been aware.
is not
Wood

This standard

the one established in Justice White's opinions in

v.

Strickland,

Economou, 438

u.s.

420

u.s.

478 (1978).

308

(1975),

and

Butz

v.

There he held that liability

can be premised either on objective unreasonableness or on
subjective bad faith.

u.s.,

In your separate opinion on Wood, 420

at 327, you also adopted a

two-part test.

You were

concerned that Justice White had gone too far in requiring
officials to be aware of "established" constitutional norms.
But you too would have allowed liability whenever there was
actual bad faith or unreasonable conduct.
The attractiveness of a purely objective test is
that it makes the immunity issue basically legal:

was the

constitutional law in this area sufficiently established to
expect

knowledge

circumstances.

on

the

part

Therefore

it

of

this

would

official

be

easier

in

these

with

an

objective standard for a defendant to win summary judgment

~

when

faced

when

a

with

a

plaintiff

frivolous
alleges

a

claim.

The

violation

.

(

same
of

is not true

constitutional

3.

rights

in

an

area

subjective

bad

of

faith.

constitutional rights
trial.

Thus,

legal
An

uncertainty,

intent

is hard

an objective

to

deprive

test

might

be

u.s.

at

508,

and

a

alleges

someone

to disprove prior

greater strictness of the part of courts
against officials.

but

of

to a full

way

to

allow

faced with suits

As you know, both the Butz opinion, 438
Judge

Gesell's

concurrence

in Kissinger

expressed the hope that courts can dismiss most such cases
at an early stage.
As a result,

if the Court ultimately decides not

to grant absolute immunity to the President in Fitzgerald,
at

the

very

least

you

might

seek

to

apply

an

objective

standard allowing the President to gain dismissal of cases
involving

areas

of

constitutional

uncertainty.

The

only

problem with such an approach in Fitzgerald is the potential
conflict
above.

with

our

reasoning

in

Kissinger,

as

discussed

As I said, we sought to apply a subjective test in

Kissinger

in deciding whether the aides possessed absolute

immunity.

Fitzgerald will

not

require you to repeat this

argument, since the actions plainly do not involve national
security.
might

But an emphasis on objective tests in

make

it difficult

future.

If,

on

immunity

for

the

the

to make

other

President

such

hand,
in

you

an

Fitzgeral~

argument
can

Fitzgerald,

in

the

win

absolute

while

applying

normal qualified immunity principles to the aides, the case

•.

4.

will

not

prevent

a

future

decision

authorizing

absolute

immunity for aides acting to protect national security.
I'm afraid this
this point.
view

will

briefed

Perhaps the infusion of a new clerk's point of
help

Dick,

and

useful next Term.

l·:

is all the wisdom I can offer at

with

these

tried

to

intractable
arrange

the

problems.
file

to

I've

make

it

August 24, 1981

Subject:

Fitzgerald Cases

Dear Chief,
As you will remember, th~se two cases present most
of the immunity issues that were before us in Rissinger.
When we granted them in ~une, I believe we planned
on having them set in October so that there would be a chance
to decide them before the Kissinger case is tried by the
District Court.
To avoid another 4/4 spl~t, it is essential that
we have a full Court. I understand that Judge O'Connor's
confirmation hearing commences about September 9. If she is
confirmed promptly, as I would expect, she should be ready
to participate in the October cases.
However, in view of the ~omplexity of the issues
(the memos that Byron and I circulated totalled almost 100
pages ! ), it may be desirable to defer the Fitzgerald cases
until November. This would assure that Judge O'Connor has
an opportunity to prepare herself.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. c. 20543

LFP/dj b

rhf 11/25/81

BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Dick Fallon

DATE:

November 25, 1981

RE:

Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945, Nixon v. Fitzgerald and Harlow

v. Fitzgerald

Question Presented
The main question
President's
from

his

in

this case

involves

the

scope of a

immunity from a private suit for damages arising

actions

as

President

of

the

United

immunity of presidential aides is also in issue.

States.

The

In addition,

2.

there

are

jurisdictional

"contingent

settlement"

questions.

negotiated

by

One
Nixon

concerns
and

the

Fitzgerald.

Another involves the claim that this suit for damages is barred
by

congressional

provision

of

an

exclusive

administrative

remedy.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Facts

The events underlying this suit occurred during the waning
days

of

the

respondent

administration

Ernest

of

Fitzgerald

Lyndon

was

at

B.

Johnson.

that

time

a

The
Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Management Systems of the Department of
the Air Force.
Senator

William

Government
disclosed

Late

of
a

in 1968 Fitzgerald met with members of

Proxmire' s
the

Joint

pattern

transport aircraft.

of

Subcommittee
Economic

cost

for

Economy

Committee.

over-runs

in

Fitzgerald

involving

the

C-SA

On November 13, 1968 he testified publicly

that cost overruns on the plane could approximate $2 billion.
At this juncture the facts become subject to dispute.

For

purposes of this Court's analysis, however, all of Fitzgerald's
allegations should be taken as true.
Fitzgerald

claims

that

his

testimony

caused

a

deterioration in his relationship with officials of the Johnson
Administration.

Shortly

after

his

testimony

Fitzgerald

received notice that his career civil service status--given to
him

only

shortly

testimony--was

being

before

the

revoked.

date

of

his

congressional

(The Civil Service Commission

3.

found that the revocation
fide

administrative

error.

characterizes

it as

In

Fitzgerald

addition,

constitu~ed

retaliation

the correction of a bona

JA

74a,

for

his

alleges

that

82a.

Fitzgerald

truthful

testimony.)

Johnson's

Air

Force

Secretary, Harold Brown, advised his successor, Robert Seamans,
that

Fitzgerald

could

not

be

trusted

and

should

not

be

retained.
According

to Fitzgerald,

Secretary Seamans

had

scarcely

assumed office before he began to consider schemes to discharge
Fitzgerald pursuant to an "office reorganization."

With this

in mind Seamans consulted White House aide Bryce Harlow in May
and November 1969.

White House aide Alexander Butterfield also

wrote a memorandum

in May 1969,

in which he reported to his

White House superior John Ehrlichman that Fitzgerald was "about
to blow the whistle on the Navy."

JA 274a.

Butterfield said

that he understood the matter to have been reported to the FBI.
He

apprised

Ehrlichman

in

case

other

action

of

White

House

might

be

appropriate.
Allegedly

as

a

result

hostility,

Fitzgerald's job was abolished as part of a reorganization that
took effect on January 5, 1970.

Secretary Seamans signed the

reorganization order on November 3, 1969, and the decision was
announced the following day.
Fitzgerald's firing attracted considerable publicity.
order

to

advise

the

President

how

to

respond,

at

In

least one

member of the White House staff, Clark Mollenhoff, telephoned
Secretary

Seamans

to

determine

the

basis

for

Fitzgerald's

7

4.
discharge.
House

In addition, Secretary Seamans consulted with White

aide

Bryce

Harlow

on

November

Fitzgerald's firing was announced.
a

summary of developments

in the

4,

the

day

that

White House staff included
11

br ief ing book 11 prepared

in

anticipation of a presidential press conference scheduled for
December 8, 1969. In the book, staffer Patrick Buchanan urged
the President to adopt Mollenhoff's recommendation and retain
Fitzgerald.

JA 267a.

When queried at the press conference,

however, President Nixon stated only that he would look
the matter.

into

(According to a subsequently released White House
all for canning 11

tape, the President recalled that Harlow was

11

Fitzgerald.

recollection

JA

282a.

Ronald

Ziegler's

different, and he so advised the President.

was

Id.}

White House interest in the Fitzgerald case continued at
least

through

prepare

a

January

memorandum

Butterfield

reported

1970.
for

Butterfield

the

privately

was

delegated

press

office.

In

to

Haldeman,

to

to

addition,
whom

he

recommended that Fitzgerald should not be reemployed.
Following

his

firing,

Fitzgerald

initiated

an

administrative proceeding before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC} seeking reinstatement and backpay.
January 20, 1970.

After

three

yea~s

He filed his claim on

.of litigation,

finally came up for public hearing i~ January 1973.
30,

1973,

Secretary

received any
Fitzgerald
questions

Seamans

instruction"

matter.
about

his

But

from

testified

that

he

the case

On January
had

"never

the White House regarding

Seamans

refused

communications

with

to
the

answer
White

the

further
House.

5.

Seamans repeatedly invoked Executive Privilege.
As

a

result

of

the

publicity

attending

the

Fitzgerald

hearings, President Nixon was again asked about the matter at a
press conference of January 31, 1973.
occasion

took

full

responsibility

Fitzgerald's federal employment:

The President on this

for

the

termination

of

"I was totally aware that Mr.

Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign.

I

Seamans must have been talking to someone
had discussed the matter with me.

No, this was not a case

of some person down the line deciding he should go.

It was a

decision

it."

that was

submitted

to me,

and

I

stick by

JA

185a.
,

The

~~ retraction

/ ~r'

~

~

v

following
of

day,

the

however,

President's

the

White

statement.

Huse

issued

According

to

a
the

White House press office, the President had confused Fitzgerald
with another civilian employee of the Defense Department.
reported

by press

indicated

to me

secretary Ronald

after

reading

Ziegler,

"[The President]

transcript

the

As

of

yesterday's

press conference that he was mistaken in his reference to Mr.
Fitzgerald
President

and
did

conference,

not,

have

Fitzgerald."
The

that

the
as

put

fact

of

the

indicated

before

yesterday

h~ he

Civil

position

of

decision

is
in

that
the

the

press

regarding

Mr.

JA 196a.
Service

Commission

issued

Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973.
evidence

matter

record

was

does

abolished

not

The

its

esc

ruling

on

the

found that "the

support the allegation that his
in

retaliation

for

his

6.
[Congressional]

testimony. II

But the esc also ruled

JA 8la.

'

that the abolttion of Fitzgerald's job "resulted from reasons
purely personal
the

governing

force

should

to"

him.

statute,
be

which

implemented

holding

the

affected

ordered

Fitzgerald

equivalent

JA 86a-87a.

established
without

positions.

reinstated,

Id.
either

-

position,

It therefore violated

with

that

regard

to

On this
to

backpay.

his
JA

reductions

in

the

persons

basis

the CSC

old

job or

87a-88a.

an
The

administrative award included no provision for interest or for
punitive damages.
In January 1974 Fitzgerald ir:sti tuted tbe present action
in the U.S.

District Court for

the District of Columbia.

He

sought $3.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages from
eight

Air

Force

and

Defense

Department

officials

and

from

Alexander Butterfield.

The district court dismissed the suit

based

of

on

the

limitations.

district

384 F. Supp.

Columbia's
688

(1974).

three-year

statute

of

The Court of Appeals

affirmed the dismissal as to all defendants except Butterfield.
Finding that Fitzgerald had no reason to know of Butterfield's
involvement until 1973,
him to go forward.
Following
filed

a

the

the court permitted the suit against

553 F.2d 220 (1977).
remand

to

the

second amended complaint.

District

Court,

Fitzgerald

It was only at this late

date in the litigation that the petitioners Nixon and Harlow

-------------~--------~--------------------------were
added as defendants. The complaint alleged generally that
they, together with unnamed others, had conspired to retaliate
for Butterfield's testimony on the C-5A transport plane.

...

The

as~

complaint

{p

~

based

on

criminal

u.s.c.

Columbia.

the

First

statute

testimony

statutes,

given

these,

Of

Amendment;

proscribing
to

and

a

the

one

common

thr'ee

only
on

law

against

committee;

§

the

of
One

is

1505,

a

remain.

u.s.c.

18

retaliation

congressional

the

arising under

of actio@

eight causes

constitution~ ederal
District of

7.

anyone

and

one

for
on

5

7211, which provides that the right of employees to

§

furnish information to Congress "may not be interfered with or
denied."
Upon

Richard

Nixon's

being

named

as

a

defendant,

the

Justice Department moved on his behalf to dismiss the complaint
on the ground
civil

that he was entitled to absolute immunity from

liability

for

the

actions

Judge

alleged.

Gesell

initially denied the motion based on the state of the record.

discoveryq~ in

After extensive

~------------

The

Court

of

Appeals

had

by

denied a motion to dismiss.

then

rendered

its

decision

in

Halperin v. Kissinger, which found that the President did not
enjoy

absolute

immunity

from

suits

for

civil

damages.

The

various defendants in the action sought to appeal the denial of
their

immunity claims to the Court of Appeals.

They claimed

the right to do so pursuant to the collateral order doctrice.
But

the

court

of

appeals

summarily

dismissed

the

appeal,

apparently on the basis of Halperin v. Kissinger.
A petition to this Court ensued.
before

it

"contin~nt
~

absolutely

was

granted,

settlement."
to

pay

Nixon
On

and
May

Fitzgerald

After it was filed, but
Fitzgerald
18,

the

1981,
sum

agreed
Nixon
of

to

a

agreed

$142,000.

8.
Contingently, Ni~agr ~__t_:>_P ~~~~ oo if _!wo
conditions were satisfied:

(a)

pending petition for cert and

7

if this court should grant the
(b)

if it should give a decision

that would result in the District Court's dismissal of the case
against Nixon
other

"without additional adjudication of

than upon the record as

it

the

presently stands."

facts,
On June

??
;

10, 1980, the parties filed a "Joint Statement" in this Court.
The Statement asserted that "The parties have agreed at this
stage to fix the amount of payments to which respondent would
be entitled in this case,
upon

this

Court's

subsequent

but the amount of payments depends

disposition

proceedings

in

of

the

instant

the District Court.

petition

and

Therefore

the

case has not been settled and is not moot."
The Court granted the petition on June 22, 1981.

Shortly

thereafter Morton Halperin filed papers seeking to intervene.
Calling

attention

to

the contingent settlement agreement,

he

alleged that the parties could not be trusted to contest the
issues

with

all

appropriate

vigor.

This

Court

denied

the

motion.

II.
are

three

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
possible

jurisdictional

of this case on the merits:

controversy

between

them

or

(a)

barriers

to

a

the possibility that

and Fitzgerald has

"mooted"

the

otherwise

them

the

deprived

of

"concrete adversity" needed for them to invoke the jurisdiction
of

this

Court;

(b)

the

claim

of

petitioners

Harlow

and

.

9.

Butterfield

that

Fitzgerald's

__________

the'--, esc were

intended

administrative

by Congress

to

be

remedies

exclusive

before

and

thus

deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear this suit;
and

(c)

the

argument

that

the

district

court's

denial

of

absolute immunity is not an appealable "final order."
Although I do not regard any as a likely bar to reaching
merits, each deserves discussion.
A.

The Settlement Agreement: Mootness Question

As a result of the settlement agreement between Nixon and
Fitzgerald,

there will never be a trial on the merits in the

District Court.
Fitzgerald,

If

he

has

this Court gives a decision
agreed--in

return

for

in favor of

consideration

$28,000--to move in the District Court for dismissal.
Court gives a

decision

of

If this

in favor of Nixon on the question of

"absolute immunity," then again there will be no trial.

On

one

view

of

Article

this

III,

Court's

only

justification for deciding constitutional issues is to permit
the

adjudication

of

district courts •
can

be

argued

actual

cases

and

controversies

in

the

As a result of the settlement agreement, it

that

this

because

the parties have

proceed

to

judgment

in

case

has

indicated
the

ceased
that

district

to

be

justiciable,

they do not wish to

court--only

to

get

an

answer to the "absolute immunity" question, on which they have

a "bet."
I

find

/
the

"settlement agreement"

troubling,

-------

because

it

gives the appearance that the parties--who have settled their
main

financial

dispute--may

nonetheless

"buy"

a

9

-:) ~

decision of

10.
this

Nonetheless,

Court.

jurisdictional

doctrine

it

is

under

difficult

which

to

identify

a

would

be

dismissal

required.
Mootness.

The case is not moot.

Both parties retain a

financial stake in the outcome; and their interests continue to
be adverse.

It does not matter, I think, that there will be no

trial in the district court.

There would similarly be no trial

in cases in which a purely legal issue was presented to this
Court

in

turning

a

suit

for

solely on

a

declaratory

judgment--e.g.,

the constitutionality of

under

which a

crimina! prosecution was

Court

upholds

the

without further
will

still be

"bet"

statute,

trial.

the

a

a

state

statute,
If

threatened.

declaratory

case

judgment

this

issues

If the Court voids the statute, there

no further

In addition,

trial.

the so-called

in this case has not entirely replaced an interest in

judicial resolution.
return

to

the

It is obvious that both parties plan to

district

court

for

the

entry

of

a

judgment,

regardless of this Court's decision.
One way to assess the mootness argument is to compare this
case
[

to

one

in

which

the

parties

against an adverse

judgment.

between

Fitzgerald,

Nixon

and

insurance

in a private market.

$142,000,

in return for

judgment against him,

which

have

bought

"insurance"

Assume there were no agreement
but

that

both

sought

to

buy

Nixon pays a private insurer
the

insurer

agrees to pay any

less $28,000--i.e., Nixon would pay no

more money if he won in this Court, and could pay no more than
$28,000 if he lost.

This is exactly where he stands under the

11.
present contract.

It is also possible to imagine Fitzgerald,

through a private "insurance" of his financial interest in the
outcome of the suit, getting into the same position in which he
now stands.
of

an

A contract of this kind--which resembles the sale

interest

in

litigation--might offend

some circumstances.
way

to

analyze

public policy

But I would not think always.

a

plaintiff's

agreement

to

pay

in

This is one
a

lawyer

a

"contingent fee."
Finally, I am told that private litigants not infrequently
make

"contingent

negotiated here.

settlement"

agreements

similar

In private litigation, I am told

to

that

(by another

clerk), the parties sometimes agree to settle, with the amount
of

liability

to depend

on

the

district

court's

ruling

on a

particular pretrial motion--a discovery motion for example.
is

easy

to

imagine

cases

in which

the

scope

of

permissible

discovery would determine the settlement value of a claim.
it

is

hard

to

imagine

a

public

policy

It

against

And

promoting

settlements in such cases.

~
I
~ ~_.vi~_Jther

am

the

~ 'v~~itigation.

~

at

a

use

loss,
of

however,

to

"contingent

know

how

to

settlements"

investigate
private

in

If I discover anything, I shall inform you.

Feigned and Collusive Cases
This Court has consistently refused to hear cases in which
the parties, although formally independent, are cooperating to
achieve

the

same

result,

e.g.,

Lord

v.

Veazie,

49

u.s.

251

(1850) (sale and suit on contract arranged in order to procure
judgment on navigation rights on public river), and where the

12.

interests
adverse
Amador

of

in

the

parties,

fact,

e.g.,

though

formally

adverse,

are

not

South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co.

Medean Gold Mining Co.,

145 U.S.

300

(1892)

v.

(pending

appeal, ownership of both plaintiff and defendant corporations
came into hands of same persons) .
It is easy to distinguish the current case from cases of
this kind.

Nixon and Fitzgerald have adverse legal interests

cognizable

in

a

federal

resolution of the

court--i.e.,

their

interests

in

a

immunity question, which may be crucial to

the ----------~--------------------outcome of a suit for damages.

Their interests are adverse

------------------~

in fact:

each stands to gain or lose financially, depending on

how this Court decides
Fitzgerald

have

the case.

structured

their

most adverse parties do not.
defeat justiciability.

It is true that Nixon and
relationship

in a

way

that

But this alone would not seem to

The Court has permitted parties to go

so far as purposely to create an adversary relationship solely
in order frame a "test case."
202

(1958)

E.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S.

(although the negro plaintiff had ridden bus only

once, and did so in order

to provoke an order to sit in the

back, the controversy that resulted was still "real").

Here,

there

in

is

no

doubt

that

Nixon

concretely adverse relationship.
create

such

a

relationship

in

and

Fitzgerald

began

a

If parties can deliberately
order

to

frame

a

justiciable

controversy--and Evers v. Dwyer holds that they can--then, by
the same logic,

the par ties here should be able to structure

their relationship so that it would continue to be adverse.
Nonadversity With Regard to Granting of Cert

13.

For

a

while

it

seemed

following

the

conclusion

agreement,

Fitzgerald

no

to

me

of

to

troublesome
'

their

longer

be

contingent

held

an

that,

settlement

interest adverse

to

Nixon's interest--asserted in his cert petition--in having this
Court take the case on certiorari.

Fitzgerald, though formally

opposing a grant of cert, could collect an additional $28,000
only

if

this

favorably
this

Court

both

to him.

It

granted

is disturbing

Nonetheless,

candidly.

cert

his

and

decided

the

issue

that he did not confess
posture

ultimately to defeat justiciability.

would

not

seem

The rules of this Court

do not require a party to oppose a petition for cert.

And it

is easy to imagine cases--e.g., cases involving a split among
the Circuits--in which

both parties would

Court to resolve the split.

be eager

for

this

Thus, from Fitzgerald's side, lack

of adversity would not seem to be troublesome.
Nixon's
into

a

stake

in the cert petition is

traditional legal category.

less easy to fit

Following his

settlement

agreement with Fitzgerald, in a financial sense Nixon no longer
stood

to gain anything

circumstances
anything.

would

if the Court took the

Fitzgerald

be

case~

required

to

under

pay

no

Nixon

On the other hand, a grant of cert put Nixon in a

position where

he could

lose up to $28,000.

Yet he was the

petitioner.
After he entered the settlement agreement, I do not think
that

Nixon

had

a

legally

cognizable

needed to support "standing"
Court

grant

certiorari.

interest,

to bring a suit,
His

financial

of

the

kind

in having this

interest

lay

in

14.
dismissal.

Any other interest was "abstract" in the sense of

being unrelated to his conflict with Fitzgerald.
sure that this matters.

But I am not

At every stage of judicial decision--

from decision in the district court through decision by this
Court--there would be concrete adversity between the parties.
It is adversity at these stages that is needed to frame issues
in a proper light for judicial resolution.
Integrity of the Judicial Process
As

the

reconcile

commentators

all

of

this

have

often

Court's

noted,

it

is

justiciability

hard

to

decisions.

Curiously, the decisions most difficult to fathom are several
of those in which the Court has denied justiciability.
seeming

anomalies,

mention.

They

are

two

seem

Muskrat

to
v.'

me

to

United

(1911) and United States v. Johnson, 319
£uskrat

involved .· ~

require

some

States,

u.s.

Of the
passing

u.s.

219

346

302 (1943).

dispute over entitlement to share in

money and lands due to the Cherokee Nation.

By a legislative

act of 1906, Congress expanded the class of those entitled to
claim as Cherokees.
conferred

federal

By legislative act of 1907, Congress then
jurisdiction

Cherokees disadvantaged

by

to

hear

the 1906 act,

a

suit

by which

by

those

they were

required to divide their settlement into more, smaller shares.
Muskrat

sued

under

the

1907

United States as defendant,

jurisdictional act.
he argued

that

Naming

the

the 1906 act was

unconstitutional because it deprived him of a property interest
without

just

Article

III

compensation.
jurisdiction,

This
on

the

Court
ground

held
that

there

was

Congress

no
had

15.

effectively asked the Court to render an advisory opinion.
In

the

other

dismissed

a

adverse.

Though

case,

suit

in
the

United States v.

which

the

plaintiff

Johnson,

plaintiff
did

have

was

an

the Court

not

in

fact

actionable

claim

that the rent he was forced to pay rent in excess of the limit
imposed by a federal rent control statute, the plaintiff was in
fact paid to bring the suit by the defendant in the action, who
wanted

to

statute.
because

litigate

the

constitutionality

of

the

federal

The Court explained that "Such a suit is collusive
it

is not

in any real sense adversary.

It does not

assume the 'honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights'
to be
the

adjudicated--a safeguard essential to the

judicial

process,

and

one

which

have

to

be

constitutional questions

by

indispensable

to

this Court."

This was held to be so even though

States

had

adjudication of

we

integrity of

intervened

constitutionality
government

of

and
the

in the case,

stood

prepared

challenged

held

the United

to

defend

the

statute.

With

the

adversar iness was patent.

Nor could

there be any question of the adequacy of the representation.
It is easy to cite cases in conflict with both Muskrat and

)

United States v. Johnson.

And neither of course bears directly

on

can be

this

case.

-----

But

both

best explained,

I

think,

by

reference to this Court's concern to maintain the integrity
of
,;
judicial

form.

Both cases

involved

justiciable "issues,"

("'"

they had been framed by parties to a "real" lawsuit.

if

And there

was adversary representation in both.

But litigants in both--

the

the

United

States

in

Muskrat

and

collusive

private

16.
plaintiffs
decide

in

Johnson--had

questions

merely

conspicuously

because

they

asked

wanted

the
them

Court

answered.

Though an appropriately adversary posture was developed,
adversity bore

insufficient resemblance

to

that

to the kind of real-

world adversity that courts exist to resolve.

It smacked of

manipulation.
It is hard to extract a legal principle.

But I think the

Court should be bothered about what Nixon and Fitzgerald have
done,

for

essentially the same reasons that I

think troubled

the Court in Muskrat and in United States v. Johnson.

If it

decides to reach the merits--as I have no doubt that it can--!
think that there may still be an unfortunate devaluation of the
integrity of judicial form.
B.

If so, this cost should be faced.

Allegedly Exclusive Administrative Remedies

The petitioners Harlow and Butterfield invite this Court
to avoid the immunity question by ruling that Fitzgerald has no
federal cause of action.
clear that this issue need not bar
from

r/

v/

the

immunity question.

Indeed,

the

"cause of action" question itself need not be reached, as it
was not among those raised - in the / cert petition. This case is

'
"
I
v-YV""
I'

~

J

~
~

/)!-

-

under

th~ t!

-----

the "collateral order" doctrine for

a decision of

.!!s!!.. The "cause of action" question can still
be raised following a final judgment.

~ pAY~

-~

reaching

Nor does Fitzgerald's pursuit of administrative remedies-r :::::::::;n:a:n:imb::::a:e:: ::g t::r ec

j);v

~:~~1:::v~:: i::::i::~:::~

17.

Where

an

agency

possesses

"primary

jurisdiction"

over

the

subject matter of a dispute, a plaintiff must ordinarily take
his

grievance

enforced
agency

this

can

there

in

rule

even

give

only

the

first

instance.

The

cases

where

administrative

in

partial

relief.

Conference v. United States, 342
judicial

forum

is

u.s.

subsequently

the

See,

e.g. ,

570 {1952).

barred

only

u.s.

Far

has

East

Resort to a

when

intended an alternative remedy to be exclusive.
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447

Court

Congress

See New York

54, 66 {1980).

In this context it seems clear that Congress intended to
impose no special limits on remedies that would otherwise be

-----

{This~--------------------------------------is not, of course, to say that Congress

'
available.

---------

affirmatively intended that judicial relief would be available.
See infra.)
service.
of his

Fitzgerald was a member of the unclassified civil

He was able to challenge his dismissal only because
veterans'

status:

Congress has provided veterans with

this special benefit.

Thus, if Fitzgerald were not a veteran,

he

administrative

would

have

had

no

question

thus

becomes:

Did

Congress,

relief
in

whatsoever.

giving

special right to administrative relief before the

The

veterans

esc'

a

intend

to preempt a cause of action for damages that would otherwise
exist

under

federal

doing

extensive

statutes

research

question answers itself.

in

or
the

the

Constitution?

legislative

Without

history,

the

Congress intended to favor veterans,

not to deprive them of a benefit that they would otherwise have
enjoyed.
But

would

Fitzgerald,

otherwise,

have

had

a

cause

of

18.
action for damages?

Although it need not be reached, I point
'

to this questibn now, for the following reason.

In last year's

draft opinions in Halperin v. Kissinger, your "second version"
would have held that Halperin had no Bivens claim against the
President,

due

to

the

"special

factors"

President's constitutional status.

attaching

to

the

In this case, by contrast,

Fitzgerald claims three causes of action: two "implied" rights
._____

.,_

under

federal

statutes as well as a Bivens action under

~

l

""/'?

the

1

immunity

:::::stw :h :
0 1

issue

on

Bivens

grounds:

P:::~:en:~isein u:;::s

c:::·

no

cause

of

action

:::re:era~s:hehe::u:~::

Fitzgerald had no cause of act ion under either of the federal

~~ s~atutes.

~~~uld

~~

the

It is in many ways attractive to deal with

First Amendment.

~~ ,~

--

It seems to me entirely plausible to argue that he

not.

In light of the decision in the recent implication

case involving the CFTC, however, i t seems doubtful that this

~--~~ would be a winning argument.

;v<P ~
~

I shall return to this issue in the discussion •on the

~ merits."

?:t

.,~~

• ~--

c.

(~)

Appealable Collateral Order

Although a question is raised,

I

think the objection is

Immunity "was designed to protect

[officials] not

frivolous.
only from the consequences of litigation's results, but also

~~ :::m 0~:~ :::~e: 0:f ~:~:~~in;u::;~se~~=:~~w::~s:~s::s:~a::~n:::
t-v: (J;.P'' u.s.

~v

82,

immunity

85

(1967).

serves,

In order

this

Court

to protect the

interests that

has

twice

at

least

'

.

allowed

19.

interlocutory

appeals

of

immunity

"collateral order" doctrine.
of

defenses

under

the

Helstoski, supra {denial of claim

immunity under Speech and Debate Clause) ; Abney v.

States,

u.s.

431

651

{1977) {denial of

double jeopardy clause).
this

case,

all

Cohen

United

immunity claimed under

Before the D.C. Circuit's decision in

courts of

appeals

to consider

the

issue

had

agreed: denials of claims of executive immunity are similarly
appealable.

Although the Court of Appeals did not explain its

summary denial in this case, it seems most reasonable to think
that there was no colorably appealable issue under the law of
the Circuit,

established

by Kissinger

v.

Halper in,

606

F. 2d

1192 {CADC 1979).
III.

MERITS: CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

I do not think that the parties add much to the arguments
exhaustively
understand

rehearsed

in

cases,

there

the

probably more

~ White
tflA-- ~ ~'

~·

~

~~

~~

than

relevant

to

there

those
is

no

to

Kissinger
are

two

v.
main

Halperin.

As

differences,

I

both

the arguments developed by Justice

presented
federal

in

your

statute,

circulated
involved

drafts.

here,

that

directly creates a cause of action arguably enforceable against
the Pres1'dent.

~~-/'~~implication

Fitzgerald's cause of action, if any, arises by

from

one

~~· Constitution itself.

of

two

narrower

statutes

or

from

the

Your "absolute immunity" position permits

11; r1_ ~ /~

y. onufertroedbyupnadsesr the question whether a cause of action can be

~--

1

either of

those statutes.

The cert petitions

presented no "cause of action" question; this Court can decide
the immunity question without reaching it.

20.

I

~Jb

~
fJv fJ.;

am

uncertain,

might take.
order

however,

approach

There seem to be two lines open

to "deconstitutionalize"

~ argue

what

Justice

White

t~ him.~,

in

the issue, Justice White might

(a) that a cause of action can be inferred under one or

both of

those

statutes;

(b)

that

the

relief available

is so

thorough as to make a decision on the Bivens claim unnecessary;
and

(c)

that

no

"judge-made"

~

statutes.

he

immunity
could

is

take

needed
just

under

the

the

opposite

approach: He could argue that Fitzgerald simply lacks a cause

-

'

-

of action an~ that no immunity issue is therefore presented.
Accordingly--if my analysis is correct--you might find it
necessary,

in

immunity as a
cause

of

order

to

show

constitutional

action,

to

argue

inferred under the statutes.

that

Justice

issue under
that

no

White

must

treat

the First Amendment

cause

of

action

can

be

(You need not do so to reach the

immunity issue as presented by the parties--only if you think
it expedient to attack the "diversionary" approach adopted last
year

by Justice White.)

approach,

you

might

Again, depending on Justice White's

not.

Unfortunately,

the

parties devote

little space or energy to analysis of the statutory basis for
Fitzgerald's claimed cause of action.
As

the

briefs

are

not

very

helpful,

I

summarize

their

arguments only briefly.
A.

Arguments of the Petitioners

1. Arguments of the Petitioner Nixon
In

essence

Nixon

advances

three

arguments.

First,

he

argues that the President has historically been recognized as

?2

21.

(The purpose of this argument is

immune from civil liability.

to respond to the guidelines of Butz v. Economou, 438
508

(1978):

inquiry

"In each case we have undertaken

into the

u.s.

478,

'a considered

immunity historically afforded the relevant

official at common law and the interests behind it.'")

As

evidence he cites historical practice: For nearly 200 years,
suits against the President were "exceedingly rare."
The

22.

Federalist

Papers

and

the

debates

Brief at
at

the

Constitutional Convention suggest that impeachment was intended
as an exclusive remedy.

Justice Story,

in his Commentaries,

spoke explicitly of the President's "official inviolability."
Second, a recognition of absolute Presidential Immunity is
"essential
President

for
is

the
an

conduct

obvious

of

the

target

citizens and public employees.

public

for

suits

business."
by

The

dissatisfied

The costs of such lawsuits--in

time as well as money--would place an unacceptable drain on the
presidential

office.

Discovery

is

especially

burdensome.

Against these costs must be weighed the largely inconsequential
benefits of
Damages

allowing

liability

the President

adds

little

to

impeachment and criminal liability.

to
the

be sued
deterrent

for damages.
effects

of

An array of administrative

and judicial remedies exists under Civil Service statutes and
the

Federal

Tort

Claims

Act.

These

compensation to victims of unlawful action.
must

"

,\

be

~~ ti nadequate

'- ~

0

recognized

that

to its purpose.

qualified

provide

adequate

In this regard, it

immunity

has

proved

It constructs no effective barrier

frivolous pleadings, and it permits ruinous discovery.

22.

Third,

absolute

integrity of
discovery

immunity

is

necessary

the executive branch.
the

threatens

communications.

As

Court

has

"realistically

threaten

to

officials of a coordinate branch.
U.S. 606, 617
477,

491

the

presidential

of

recognized

implicating the Speech or Debate Clause,
would

protect

The possibility of civil

confidentiality

this

to

in

cases

"judicial oversight"

control"

the

conduct

of

Gravel v. United States, 408

(1972); see United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S.

(1979)

(purpose

of

privilege

is

to

"preserve

the

constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent
branches of government) .
2.

Defendants Harlow and Butterfield

These defendants offer the argument that Fitzgerald has no
cause of action, and that the Court should decide the case on
this basis.

Fitzgerald seeks to imply a cause of action under

two federal statutes and the Constitution.
(a) The First Federal Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7211.
a section of the
right

of

furnish

~~ which provides that "The

employees,
information

committee

of

denied."

It

This is

Member

individually
to

either

thereof,

expressly

or

House
may

provides

collectively,
of

not
no

Congress,

be

interfered

right

of

to
or

to

with

action.

a
or

The

petitioners advance a variety of reasons why there can be no
implied

action

established

in

under
Davis

this
v.

provision.

Passman,

442

First,
u.S.

279

this
(1979) ,

court
that

statutory causes of action would be implied less readily than
rights to sue under the Constitution.

Second, under a statute,

23.

the dominant question concerns congressional intent.
Industries v.

Radcliffe Materials,

451 U.S.

See Texas

__ ,__

{1981).

Here, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress
did

intend to create a

provision

of

a

right of action.

panoply

of

alternative

Finally, Congress's
remedies,

available

through the Civil Service Commission, suggests that it did not
intend a judicial remedy.
Inc. v. Lewis, 444

u.s.

See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,

11, 19-21 {1979).

{b) The Second Federal Statute, 18
a

criminal statute,

with

witnesses

agencies.

u.s.c.

which provides penal ties

before

This Court

1505.

§

for

congressional committees
has

been reluctant

action from criminal statutes.

to

This is

interfering

and

goverment

imply rights of

Here, Fitzgerald is not even a

member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted.

Section 1505 was designed to protect the legislative

process, not to benefit witnesses.
Refining Co.,
{1953)

Cf. Odell v. Humbel Oil &

201 F.2d 123 {CA 10), cert denied, 345 U.S. 941

{plaintiffs

caused by grand

suing

for

employment

discharge

jury testimony not entitled

allegedly

to any right of

action under a related statute, § 1503, because it was enacted
for

"protection of the public" rather than for the benefit of

plaintiffs).
{c)

Bivens

Action

Under

the

First

Amendment.

As

this

Court recently reaffirmed in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18
{1980), a Bivens action "may be defeated in a particular case
when

defendants

demonstrate

'special

factors

counselling

hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.'"

...•

...

24.

In this case at least three such
First,

there

President
Second,
Lucas,
F.2d

is

of

as

the

the

the

special

United

64 7 F. 2d S 7 3,
9S8

(CAS

S76

1979),

status

States

Fifth Circuit

~pecial

factors are present.

of

and

the

his

recently

defendants:

personal

recognized

the

advisers.
in Bush v.

(CAS 1981) , affirming on remand S98

the

"unique

relationship

between

the

Federal Government and its civil service employees is a special
consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens
remedy," because the federal government should be accorded the
"widest latitude" in administering its internal affairs.

This

Court has recognized repeatedly that the role of the Government
as an employer toward its employees is fundamentally different
from
E.g.,

its

role

Sampson

Kennedy,

as
v.

sovereign over
Murray,

41S

u.s.

416

concurring) ("Government,

private

u.s.
134,

as

an

61,

citizens generally.

83

(1974)

/Arnett

~

(Powell,

168
employer,

must

v.
J.,

have

wide

discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs").
remedial

scheme

Third, the availability of an alternative

constitutes

a

special

factor

counselling

hesitation.
On the merits of the immunity question, petitioners argue
that

the

public

immunity for

interest

requires

recognition

the President's closest aides.

of

absolute

"Again and again

the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be
founded on a mistake in the face of which an official may later
find

himself hard put to satisfy a

jury of his good

faith."

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d S79, S81 (CA 2 1949), cert denied,

25.

339

u.s.

949

(1950).

This insight is confirmed by experience,

which has shown that qualified immunity is inadequate to serve
its

protective

Suits

purposes.

against

presidential

aides

result in discovery of documents requiring confidentiality.
If

this

immunity

Court

is

unwilling

of presidential

application of

the

aides,

to

recognize

the

absolute

it should at least adopt an

immunity doctrine that better conduces to

summary disposition of

frivolous

suits.

One possibility was

ably stated in Judge Gesell's concurring opinion in Halperin v.
Kissinger,
required

supra,

606 F. 2d at 1215:

"[A]

plaintiff should be

to make a stronger showing on the

immunity question

before being permitted to proceed to trial.

I would hold that

the plaintiff must establish after the completion of discovery
and

before

trial

commences,

not

merely

the

existence

of

a

genuine dispute as to some material issue of fact but also, by
the

preponderance

convincing

of

evidence,

the
that

evidence
the

or

official

through
failed

clear

to

act

and
with

subjective or objective good faith."
Finally,

petitioners argue

that their actions concerning

Fitzgerald all occurred "within the outer perimeters of their
line

of

duty."

Accordingly,

they

Barr
are

v.

Matteo,

entitled

360
to

u.s.

claim

564,
the

575

full

(1959).
immunity

attaching to their offices.
C.

Arguments of the Respondent Fitzgerald

Fitzgerald argues that there is neither a constitutional
nor

a

judicial basis adequate

to

support

absolute

immunity.

The Constitution provides Congress with the Speech or Debate

26.
Clause, but gives no similar shield to the executive branch.
The

impeachment

politic itself.
remedies.

remedy

redresses

injuries

done

to

the

body

It was not intended as a substitute for civil

Thus, when Thomas Jefferson was sued for a trespass

allegedly occurring while he was President, he invoked a plea
much

more

like

qualified

that

like

absolute

immunity.

He

claimed that the act was "done under a law of congress, and in
his

character

of

president

malice."

The suit was

immunity,

but because

of

the

United

States,

ultimately dismissed,
it was brought

without

not because of

in the wrong district.

_L_i_v_i_n.....,g'-s_t_o_n__v_._J_e_f_f_e_r_s_o_n_, 15 F . Cas • 6 6 0

(CCD Va • 1811)

(No •

8,411).
The modern immunity cases clearly establish that "rank" is
irrelevant
functions

to
for

"immunity."
which

it

Immunity

is

attaches

necessary--the

only

to

the

prosecutorial

and

judicial functions.
And the claim to "derivative immunity," which is asserted
by Harlow and Butterfield, is both bizarre and "ahistorical."
It would hold "that a Henry Kissinger of a James Schlesinger
enjoys an absolute immunity while serving in the White House,
but

forfeits

this

immunity

when

he

assumes

the

greater

responsibilities of a Cabinet office."
Absolute immunity is not needed to protect the performance
of

the

presidential

swarming

with

former,

not

needed,

a

a

office.

process

servers.

sitting,

limitation

The

of

White
In

President.
suits

any
If

against

House

lawn

event,
any

is

Nixon

limitation

incumbent

not
is

a

were

Presidents

27.

would suffice.
with

regard

Yet the courts have not thought this necessary

to

injunctive

remedies.

u.s.

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
Nixon

argues

that

absolute

See,

e.g.,

Youngstown

579 (1952}.
immunity

is

essential

to

preserve the separation of powers and prevent judicial review
of presidential motives, thought processes, and communications.
But

this

is

essentially

the

same

argument

twice

before

presented and twice before rejected in Nixon v. Administrator
of

General

Services,

U.S.

States

v.

damage

suits--especially after

term of

Nixon,

433

418 U.S.

office--are

425,

638,

surely

443

707

(1977},

(1974}.

and

United

Moreover,

civil

a President has completed his

far

less

intrusive

than

judicial

orders commanding of restraining executive action.
Finally,

although

he

asserts

that

the

"implication"

question is not properly before the Court, Fitzgerald contends
that he does in fact have an implied cause of action under two
federal statutes and under the Constitution.
(a} First Statutory Basis, 5

u.s.c.

7211.

§

This statute

creates rights for the benefit of federal employees, a clearly
identified

class of

which Fitzgerald

passed the original version in 1912.

is

a

member.

Congress

Its intent, as expressed

then, was "to protect employees against oppression and in the
right

of

free

speech

Representatives."
administrative

and

the

Nonetheless,

remedy

at

the

right

Congress

time

to
did

it enacted

consult
not
the

their

provide

an

provision;

criminal sanctions were not available until 1940; and there was
no

express

provision

for

backpay until 1948.

It

thus

seems

28.

clear that Congress meant to create a right of action in 1912,
and there is no indication of a subsequent intent to withdraw
that right.
(b)

The

Second

Statutory

Basis,

u.s.c.

18

1505.

§

Concentrating mostly on the first statutory claim, Fitzgerald's
brief

makes

little

attempt

to

justify

his

claim under

this

criminal statute.
The

(c)

Fitzgerald

Bivens

argues

Claim

that

no

Under

special

the

First

factors

Amendment.

counsel

against

--------------------------------------------------Lucas v. Bush, supra, the CAS case relied

Bivens remedy.
the

petitioners,

is

distinguishable.

Congress

had

a

on by

not,

as

here, expressly prohibited the conduct for which the suit was
brought.

To the extent that Bush holds personnel decisions too

sensitive to be reviewed at all, it is simply wrong.

Executive

discretion in this area is broad, but it is not unreviewable.
D.
The
has

amici

filed

Briefs of Amici

add virtually nothing.

precisely

the

same

brief

~~
The Solicitor General
that

the

Government

submitted a year ago, not even changing the cover.
Briefs in support of the respondent have been filed by a
collection of Members of Congress, ranging from Orrin Hatch to
Barney Frank; by the Government Accountability Project of the
Institute for Policy Studies; and by the Mountain States Legal
Foundation.
IV. ANALYSIS
The

main

difference

between

this

case

and

last

Term's

Kissinger case is that this case involves an attempt to "imply"

29.

causes

of

action

under

two

federal

This

statutes.

----- -

could

complicate the ' case in any of several ways, most of which are
reflected in what follows.
A.
Last
"versions"
assumed
the

Last Term: The Powell Approaches

Term

in

Kissinger

v.

Halper in

of

an

"absolute

immunity"

you

circulated
Version

opinion.

two
I

the existence of a Bivens cause of action, then held

President

entitled

to

abolute

This

immunity.

remains open on the facts of this case.

approach

The main difference is

that the Court would probably also need to assume--although it
would not need to hold--that a statutory cause of action also
exists.
Version II would have held that no Bivens action could be
implied

against

the

President.

His

constitutional

stature

would have counted as a "special factor" counseling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. This approach
also remains open,

but with a caveat.

In order to reach the

Bivens question, the Court would first probably need to decide
that there was no cause of action under either of the statutes.
It would seem very, very odd to assume the existence of causes
of action under the statutes, then inquire whether there was a
cause of action under the Constitution.
B. Last Term: The White Approaches
Justice White also circulated two versions last Term.
his

differed

assumption

less

that

than

Congress

yours.
had

In

both

expressly

he

began

created

action against the President under Title III.

a

But

with

the

cause

of

His question,

30.

which

he

then

answered

in

the

negative,

was

whether

the

Constitution barred the Congress from subjecting the President
to damages liability.
This year the question cannot be framed the same way.
statutory

~~ implied.

~~

cause

of

am

not

I

implied

cause

~~./! difference.

~,A; matter--it

On

of
the

action,
other

exists

Justice

at

White

~~~ ngress

had

expressly?

there

would

hand--purely

presumably
as

an

be

no

evidentiary

damages

liability

intended

to

do

so,

is

a

serious

wouldn't

it

matter.
have

If

said

I do not know what Justice White would say.

so

Much

other executive officers.

immunity

~;J. ffic~s

ir'

the

To subj~ the

1

~

assess

If Congress intended to create

~ .~
A~ the_ c3ns~ itu~oEa~ level, Justice White
W c;Y'~ ~~ ~~j.~al" approac~ to the immu~~ssue.

y

be

depends on how one views the President--how different he seems

~ 7 f~from

~ ~·

all--must

may

failed to create a cause of action expressly.

~

~ ~~

how

it

may be more than usually significant that Congress

to

-~)

sure

relevance of this difference.

1'~,~

~

action--if

The

attached
of

persons

to

the

performance

who performed

of

them,

took a narrowly
He argued that

functions,
and

not

the

that good

faith

1mmun1 ty adequately protected the wiretapping function.

This

year he could take a similar approach, so defining the function
involved here as not to require absolute immunity.
One other possibility might be worth mentioning.
White

could

~~r-disappear
'-.,._~

conceivably

altogether,

exists at all.

by

attempt
denying

to make
that

the

any

Justice

immunity

cause

of

issue
action

M~~-JYJ?W~

31.

~ ~ ~II( t:U-~
My guess, however,

is that he will find an implied cause
~

L211, which provides that
----------------employees, individually or collectively, to ••.

of action at least under 5 U.S.C.
"The right of
furnish

information

committee

member

to

either

thereof,

House

may

not

of
be

Congress,

or

interfered

to

with

a
or

denied."
C. The Powell Approaches Compared: Applications to This Case
To assume a cause of action,
immunity

questions,

is

an

proceeding directly to the

"all

constitutionally and tactically.

or

nothing"

approach--both

In taking it you would need

to hold that Congress cannot, by statute, subject the president
to

liability~

damages

constitution,

may

not

and
do

that

so

judges,

either.

in

This

construing

would

strong holding, which you may find attractive.

be

a

the
very

There is also

the question whether it could win a Court.
A subsidiary approach is possible,

~t

unattractive.

The

---self-restraint,

uphold

absolute immunity in actions based on the Constitution.

At the

Court

could,

as

a

matter

statutory level, however,
Congress

could

of

judicial

it could evade the question whether

knowingly

subject

a

President

to

damages

liability by treating an implied cause of action as one arising
under

"federal common law."

By doing so,

it could claim the

authority of cases upholding absolute immunity under the common
law,

e.g.,

Barr

v.

Matteo.

This

approach

is

unattractive,

however, because of your views about implied rights of action-that judges have no common law power to create them, and that
the central inquiry concerns congressional intent.

,.

32.
Accordingly,

the

other

plausible

approach

would

be

to

examine the causes of action individually. The Court could do
-----------~-------------------------~
this--although it did not grant cert on any "cause of action"
question--essentially

on
'-

the

theory

that

the

"immunity"

---------------------------

question necessarily includes the question: Immunity from suit
under

what

constitutional

provision

or

what

statute?

This

connection is necessary if the Court is not to assume that it
must

answer

the

immunity

constitutional basis--i.e.,

question on

the

that absolute

broadest possible
immunity is always

available to the President, or that it never is.
that

some

justices

would

dislike

addressing

the

I am sure
"cause

of

action" question without the benefit of a decision by the Court
of Appeals. 1 But it should surely be considered, for several
1 There are two interconnected bases on which the Court
could reach this question. Under Rule 2l.l(a), the Court may
address any issue "fairly comprised" within the questions
presented in the cert petitions. In their petition in 80-945,
Harlow and Butterfield raised as their second question: "Whether
petitioners, as senior advisers to the President of the United
States, should be subjected to trial and the risk of civil
damages from a person claiming injury from an adverse personnel
decision of a federal executive department?" I think that this
question can fairly be said to subsume the question whether there
has been a cause of action stated against them. This basis is
related to the precedent established by Justice White's opinion
in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, 559-60 n.6 (1978). In
that case the Court granted cert on the question whether the
respondent had stated a cause of action against prison officials.
But it then treated this question as "comprising" the question
"whether petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged
conduct violated Navarette's constitutional rights." Id. This
of course was in order to establish whether there was a-factual
predicate for a decision of the case on immunity grounds; and it
was on this immunity basis that the Court in fact decided in
favor the petitioner. Procunier can thus be read as holding that
the "immunity" and "cause of action" questions are so intimately
related that a decision of one properly entails a decision of the
Footnote continued on next page.
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reasons.
(1}
approach

With ' respect
would

to the statutory cause of action,

exploit

imply

his

right

would

be

hardest,

to

the

sue
I

fact

for

that

the plaintiff

damages.

think,

in

a

The

case

P -~~~;J::~ not said this.

7~~)-s_ gowerful

seeks

to

immunity question

in Congress

clearly that the President would be liable

this

had

in damages.

said
Here

As I suggested above, I think that

in this context.

If Congress had intended

to make the President liable, would it not have said so?

__

There are two statutes under
...._,which a cause of action could
be

implied.

One is a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C.

I

think it would be easy to reject the implication attempt under
.._

this
that

statute.
the

The other

right

interfered with."

to

is 5 U.S.C.

testify

before

§

72ll, ) which provides

Congress

"may

not

be

The legislative history is obscure; I intend

~

to do more research.
the

argument

for

Provisionally, I would have to say that

implication is stronger under

this statute.

other. Finally, if necessary it could (correctly} be argued that
Rule 21 is not jurisdictional, and that the Court is free to
dispose of a case on any proper basis, especially where necessary
to avoid large holdings of constitutional law. The Procunier
opinion hinted at this: "In any event, our power to decide is not
limited by the precise terms of the question presented. BlonderTon ue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univeersit Foundation, 402 U.S.
,
n.6." In th1s connect1on 1t appears that the Court's
celebrated decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 u.s. 64
(1938}, effectively answered a question--i.e., whether prior
decisions of the Court should be reversed--that was not presented
in the petition.
As a final resort, 28 U.S.C. § 1254
establishes the power of this Court to review any aspect of cases
"in the courts of appeals."

t

•

34.

But there are alternative remedies.
President is tne President.
that

unusually

And, to repeat myself, the

In his case, surely, I would think

persuasive

evidence

of

congressional

intent

approach,

at

the

statutory level,

cases of Harlow and

Butterfield--with

would be required.
A problem with
might

arise

from

the

this

regard to whom the implication question might look different.
However,

based on the availability ot_
......

remEt,dies, I

altern~tie

-----

think that you would probably be comfortably in holding that no
cause of action could fairly be implied.
(2) Concerning the Bivens action under the Constitution,
this

approach

factors"

would

counselling

allow

the

Court
Here

hesitation.

President.

The~

the

is

President, in this case, was acting
chief

of

undisputed

personnel
that

reorganization.
7;:

executive

.... .........

and

there

function
,__..__,_ ...-

on

"special

would

be

two,

-...

lost

in

-

which

the

(if at all)--that of the

organizational

Fitzgerald

rely

The~ is the ~us of

which seem to me to mesh nicely.
the

to

his

structure.
job

pursuant

It
to

is
a

Structuring the government is a quintessential

function.

Moreover,

assuming

that

it

frequently

results in people losing their jobs, it is one in which the
President is peculiarly vulnerable to suit: it is also--which I
think is crucial--one in which the fear of being sued could
frequently deter the President from acting independently in the
public interest.

A plaintiff should not be able to arouse such

fear through ingenious pleading that his dismissal constituted
retaliation for First Amendment activities.

35.

Again,

however,

the

inconvenient questions.
should

they

be

selection

would

inclined

be

factors"
what

defeat

absolute

immunity

organization

answer

Bivens

liability

to

and
to

defendants

In which of their functions,

entitled

personnel

non-presidential

that,

of

once

the

could

impose

if any,

in matters

of

government?

I

again,

the

"special

open

the

question

liability--leaving

Congress

raise

by

statute,

if

it

that

the

expressly did so.
D.
Whichever

The Relevance of Peculiar Facts

your

"version"

of

approach,

I

think

main question is how far to rest on the favorable facts of this

-

case--how

narrowly

to

write

an

opinion.

----------------------------------jurisprudence, I would

constitutional

be

As

a

matter

of

inclined to put the

matter on narrow grounds, hinting perhaps that broader grounds
were

available

but

need

not

be

invoked:

Congress

did

not

explicitly impose liability on the President and should not be
presumed
which

to have done

the

President

so, at least in this delicate area in

(a)

is performing

the

crucial

executive

function of structuring the government and thereby eliminating
employees

and

(b)

could

easily

be

deterred

from

fearless

performance of that function by the threat of civil suits by
fired

federal

powerful

in

employees.
assessing

the

These

considerations

question

of

immunity

are
in

equally
a

suit

arising under the Constitution.
The argument involving the sensitivity of the President's
functions relevant to this particular case could be fashioned
to

fit

the

approach

of

either

Version

I

or

Version

II.

36.
Depending on the breadth of an opinion that would hold a Court,
could be extended across a broader range of functions than I
have suggested.

Alternatively, I suppose it could be used as a

kind of examplar to justify absolute immunity for a President
in

the exercise of all his

that

~~

some

use

should

be

functions.

made

of

I

it.

do,

In

however,

my

view,

think

Justice

White's strongest argument last year was that absolute immunity
has

traditionally attached

to functions,

~ that it has been associated especially
~~fiability could influence an official's

not to officer;- and

closely where fear of

decision about how to

~i.aM

behave.

ft1/7-

The more that an opinion moves to a clearly "functional" view,

Imbler

v.

Pachtman

is

illustrative of

both

points.

the better it accords with the tenor of the case law--and thus,
in my view, the more powerful the legal analysis.
V.
I

close

with

an

CONCLUSION

apology

for

being

somewhat

unfocused.

There are many, many directions that the Court could take.

I

have been somewhat uncertain which to pursue.
My tentative views:
(1) The Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, though I
have

prudential

doubts--based

on

the

appearance

of

manipulation--about whether it ought to do so.
(2) Assuming that it exercises its jurisdiction, the Court
is free to inquire into Fitzgerald's alleged causes of action-the approach that it would seemingly have to take in order to
pursue the analytical approach of last Term's Version II.
(3)

The

President's

functions

at

issue

here

can

be

37.

characterized
that

civil

in

very

liability

favorable
could

terms,

deter

a

implicating
President

personnel decisions in the public interest.

the

from

fear

making

The more narrowly

the "immunity net"

is cast, more the opinion comes within the

precedential

of

ambit

Imbler

v.

Pachtman and other cases

which absolute immunity has been upheld.
equal

benefits

hesitation"

under

inquiry

Version II approach.

the

mandated

"special
in

the

in

Narrowness would have
factors
Bivens

counselling

inquiry

of

the

Nov. 27, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Fitzgerald: His Implied cause of Action

1lf-

11~ g

Fitzgerald's strongest claim to "imply" a cause of action
arises under 5 u.s.c.

§

7211 (Supp. III 1979).

The section

provides that "The right of employees, individually or
collectively, to petition Congress or provide information to
either House of Congress, or a committee or a Member thereof,
shall not be interfered with or denied."
A strong argument can be made that no private cause of
action can be implied under this statute.
Section 7211 was adopted in its present form as part of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

Prior to 1978, similar

language had been included in 5 u.s.c.

§

7102.

Like

§

7102,

§

7211 applies only to civil servants, who have the full panoply of
civil service remedies available to them.

These include

administrative review of allegedly improper discharges, with a
right of appeal to the courts.

There is no indication on the

face of the statute that Congress intended to create a private
right of action.

Fitzgerald admits there are no references to

implied rights of action in the legislative history--either of

Section 7211 or of its predecessor statutes.
Respondent, at 44-45.

See Brief for

And the availability of alternative

remedies is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to
provide the additional remedy of civil damages.

See Transamerica

Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 1921: Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421

u.s.

412, 419 (1975).

In addition, Congress has provided the deterrent of a criminal
statute to protect the employee rights enumerated in the section.
See 18

u.s.c.

1505.

§

Finally, in this case--unlike the Leist

case under the Commodity Futures Trading Act--there is apparently
no history of judicially implied rights of action.
Upon a reading of the briefs, Fitzgerald's strongest
argument seemed to rest on the history of the first statutory
predecessor of

§

7211, Section 6 of the Post Office

Appropriations Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539.
But his claim dissolves in the legislative history.

As

Fitzgerald argues, that section was enacted "to protect employees
against oppression and in the right of free speech and the right
to consult their Representatives."
2d Sess. 7 (1912).

H.R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong.,

This protection was thought necessary to

override the "gag rules" that had been imposed by executive
orders prior to that time.

However, while Fitzgerald seems

correct that Congress was concerned about the welfare of civil
servants, there is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended the section to create a private right of action
for damages.

Section 6 of the 1912 Act was a general provision providing
that persons in the classified civil service could not be fired
except for cause.

It provided for at least a "paper hearing"

within the department seeking to dismiss an employee.

Beyond

that, it required that copies of the records of dismissal cases
should be annually reported to Congress.

In the floor debate in

the House, at least two members suggested that this congressional
oversight--not any judicial remedy--would be the bill's principal
protective mechanism.

Representative Calder stated that

"Supervisory officials will hesitate to trump up charges

as

all cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to
Congress each year, and if an employee can produce satisfactory
evidence that he has not received the protection afforded in this
bill his case can be made the subject of a special inquiry of
Congress so ddecides."
to a judicial action.

48 Cong. Rec. 4654.

He made no reference

Representative Reilly--the only House

member quoted by Fitzgerald--spoke to similar effect: "Men in
official position will hesitate to trump up charges against an
employee for the purpose of satisfying some ••. grudge, as all
the cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to
Congress each year .••. " 48 Cong. Rec. 4656.

Thus, although the

section was intended to protect employees, there is no indication
that the protection was to come through an implied right of
action.
Indeed, in the historical context it is entirely implausible
to think that Congress, in 1912, could have intended to create by
mere implication a right to sue for damages from an executive

official performing an official function.

Only a relatively few

years earlier, in 1896, this Court had held explicitly that
executive officials were absolutely immune from civil suits
arising from "general matters committed by law to [their] control
or supervision."

Spalding v. Vilas, 161

u.s.

483, 498 (1986).

The other section from which Fitzgerald would infer a
statutory cause of action is a criminal statute, 18
1505.

u.s.c.

§

It was passed originally in 1940, at a time when civil

service employees already enjoyed administrative remedies for
improper discharge.

Again there is no indication in the

legislative history that Congress intended to create a private
right of action.
In sum, I think that the argument could be made that
Fitzgerald has failed to present a statutory claim on which
relief could be afforded.

That would leave him only with his

constitutional claim--a case in which he could not claim that
Congress had meant to impose liability to the full extent
permitted by the Constitution.

(Justice White invoked this

argument in discussing immunity under Title III in last year's
Halperin case.)
For now, however, I have no further thoughts on the relative
desirability of this line of analysis.

79-1738

NIXON v. FilZGERALD

Argued 11/30/81

'~(P.bl+)

.

.

---~.w-f(- .~"'f~~~
~·

~ s~ ~- ~JJ"'<;~Ue~~

~~.

:s-~~,4_~.

1~ ~I t7.3- -~-~ ~~ ~~
~~~-~~
1

~~ 73(~~~~~)?~~~

~ 1--z:-J::;::.,w '1 ~ '!!4 f-.- ~ ) 9 ?e>
ci-

~

tA-

~~ ~14 ~~-

~~(&~evi-l-~
4J~~~~~~
~~'

/1
2~~
~,LJ.~ ~~~ /~ ~~.(~~
~ ~fw.- )..;r_../2 ~ ~ ~ ~

Ysr··

~~ tk.~ ~f ~ ~tst1

IA~A~

bf/..-

~·;6e ~

~ ~~~\'pt ~

~~ .. ~4-v-TV -u<_~~

--

~~~~~)~
~~~~~;-/~

h_~ t01/J&{~.f~ ~CL~
~).

~h<- ~1~

1!1r-Fw-t a#--~ ..

~J

7Wt4:«-{

, -/ -. "

~~ ~ J~~"''~4/r~

~~~~,J.f7~~
~4~~,,~~~

~.

~~)'-r6-<~~1~

~~~~.P~~

~~.4

4~~~~

~~.

~~~eL~~~

~~~~· · ~c.~~
~

h

P~a.. ~~k.::i:.e,P-f~ ·

(4~ "-tJA){JAfi q) ~~
~P~.~~~~~
~ ~ ~ ~~~--,'1~.

~ ,La

JJ?s-)

~~

~~/~~~
~~I h
~~--- tA,v u-- ~ ~

~~-~~4~h-rLAA..

~ c!:~

.-e)

11L-~~~kd~~

,;;~

~ ·

~ ~_,.

'-r .

--~~£.-«.4A-444~./ ~

~~~~.

I 5o)

~

7 z 1/
'

'

~~~~~
~'4,4~~~~~~

til-(~~ ..

~-u~rttt-i.~df~
rt- ~-~.a~~(.,.

i

(,., J~~~
..

'

-

~

~ ~ ~&tlf'--c.'

1fJS

~ ~~·~~~~............,~.¥

~,,...,_ ~ ~? (~

~~ ~"'~~)

.,

Dec. 1, 1981
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Dates of the Nixon-Fitzgerald Agreement

Yesterday we spoke about the date of the settlement
agreement in the context of other relevant dates in the Kissinger
and Fitzgerald cases.
Nixon and Fitzgerald claim to have reached the agreement in
the early hours of the morning of May 19, 1980.

That is the date

on which this Court granted the petition in No. 79-880, Kissinger
v. Halperin.

Nixon had previously filed his petition for cert on

May 2, 1980.

Cert was not granted, however, until over a year

later, on June 22, 1981--the same date on which the Kissinger
decision was announced.
Nixon and Fitzgerald have made two claims about the timing
of their actions that may or may not be crucial to the propriety
of their behavior.
(1) They claim to have reached their agreement before this
Court granted Kissinger.

This claim cannot be substantiated by

the record, aside from the testimony of the parties.

That

testimony is that they reached their agreement some hours before
the Order List was released on May 19, 1980.
\

I am unclear that

this question makes any difference, either practical or ethical,
to the outcome of the case.

However, if Nixon knew that

Kissinger would be granted, he might have assumed that the
immunity issue would almost surely be decided in that case.

If

so, he might have expected his settlement agreement with
Fitzgerald to be dispositive, on the assumption that there would
be no reason for this Court grant Fitzgerald as well.

If he

meant to preserve the case as a "backup" in the event of a
Kissinger deadlock, this intent might be relevant to the claims
that the case was "feigned" or "collusive" in the sense of being
preserved at all only to get a decision of the immunity issue.
(2) Nixon and Fitzgerald claim to have filed notice of their
agreement in this Court on either June 10, 1980.

Although the

Docket Sheet kept by the Clerk fails to record any such filing, a
search of the files--conducted since our conversation--reveals
that the statement was in fact filed.

For reasons that remain

unclear, however, it was not circulated.

It thus appears that

the Court was not aware of it at the time it voted to grant the
case.

?--y-Nixon v. Fitzgerald
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JAMIE S . GORELICK
JAMU It, ROCAP', Ill

TELEX
89-2343

STEP'HEN L . NIGHTINGALE
SETH P. WAXMAN
DAVID 0. STEWART
JONATHAN a . 8ALLET
ANNE SHERE WALLWORK
SUZANNA SHERRY

Honorable Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk of the United States
Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald, No.
79-1738; Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald,
No. 80-945

Dear Mr. Stevas:
This letter is submitted to clarify a response
which I gave on Monday, November 30, to a question from
Justice O'Connor during oral argument in the above-referenced
case.
I had intended to offer this clarification during
my rebuttal, but did not have a rebuttal opportunity.
Justice O'Connor inquired whether, under the
liability limitation agreement between Mr. Nixon and Mr.
Fitzgerald, there would be any adjudication of the facts
in the court below following the decision in this Court.
My reply was that there would not be any further adjudication
of the facts.
I meant, thereby, that there would be no
trial on the merits of the respondent's complaint irrespective of how the Court decides the case. However, the agreement does contemplate further proceedings below, including
such additional adjudication of facts and the application
of the law to the facts as are appropriate in light of this
Court's decision. For example, were this Court to issue an
opinion setting forth the standard for determining whether
a President's actions are within the outer perimeter of his
duties, this could require the district court, on remand,

MILLER,

CASSIDY, LARROCA

Be

LEWIN

Honorable Alexand~r L. Stevas
December 2, 1981
Page Two
to determine either that the record as it now stands establishes
that Mr. Nixon's actions satisfied or failed to satisfy that
standard, or that the evidence adduced thus far is in dispute
and that a trial is required to resolve the factual issue.
The effect of the agreement's limitation is that any such
further adjudication of facts must be based upon the existing
record.
In other words, if any factual issues remain outstanding following this Court's decision, and such issues
cannot be resolved on the current state of the voluminous
record (thereby necessitating either additional discovery
or a trial), Mr. Nixon's obligation to pay $28,000 ripens.
Such payment will be accepted by the respondent in lieu of
added liability, and the case will be dismissed.
I am providing sufficient copies of this letter
for distribution to the Court and request that you make that
distribution.

cc:

John E. Nolan, Jr., Esq.
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq.
Rex E. Lee, Esquire
William H. Mellor, III, Esq.
Louis Allan Clark, Esquire
John C. Armor, Esquire
Thomas J. Madden, Esquire
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TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945

Jurisdiction Over Fitzgerald's

'

~

~~~+
"Implied Causes of Acti~~

In his suits against Nixon and Harlow and Butterfield,
Fitzgerald claims causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment.

In the briefs and again in oral argument,

the question has arisen whether the Court ought to examine the
bases for Fitzgerald's claim to possess "implied rights of
action."
There are really two questions:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction to reach the
"implication" question if it should, for prudential reasons, wish
to do so?
(2) Could the Court reach the implication consistently with
its own rules?
The Court's Statutory Jurisdiction

There is no jurisdictional bar to this Court's reaching the
implication question if it wishes to do so.
conceded this at oral argument.
QUESTION:

Fitzgerald's counsel

See Transcript at 55-56:

You are not claiming we don't have jurisdiction

[to consider the implication question]?
MR. NOLAN:
QUESTION:

No, absolutely not.

Absolutely not.

And if we should entertain it, it would, would it

not, avoid the decision of a constitutional question? ••.• If we
decided it one way?
MR. NOLAN:

Yes.

I mean, it arguably could do that.

Mr. Nolan had no choice but to make this concession.
Court granted cert in this case pursuant to 28

The

u.s.c. ~

This is a jurisdictional statute, which provides for review by
this Court of "cases"--not "questions"--in the courts of appeals.
As a matter of self-regulation, the Court has established
rule that it will generally limit its review to "the questions
set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein."
2l.l(a).

Rule

But the Rule "does not limit our power to decide

important questions not raised by the parties." vBlonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 320 n. 6 (1971).

The Court has held repeatedly that it may

"in exceptional cases" review an issue not raised below or in the
petition for certiorari.

Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195,

200; Youakim v. Miller, 425

u.s.

231,

234~

Among those cases the Court has considered "exceptional,"
one category consists of cases in which the Court has considered
issues outside the petition in order to avoid decision of braod

'
constitutional issues.

454, 457 (1960)

See, e.g.,

Boynton v. Virginia, 364

u.s.

(case should be decided, "if it can," on

statutory rather than "broad consitutional

basis~

under the

circumstances it was "appropriate" to consider issues not raised
in cert

petition)~~

v. United States, 421

u.s.

542, 545 (1975)

(Court decided statutory issue raised only in amicus briefs
"rather than decide a constitutional question when there may be
doubt whether there is any statutory basis for it").

--------

This case falls squarely within this "exceptional" category.
If Congress had enacted a statute specifically imposing liability
on the President, the "immunity" question would be presented in
the broadest constitutional terms: Does it lie within the
constitutional power of Congress deliberately to subject the
President to liability in a private action for damages?

Here, if

there is no statutory or First Amendment cause of action, the
broad constitutional issue is avoided.
Justice White has also argued that the "implication" issue
is "quasi-jurisdictional."

It is clearly established that this

Court is always free to consider jurisdictional issues, whenever
raised.

u.s.

See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351

193, 197

206, 209 (1963).
ways.

) ~Gutierez v. Waterman

s.s.

Co., 373

u.s.

Gutierez is analogous to this case in several

The question there was whether the case actually lay

within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Although "purely" jurisdictional in one sense, this was
essentially a question whether the court could award relief under
statute pleaded as the basis for the cause of action.

This case

involves a similar question: whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim on which relief could be granted.
Consistency with Court Rules
There is also an argument that the "cause of action"
question could be treated as "fairly comprised" within the
questions presented in the cert petition filed by Harlow and
Butterfield.

In their petition they raised as their second

=---------.----?
question: "Whether

petitioners, as senior advisers to the

President of the United States, should be subjected to trial and
civil damages from a person claiming injury from an adverse
personnel decision of a federal executive department?"

This

question arguably subsumes the question whether there has been a
cause of action stated against them.

There is strong support in

Justice White's Court opinion in Procunier v. Navarette, 434
555, 559-560 n.6 (1978}.

u.s.

In that case the Court granted cert on

the question whether the respondent had stated a cause of action
against the petitioner prison officials.

But the Court then

treated this question as "comprising" the question "whether
petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct
violated Navarette's constitutional rights."

Id. This of course

was in order to establish whether there was a factual predicate
for deciding the case on immunity grounds--the basis on which the
Court in fact held for the petitioners.
Procunier can be read as holding that the "immunity" and
"cause of action" questions are so intimately related that one
"fairly comprises" the other.

To establish whether "there is a

cause of action," the Court must know "a cause of action against

'

whom"?--a question that obviously entials the question of
immunity.

Conversely, to know whether an official can be

"subjected to trial and civil damages," it is necessary to answer
the question, "trial and civil damages under what statute of
constitutional provision"?

On this reading of Procunier, the

cause of action question is squarely before the Court because
"fairly comprised" within the second question in their cert
petition.
Summary
To summarize:
1. The Court has clear jurisdiction to address the "cause of
action" question.
2. A plausible argument can be made that the "cause of
action" question is present within the meaning of Rule 2l.l(c),
because "fairly comprised" within the second question presented
by Harlow and Butterfield.
3. Even if the "cause of action" question is not "fairly
comprised" with the questions presented, it falls within an
established category of exception to Rule 21--a category of cases
in which the Court has entertained questions not presented in
order to avoid unnecessary decisions of large questions of
constitutional law.
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No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Second Conference on this case.

The Chief Justice

Con f . · 12 I 14 I 8 1

Reverse

Absolute immunity - 1st choice.
Bivens

J ustice Brennan

is 2nd.

Absolute immunity for all three.

DIG

As to Nixon, no change (took no part in discussion)

J ustice 'White Reverse
No Bivens cause of action in any of these cases.

5

Justice Marshall

Reverse

With Byron (?)

(Not with LFP)

(not sure TM unde~stands BRW's position)
,

Justice Blackmun D 1 G

No change (said nothing else).

Justice Powell /?~
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Justice Rehnquist

Reverse

Agree Bivens

question may fairly be

whether we should reach it.

~ubsumed,

but natat rest

Prefer absolute immunity for all three.

Justice Stevens Reverse

There is jurisdiction to address Bivens and favors doing this
for all three.

Justice O'Connor

Still with LFP.

Reverse

Will go along on implied cause of action if can be satisfied
it is proper to reach it.
Absolute immunity for President, but only implied immunity
for others.
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Re:

~December 14, 1981

<:19~ -

No.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
80-94'5- ·:. Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Today's Conference generally confirmed the discussion and
votes on the above. Unlike you, I regard the issue of absolute
immunity as the threshold question. I would not reach Bivens
first for there is nothing to "reach," and no lawsuit at all, if
there is absolute immunity. Before the Tort Claims Act in 1946,
for example, a Court would not inquire into "standing" of a
plaintiff in a suit for negligence by the government. There was
no liability, no lawsuit in which to have standing.

In this setting the assignment is made to you but I feel
obligated to state that my view is irrevocble on absolute
immunity. I believe at least Bill Rehnquist and Sandra stated
that view at Conference.
I am still unable to understand why we should "duck" that
issue when the votes ar
here
Byron can concur in the judgment
on Bivens grounds. Pu
your choice iS my vote or
Byron's! Among other hi
you have a mild (!) headstart, given
the 5-6 inches of memo, chiefly compiled by you and Byron. All
of that exploratory development has been valuable. I will at
least support your judgment.
Regards,

0
Justice Powell
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December 16, 1981

79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

.! 1-*"•' (._a- ~

b(

~

~~1-o~S~~
Dear Chief:

~a_., ~
k-~. -~t<J.~

- . , -.,Lor

Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached

~~~~

me late yesterday.

I respect, of

cour~e, -yo~~ ~ iew that

~~~;t/~

absolute immunity is the threshhold question.

As you say,

if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the
outset.

It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic

that if there is no cause of action one never reaches the
immunity question.

..

···~

2.

A somewhat stronger reason for going the "immunity"
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order
doctrine.

This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra.

Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question
{"Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution
of these cases.
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as
can be mustered.

The following "chart" shows the votes at

Monday's Conference:

DIG~

PREFER "BIVENS"

PREFER IMMUNITY

WJB

BRW

CJ

HAB

TM

WHR

LFP

SO'C

JPS

3.
Address~ng

now what perhaps ' can be called prudential

reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following:

There could be seven votes for a Bivens resolution of
both of these cases.

You, WHR and SO'C, though preferring

immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens.
however,

Byron,

will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based

primarily on the fact that this case involves the
relationship of employer - employee in the government
service.
analysis.

Thurgood said he would join Byron on this
I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last

spring, but would leave open whether a president could be
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized
suit.

You have agreed in our discussions that the

likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a
presidential veto is remote.

4.

In sum, , we would have seven votes for a Bivens
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the
judgment only.

Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages

in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case.

Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the

effect~-the

way Nixon is

writte~

presents precisely the same options:

That case

a holding of no

implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the
immunity issue.
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do
likewise in Harlow.

The result would be - if the votes

remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance.
WHR alone would find absolute immunity.

You and

I feel bound

generally by Scheuer and Butz, and this was the position I

-

5.

'

took last Term with respect to Halderman in the Kissinger
case.

If, however, we decided Harlow on Bivens analysis

there would be seven votes for reversal.
Thus, if we all were to remain with our "first choice"
votes the division in Nixon would be as follows:
votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and

SOC)~

Three

two votes for

a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS)

~

narrow Bivens disposition (BRW,

and WJB and HAB to DIG.

TM)~

two votes for a

There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes for
reversal.

If, however, John and I were to defer to your

views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on
absolute immunity.

Byron has said he then would not reach

the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on
immunity.

This would leave only five votes for the judgment

of reversal.
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive.

A good deal

can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's

6.

personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment
(Bivens).

'

But we would then have a badly fractionated Court

- a result that none of us would welcome.

Indeed, we have -

in this case particularly - a strong institutional reason
for avoiding fractionalization.

I therefore am inclined

reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to
your view.

On balance, I think it may be preferable in

Nixon to have a Court opinion than to end up with seven
votes for a judgment with no more than three votes for any
single rationale.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc - Justice Stevens

December 16, 1981

79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:

Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached
me late yesterday.

I respect, of course, your view that

absolute immunity is the threshhold question.

As you say,

if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the
outset.

It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic

that if there is no cause of action one never reaches the
immunity question.

2.

A somewhat stronger reason for going the "i~munity"
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order
doctrine.

This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra.

Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question
("Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution
of these cases.
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as
can be mustered.

The following "chart" shows the votes at

Monday's Conference:
DIGG

PREFER "BIVENS"

PREFER IMMUNITY

WJB

BRW

CJ

HAB

TM

WHR

LFP

SO'C

JPS

3.

Addressing 'now what perhaps can be called prudential
reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following:

There could be seven votes for a Bivens resolution of
both of these cases.

You, WHR and SO'C, though preferring

immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens.
however,

Byron,

will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based

primarily on the fact that this case involves the
relationship of employer - employee in the government
service.
analysis.

Thurgood said he would join Byron on this
I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last

spring 1 but would leave open whether a president could be
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized
suit.

You have agreed in our discussions that the

likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a
presidential veto is remote.

4.

In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the
judgment only.

Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages

in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case.

Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow.
presents precisely the same options:

That case

a holding of no

,-,
implied cause of action

(Bivens) or a resolution on the

immunity issue.
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Ni.xon on the
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do
likewise in Harlow.

The result would be - if the votes

remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for

~~IAAJ~.
qualified immunity only; A You and WHR alone would fi.nd
absolute immunity.

I feel bound generally by Scherer and

Butz, and more particularly by our affirmance last Term of

·..
(

5.

qualified immuni ,t y for Halderman in the Kissinger case.

If,

however, we decided Harlow on Bivens analysis there would be
seven votes for reversal.
II]l~
S't2'fQ.., if we all were to remain with our "first
choice" votes the division in Nixon would be as follows:
Three votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC): two
/

votes for a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS): two votes
for a narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM): and WJB and HAB
to DI~.

There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes

for reversal.

If, however, John and I were to defer to your

views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on
absolute immunity.

Byron has said he then would not reach

the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on
immunity.

This would leave only five votes for the judgment

of reversal.
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive.

A good deal

can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's

6.

personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment
~~

(Bivens).

But we

~ have
-"'\

a badly fractionated Court - a

result that none of us would welcome.

Indeed, we have - in

this case particularly - a strong institutional reason for
avoiding fractionalization.

I therefore am inclined
~~,

reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to

~J.A4.~~

1\

~ On balance, I think it may be . ee-s-t Ato have a Court

k

~ '--fo.~

opinion thanAseven votes for a judgment with no more than
three votes for any single rationale.

~

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc - Justice Stevens

...

yetl-

December 16, 1981

79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:

Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached
me late yesterday.

I respect, of course, your view that

absolute immunity is the threshhold question.

As you say,

if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the

.)~~,~~~
outset.

It can be said with equa'*l:o_g;l:;C

~ su~eri~le~

t .,.

J..dHmf'u_D

that if there is no cause of action one

~~

~ ee Ret ~ns,der the immunity question.

2.

A somewhat f?tronger reason for going the "immunity"
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order
~~e~ the ""i:mmuni-t ¥

the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra.

i ssy.e.•

This is

Yet, for reasons

stated by Byron, John and me, we have jurisdiction to reach
the cause of action question ("Bivens") and f.ep ehe re&eoas~

of these cases.
I

state~t

the outset, however, that the importance of

the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal
~

president - make it imperative that we ntake ev-ery effort to

""

have a Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the
judgment as can be mustered.

The following "chart" shows

the votes at Monday's Conference:
DIGG

~

PREFER "BIVENS"

PREFER IMMUNITY

WJB

BRW

CJ

HAB

TM

WHR

LFP
JPS

SO'C

'

Addressing now what perhaps can be called prudential
reasons for preferring Bivens, I cite the following:

J--.. _- {..-·· l·:~·~~)rhere
,., __......-'

could be seven votes for a Bivens

of both of these cases.

J/so1~t ion

You, WHR and SO'C, though
:TP$~

preferring immunity, also agree with me on Bivens.
1\

>~}
Byron

·"
~

will write his Bivens analysis narrowly, based primarily

involves the relationship of employer - employee in the

~~A2-~~'i"d7~ lie=& fer ;,
government

service ~

a~

Thurgood said rap9ateoly

Uonday'

he would join Byron on this analysis.
~1

write Bivens broadly,

~

eeeQn~lly

but w.i-J..lA.. leave open j:.. a» r-mu-st -t.o

:zJ

I

as I did last spring

~e~.....Jehn'

e

110~

y--'

whether a president could be sued for damages if the

~~ '

congress specifically 1\enaetea a Bi-vens £eJRW'
preeiaeAt.

a~ lt'i: n:!!t

j:fioe

You have agreed in our discussions that the

likelihood of

s~ch

a statute being

a~opted

over a

presidential veto is remote.

In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the

;;;r/J7fiC;
judgment only.

Nevertheless, there are

~t

advantages

in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case.

~

Again at the prudential level, we must look also to

the effect of the way Nixon is written on

Harlow~~

-n.,~

;J--""'FF:etrant~t""~e"'1rl""f~-i-i.',.e-Tl:-A&---.=~QII'l"t'i~ "F :i: t z EJ e r e-W- ~fie i\£1\ case
precisely the same options:
of action

presents

a holding of no implied cause

(Bivens) or a resolution of

~ee~e

on the

immunity issue.
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do
likewise in Harlow.

The result would be - if the votes

remain as stated

~t

Monday's Conference - seven for

qualified immunity only.
absolute immunity.

You and WHR alone would find

I feel bound generally by Scherer and

Butz, and more particularly by our affirmance last Term of
qualified immunity for Halderman in the Kissinger case.
,

~~ ~

If, however, we decided Harlow on

there would

Biv~ysis

be~:~~ vot~for

agaiR]-

revers::;_jWhen I

the term "prudential" in this connection, I am thinking

~ability of mustering strong majorities

ly

cases that ar~~ertain to attract ~ermo~s public
'"-..,

......

and
scrutiny. ~lieving, as I do, that there is
---~00::::~ ........

1--- - - -

e of action against any one" b~ these three petitioners,
I also would like to end the litigation
them.

~s

If we go the immunity route, Harlow

will have to undergo a trial on remand.

to all three of

rider

*

*

*

In sum, if we all were to remain with our "first

~d'JA-choice" votes the division in Atfie."iTh~.s e;st dependifl'J on

-?L
......f.iv:e....of--\:\-S-i--n t'R.Q majo £ i ty

a<Wpt~

would 1\as

fo2

~ Three votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC)~

two votes for a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS)
votes for a narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM)
HAB to DIGG.

~

~

two

and WJB and

There would be no Court opinion, but seven

votes
Joan is-that we

~~&.e._
defer to your views 1 aftd Ma~A a Court of five votes for
reversal on absolute immunity.
undeLBtanding js tbat

jf

we

sh~ld

do

~~

th~ Byron ~ ~

-0-~
~would

not reach the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would

n.;_ ~ ~~:;::; ~

dissent on immunity:J ~

p

~~~

~ ....

Neither of ' these "line-ups" is i~
1\,

A good deal can

be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's personal
liability, for seven votes on the judgment (Bivens).

~s,

we

But

~

~

have a badly fractionated Court - a

result that none of us would welcome.

Indeed, we have - in

this case particularly - a strong institutional reason for
avoiding fractionalization.

~ ~ ~

~ ~~J-4, ~/£.,__,1 ~

1-o ~ ~~~,1-o~~~.
~~,/

f~~~~
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LFP/vde
December 16, 1981

79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald and 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:

Thank you for your letter of December 14, that reached
me late yesterday.

I respect, of course, your view that

absolute imrnunj. ty is the threshhold quest ton.

As you say,

if there is absolute immunity a suit is aborted at the
outset.

It can be said with equal, if not greater, logic

that if there is no cause of action one never reaches the
immunity questlon •

.~

"

2.

A somewhat stronger reason for going the "immunity"
route is that these cases are here on the collateral order
doctrine.

This is the concern of Bill Rehnquist and Sandra.

Yet, for reasons stated by Byron, John and me, we have
jurisdiction to reach the cause of action question
("Bivens") and this continues to be my preferred resolution
of these cases.
I state at the outset, however, that the importance of
the cases - and the involvement of a highly controversal
president - make it imperative that we endeavor to have a
Court opinion, as well as as many votes for the judgment as
can be mustered.

The following "chart" shows the votes at

Monday's Conference:
DIGG

PREFER "BIVENS"

PREFER IMMUNITY

w.JB

BRl'T

CJ

HAB

TM

llffiR

LFP

SO'C

JPS

~-----------~-------------..,--,.,.,,.~~

3.
'

Addressing now what perhaps can be called prudentlal
reasons for preferrinq Bivens, I cite the following:

'T'here could be seven votes for a Bivens resolut i.on of
both of. these cases.

You, WHR and

so•c, though preferring

immunity, also agree with JPS and me on Bivens.
however,

Byron,

wilt write his Bivens analysis narrowlv, based

primarily on the fact that this case involves the
relationship of employer. - employee in the government
service.
analysis.

Thurgood said he would join Byron on this
I would write Bivens broadly, as I did last

spring, but would leave open whether a president could be
sued for damages if the congress specifically authorized
suit.

You have agreed in our discussions that the

likelihood of such a statute being adopted over a
presidential veto ts remote.

---------·-~--------~--

-

4.

In sum, we would have seven votes for a Bivens
disposition, although two of the votes would be for the
judgment only.

Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages

in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case.

Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow.
presents precisely the same options:

That case

a holding of no

implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the
immunity issue.
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the
I

.'

ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do
likewise in Harlow.

The result would be - if the votes

remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance.
WHR alone would find absolute immunity.

You and

I feel bound

generally by Scheuer and Butz, and this was the position I

·•

5.

took last Term wtth respect to Halnerman in the Kissinger
case.

Tf, however,

WP.

decided

~arlow

on Bivens analysis

there would be seven votes for reversal.
~hus,

if we all were to remain with our "first choice"

votes the division i.n

~axon

would be as follows:

votes f.o:r absolute immuni.ty (CJ,

~mR

Three

and SOC); two votes for

a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS)

1

narrm'l Bivens disposition (BRW,

and W,lB and HAB to DIG .

~here

"'M):

two votes for a

would he no Court opinion, but seven votes for

reversal.

If, however, John and I were to defer to your

views, there \'lOuld be a Court of five votes for reversal on
absolute immunity.
the

~ivens

immunity.

J'yron has saic=l he then

woul~

not reach

issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on
'rhis \"lould leave only five votes for the judgment

of reversal.
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive .

A good deal

can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's

6.

personal liability, for seven votes on the judgment
(Bivens).

But we would then have a badly fractionated Court

- a result that none of us would welcome.

Indeed, we have -

in this case particularly - a strong institutional reason
for avoiding fractionalization.

I therefore am inclined

reluctantly, and subject to talking to John, to defer to
your view.

On balance, I think it may be preferable in

Nixon to have a Court opinion than to end up with seven
votes for a judgment with no more than three
single rationale .
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc - Justice Stevens

~.~--------------~~------

vot~s

for any

4.

In sum,

w~

would have seven votes for a Bivens

disposition, although two of the votes would be for the
judgment only.

Nevertheless, there are distinct advantages

in having a solid Court for the judgment in the Nixon case.

Again at the prudential level, we must look also to the
effect of the way Nixon is written on Harlow.
presents precisely the same options:

That case

a holding of no

implied cause of action (Bivens) or a resolution on the
immunity issue.
If we were to reach the immunity issue in Nixon on the
ground that Bivens is not here, we would be compelled to do
likewise in Harlow.

The result would be - if the votes

remain as stated at Monday's Conference - seven for
qualified immunity only, resulting in affirmance.
WHR alone would find absolute immunity.
generally by Scheuer and Butz, and

A

You and

I feel bound

m~~,~~~

I

~~t r~ ~~.,Lo
· ·

the Kissinger case.

·

·

5.

/\Halderman in

If, however, we decided Harlow on

Bivens analysis there would be seven votes for reversal.
Thus, if we all were to remain with our "first choice"
votes the division in Nixon would be as follows:

Three

votes for absolute immunity (CJ, WHR and SOC): two votes for
a broad Bivens disposition (LFP, JPS): two votes for a
narrow Bivens disposition (BRW, TM): and WJB and HAB to DIG.
There would be no Court opinion, but seven votes for
reversal.

If, however, John and I were to defer to your

views, there would be a Court of five votes for reversal on
absolute immunity.

Byron has said he then would not reach

the Bivens issue and he and Thurgood would dissent on
immunity.

This would leave only five votes for the judgment

of reversal.
Neither of these "line-ups" is attractive.

A good deal

can be said, particularly in a case involving Nixon's

lfp/ss 12/17/81

NIXONl SALLY-POW
78-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
My understanding is that you, Bill Rehnquist and

5

Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether
you would join a disposition of the Nixon case on the
cause of action question {referred to, for brevity, as the
Bivens question).

You view is that we took this case in a

"collateral issue .. context to decide the immunity

10

question, and the three of you continue to have serious
reservations as to whether we properly may dispose of the
case on a ground neither assigned not submitted to us
under the specified question, in the petition or in the
briefs.

15

Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case.
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case
in which no private cause of action could be implied,
limiting the analysis to the context of the special
relationship of government employment.

John and I

preferred to address the cause of action question broadly,

20

2.

holding as my Version II memorandum of last spring was
written, on the ground that at least in the absence of
specific congressional authorization no cause of action
could be implied against the President of the United

25

States.
Thus, it is evident that there may be no Court
opinion if each of us remains with our first preference
votes.

As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a

Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of

30

you, Bill Rehqnuist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage
suit liability for the reasons stated at some length in my
Version I memorandum last spring.
joined that memorandum.

John and you both

I have discussed the sitaution

35

with John, and subject to a possible qualification as to a
reservation that would not prevent a Court opinion, John
also is willing to decide the Nixon case on absolute
immunity.
I am not entirely at rest as to how to write the
Harlow/Butterfield case.

The private cause of action

issue, though not a question specifically presented in the

40

3.

petition, was stated as a question in their brief and was
argued.

Moreover, if we reach the immunity issue in the

Harlow/Butterfield case, the decision would be for
qualified immunity only.

45

As there is a Court to dispose

of this case finally on the absence of an implied cause of
action, it would be unfortunate to remand it for trial on
implied immunity.
but there is certainly greater reason here than in Nixon

50

-... .
--~
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NIXONl SALLY-POW
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78-1738 Nixon v.

Dear Chief:

~~~

My understanding is that you, Bill ~~ nq~~ s} _~
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt

a~~r

you

action question (sometimes referred to,

o~ -;-i'~~~
~,Lp cJt . ~ rM...
for ~~~:1; ,~; ~ : '

Bivens question).

took ~~

would join a disposition of the Nixon case

Your view is that we

"collateral issue" context to decide the immunity question,
and the three of you continue to have serious reservations
as to whether we properly may dispose of the case on a
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs.
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case.
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case in
which no private cause of action could be implied, limiting
the analysis to the special relationship of government
employment.

John and I prefer to address the cause of

action question and would do so broadly along the lines of
my Version II memorandum of last spring.
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not
assured if each of us remains with our first preference
votes.

As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a

Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of
you, Bill Rehqnuist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion

'.

'

2.
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage
suit liability £or the reasons stated in my Version I
memorandum last spring.

John and you both joined that

memorandum.
I have discussed the situation with John,

and he

fully shares the view that a Court opinion in a case
involving the liability of a President is important
institutionally.

Subject to a possible

reservation that

would not prevent a Court opinion, John therefore is willing
to decide the Nixon case on absolute immunity.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

<g01Ui of tlrt 'Jiitti:i:t~ ~hrlts
j\tra:~Jringhm. ~. <g. ' 2obln·~

~U:Jtttntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

December 17, 1981

78-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
My understanding is that you, Bill Rehnquist and
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether you
would join a disposition of the Nixon case on the cause of
action question (sometimes referred to, for brevity, as the
Bivens question). Your view is that we took this case in a
"collateral issue" context to decide the immunity question,
and ·the three of you continue to have serious reservations
as to whether we properly may dispose of the case on a
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs.
Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case.
Byron and Thurgood would dispose of it narrowly as a case in
which no private cause of action could be implied, limiting
the analysis to the special relationship of government
employment. John and I prefer to address the cause of
action question and would do so broadly along the lines of
my Version II memorandum of last spring.
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not
assured if each of us remains with our first preference
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquely requiring a
Court opinion, I am now prepared to defer to the wishes of
you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion
holding that a President has absolute immunity from damage
suit liability for the reasons stated in my Version I
memorandum last spring. John and you both joined that
memorandum.
I have discussed the situation with John, and he
fully shares the view that a Court opinion in a case
involving the liability of a President is important
institutionally. John therefore is willing to decide the
Nixon case on absolute immunity. John always has had some
question as to the effect of an Act of Congress that

2

expressly provided a damage remedy against a President - as
unlikely as such action may be. He may "reserve" on this
question in a way that would not prevent a Court opinion.
With five votes now for an absolute immunity
resolution of this case - the question submitted on the
collateral order - I will draft an opinion this basis.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

,I

The Conference

0

December 17, 1981

78-1738 Mixon v. Fitzgerald

near Chief:
My understand! ng is that. you, Bill Rehnquist and
Sandra continue to entertain serious doubt as to whether you
would ioin a disposition of the Nixon case on the cause of
action question (sometimes referr.~d to, for hr~vitv, as the
Bivens question). Your view is that we took this case in a
"collateral i!=;sue .. context to decide the immuni. ty question,
and the three of you continue to have serious reservations
as to whether we Properly may dispose of the caqe on a
ground neither assigned nor submitted to us under the
specified question, in the petition or in the briefs.

Bill Brennan and Harry would DIG the Nixon case.
Byron and Thurqood would dispose of. it narrowly ~s a case in
which no private cause of action could be implied, limitinq
the analysis to the special relationship of government
employment. .John and t ore fer to ~ddress the cause of
action question and would do so broadly alonq the Jines of
my Version II memorandum of last spring.
Thus, it is evident that a Court opinion is not
assured if each of us remains with our first preference
votes. As I view the Nixon case as uniquelv requirinq a
Court opinion, :t am now prepared to defer. to the w~. shes of
you, Bill Rehnquist and Sandra and prepare a draft opinion
holding th~t a President has absolute immunity from damage
suit liability for the rea~ons stated in my Version I
memorandum last spring. John and you both joined that
memorandum.
I have discussed the situation with John, and he
fully shares the view that a Court oPinion in a case
involving the liability of a President is impOrtant
institutionally. John therefore is willing to decide the
Nixon case on absolute tmmuni tv. ,John always hFls had some
question as to the effect of an Act of Congress that

2.

expressly providP.o a ClamaqP rGmeny ;tqainst a 'Pt'P>sioent - as
unlikely as such action may be. He may "reserve" on this
question in a way that would not prevent a Court opinion.
~Hth five votes now for an absolute i.mmunity
resolution of this case - the question submitted on the
coJlateral ordP.r- T 'vill draft an ooinion thts hasif.l.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The

r.onfer~nce

Jan. 29, 1982

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Attached Nixon Drafts

Attached is my first attempt at a draft in Nixon.

The first

two sections (about the first 16 pages) deal with the facts of
this case and its jurisdictional issues.
The subsequent sections are entirely new, though of course
very similar in some respects to last year's Draft VI, Version I.
It is only fair to say, however, that there are major changes of
emphasis.

In doing the research, I became increasingly persuaded

of two points.

First, the separation of powers is a very

flexible doctrine.

It is therefore difficult to rest an absolute

constitutional prohibition of presidential liability on this
doctrine.

Second, the Court repeatedly has recognized that the

law of immunity is appropriately of judicial making.

From this

perspective, I think there are much more powerful arguments that
the judiciary should not impose liability on the President, at
least in the absence of an express command from Congress.

At

this level I think the separation of powers argument to be much
less subject to attacks that it has claimed too much--i.e.,

arguments that an excessively rigid doctrine is inconsistent with
such cases as United States v. Nixon and even Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co •. v. Sawyer.

Thus, at bottom, the draft opinion would

hold that the President was absolutely immune from suits for
damages at least in the absence of clear congressional action
imposing liability: and it reserves--rather than deciding--the
question what would happen in that unlikely case of a direct
constitutional conflict between the claims of the Executive and
Legislative branches.

Again, it makes clear that the judiciary

must recognize the President as absolutely immune both from
Bivens actions and from suits under statutes of merely general
applicability.
Beginning with Section III, however, I should say that I
think it would be possible simply to readopt the pertinent
sections from last year's Draft VI, Version I.

I therefore have

attached these sections as a second draft for your consideration.
The first two sections (dealing with the facts and jurisdiction)
are omitted from this draft, which begins with Section III.
I have not yet begun--or really begun to think very
seriously about--a Harlow draft.

It has occurred to me, however,

that changes in Nixon may seem desirable or even necessary to
dispose of questions that may arise in Harlow.

But I do not

think that this should be a problem, as I expect to have at least
a rough draft in Harlow well before Nixon is ready to circulate
out-of-chambers.

February 18, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear John:
Here is a Chambers draft of an opinion. As we
have collaborated on this issue for more than e year, I
would, of course, appreciate your reviewing the draft before
I circulate it.
Although the basic analysis leading to the holding
of absolute immunity remains the same, the opinion is
different i.n several respects from ours last Term. First,
it is simplified by the absence of the 'T'itle III statutory
issue that was the centerpiece of T.-\yron's memorandum.
SAcond, as last year's case involved three defendants in
addition to the President, I could focus in this case solely
on presidential immunity. Finally, t have said explicitly in view of your reservation - that we were not expressing
any view ag to presidential immunity if Congress should
authorize a damage suit remedy against any President. I
would think it very doubtful whether Congress ha~ any such
power.
I am writing a separate opinion in the Fitzgerald
case, one that I find more troublesome - particularly since
there may well be no consensus of views among five Justices.
My bottom li.ne in Fitzgerald will be qualified immunity, the
view you and I took last 'term with respect to Halderman. At
Conference, Sandra also ipdicated a ~reference for qualified
immunity. I would expect the Chief and Bill Rehnquist to go
for derivative immunity. I do not know whether Byron and
the Justices who voted with him last Term will elect to
reach the immunity issue or will hol.d that there is no cause
of action.
It is increasingly clear, contrary to my
expectation, that summary judgment motions have not been
successful in preventing long drawn out litigation over

2.

insubstantial clai~s against officials. For example, in
addition to the suit pending here, Eo Levi and other Justice
Department officials are defendants in several other suits with the consequent expense and harassment. I therefore
think Jerry Gesell is right in urginq that when an immunity
defense in pled, the burden of proof on that issue should be
allocated to the plaintiff.
I know that you are pressed at this time, and I
regret not being able to get the Nixon draft to you earlier.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss

.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 22, 1982

Re:

79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
For the most part I think your draft op1n1on is
excellent and I am sure I will join it. I do, however,
have one concern that perhaps is nothing more than
style but I think may have sufficient importance to
discuss with you. At several points in the opinion, at
pages 14 through 18, you describe the Executive's
immunity as something that is granted by the Court
rather than provided by the law. I would be much more
comfortable if you could make language changes which I
can illustrate by reference to the last few lines on
page 14. Instead of stating that federal officials
"should be accorded" absolute immunity, could we not
say that they "have a right" to absolute immunity.
Similarly, instead of a "blanket grant" of absolute
immunity, could we not refer to a "blanket
recognition." Again, three lines from the bottom,
instead of "we extended to federal officials the same
qualified immunity we had granted to state officials"
could we perhaps say something like "we held that
federal officials have the same qualified immunity as
state officials."
I am also a little troubled by stating at the top
of page 16 that we followed the tradition of common law
courts "by freely weighing considerations of public
policy." I do not have a specific language change to
suggest there, but could it not appropriately be
phrased in terms of the Court having relied on
considerations of public policy comparable to those
that had traditionally been recognized by common law
courts, or something similar?

-2-

Perhaps this is just a flyspeck, but on page 17,
in line 4, I wonder why you say "acts in office"
instead of "official acts."
Finally, in the second line on page 18, would it
be sufficient to have "recognized immunity of this
scope for governors" instead of having "granted"
immunity.
In a realistic sense, perhaps your opinion is
entirely correct in referring to grants of immunity by
judges, but I feel much more comfortable when I am able
to say that we are merely applying the law as we
understand it to exist independently of the composition
of the Court. I think it is especially important to
take that approach when the Court is as closely divided
as it is on the issue in this case.
Except for these language changes, I really think
your opinion is excellent.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

March 5, 1982

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Nixon, Harlow, and Butterfield

Attached are three drafts, two of which are appended mostly
for reference.

(1) A Nixon draft, marked up to incorporate

(a) your last requested changes; (b) the changes suggested by
Justice Stevens; (c) editing changes to make it compatible with
the tenor of Harlow; and (d) sundry but essentially insubstantial
changes resulting from research in the record done mostly for
Harlow.
(2) A printed Harlow draft, also hand-edited, incorporating
the changes you requested and a few alterations and additions of
mine.
(3) An alternative draft on Harlow Section IV, following the
line of analysis that you discussed with Justice White.
There remains for you the major choice which approach to
take.

When you make it, however, nearly everything should be

ready for the printer.

As you will notice, clean printed copies

would be required before you would want to show anything even

informally to another Justice.

I would think, however, that

anything and everything could be ready not later than Tuesday.

.inp:rmu <!fourt of tltt ~a .itaftg

..-ulfinghtn. Jl. c.!f.

CHAMBERS OF

2!1.?,.~

March 18, 1982

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

PERSONAL
Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
I will have some "thoughts" on this case.
I
particularly am concerned that - without intent to
do so - on page 24, you seem to equate Congress and
"the press." Heaven knows, they regard themselves as
the Fourth Branch and primus inter pares at that!
On the merits, qualified immunity for a senior
Presidential aide, cabinet or sub-cabinet officer,
does no more than "buy" a lawsuit. Even assuming they
will be~winnable"suits that will be only after much
harassment and expense.
If Harlow becomes law, as appears
likely -- and if I were age 40 again -- I would not
think one second of accepting the job I once held as
Assistant Attorney General.
I will be bound to say
in dissent that the Court now literally invites
"shakedown" suits.
In 1956 when I left the Executive
Branch, I could not have been "shaken down" for very much,
but I'd be subject to harassing lawsuits and in court as a
defendant-witness, paying other lawyers to defend me-instead of being paid for being there!

Justice Powell

~u.prtutt

Qfllurlllf t4t ~tb "taftg
' jilagftittghttt. ~. <!J. 2llgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 18, 1982

Re:

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
I am fully sensible of the considerations mentioned in
your letter of transmittal to me and the Chief, and shall
make every effort to join your opinion in this case. So
long as Butz v. Economu is on the books, I don't see how you
can be faulted for relying on it. I agree with the basic
thrust of your opinion, and think you have done an excellent
job in disposing of the case. The few suggestions I am
about to make do not seem to me, and I hope they do not seem
to you, to suggest any major (or even minor) alteration in
the structure of the opinion.
My concerns are these:
(1) Page 17, sixth line from the bottom: You describe
one of the functions of the President as "the administration
of justice." I don't know that any great damage would be
done by leaving that as is, but it seems to me that the
"administration of justice" is more the function of the
courts under Article III than it is of the President. I
think the opinion would be improved if you could see your
way clear to change that phrase to something like "lawenforcement."
(2) Page 19, fn. 35: You state in the third paragraph
of this footnote, on page 20, that the absolute immunity
accorded the President should extend to "acts within the
'outer perimeter' of the area of his official
responsibility." Since in the final paragraph of the
footnote you conclude that the acts he performed "lay well
within the outer perimeter of his authority," I would prefer
to see the Court reserve judgment on the question of how far
the President's absolute immunity extends. Since you
conclude, correctly, in my opinion, that he meets the
definition laid down in Barr v. Matteo, I should think the

.'

...
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discussion could be phrased in terms of an assumption that
the President's immunity extends at least to the outer
perimeter, and a conclusion that under this assumption the
test is satisfied in this case.
(3) Page 23, carry-over sentence: You state that
"Presidents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after
they leave office." While this may well be correct, it
seems to me there is absolutely no necessity for saying so
in this case: it is not an issue here, and so far as I know
the Court has never so held. The language from Story's
Commentaries, which you quote in fn. 33 on page 19, speaks
of the person of the President possessing an "official
inviolability" "in civil cases at least." This would seem
to indicate that at least in Story's mind, the question was
an open one. I see no need to salve the wounds of the
losing view in this case by throwing them a bone which may
come back to haunt us.
-'
Sincerely ~

Justice Powell

March 18, 1982
PERSONA I.

79-1738 Nixon v.

Fitzqeral~

S0-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald
near r.hief:
This is in replv to your personal letter.
As to the sentence on page 24 of Nixon, certainly
the press as well as Congress exercises considerable
restraint on the conduct of a President. As much as I
rleplor~ his means, Woodward's expose of Watergate preceded
any action by Congress. I will try, hm-1ever, to clarify the
language.
~he second paragraph of your letter puzzles me.
You say that u: "Harlow becomes the law", the ~ourt will
then "literally inv1t~ shakedown suits". As J vi~w i.t,
Harlm" mirrors present lew. As now drafted, its only effect
on nresent law wil1 be to make it more nifficult for
plaintiffs to win these suits.

nutz v. Economou i.s now the law. The defendant in
that suit was a Cabinet member, and the opini.on aC!opted
qualified immuni.ty as the standard appJicahle to executive
officials, except for those performing specially protected
functions, such as iudges and prosecutors. I joined Butz
because it '"as foreshaC!owed - if not control Jed bv - your
opinion for the Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes.
You read Gravel more broadly than T. ever have.
However one reads it, Gravel was decided before both Scheuer
and Butz. In sum, rather than make new doctrine, I have
si.mply followed these two well establi.shed precedents of
this Court.
~or the reasons stated in my letter of yesterday
to you and Bill Rehnquist, J' am proposing a modi.fication in
the Wood v. Strickland standard. 'l'his seems permissible
because necessary to attain the balance contemplated hv ~ut7.
itself.

I have no idea whether. rny ~raft in this case will
attract a Court. I do have a rather strong feeling that,
from your viewpoint, as I understand it, my draft is likely
to be bette~ than any alternative that the Court will adopt.
~incerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 18, 1982

Re:

79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

j\u.prtntt <!fMU"t of tlrt ~b j\taftg

Jras:ftingbtn. ~ . <!f.
CHAM BERS OF

THE C HI EF JUSTIC E

2llp~.;l

March 18, 1982

Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald
80-945 - Harlow et al. v. Fitzgerald
Dear Lewis:
In due course I will be joining you in 79-1738 and
dissenting in 80-945.
Since I am not prepared, now, to
overrule Gravel sub silentio -- or otherwise .
A Presidential aide, for example, may be elbow-to-elbow
with a President several times a day preparing to implement
key government policies, while the cabinet officer you
referred to may not see a President for weeks.
If a Senator's
aide "inherits " the Senator ' s immunity, there is vastly
greater reason why a senior Presidential aide, who deals
with matters of far greater moment, is denied the same
protection.
Perhaps we are on the way to generating a
new industry in the insurance world - " Public Liability
Insurance " for public officials!
For me it simply "will not wash " to hold that the
aides of a Senator with a few hundred thousand constituents
and a dozen aides derive absolute immunity from the Senat~'
but that Senior Aides to a President -- who has 22b milllon
constituents and a large staff of Senior Aides - - do not
have the same immunity as those of Senator Gravel.
Expressed
or not this overrules Gravel or leaves our cases in
irreconcilable confusion.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,jU;Jtrtmt (!ftturt ttf t£rt 'Jfbrittb ,jtatt_s-

~~n.~.<!f. 20~~~
CHAMBER S OF

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 22, 1982

Re:

79-1728 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
I shall file a dissent in this case.
should be done by the time

the ferry goes.

Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 29, 1982

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

-

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor ·

.~-

From:

The Chief Justice

Circulated:

MAR 3 l 1982

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER, v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]

Memorandum of Concurrence, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER.
I write separately to emphasize that the presidential immunity spelled out today derives from and is mandated by
the Constitution. Absolute immunity for a President is either implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers or it does not exist.
Although immunity for governmental officials in Bivens
type actions may have been "of judicial making," ante, at 15,
the immunity of a President from civil suits is not simply a
doctrine derived from this Court's interpretation of common
law or public policy. Of course we are "guided" by the Constitution, ante, at 15, but I could not join an opinion findi g
absolute immunity for the President based on some vag'!le,
u~eoryllidependent of the ConstitutiOn .
..!'he esserrtlal~ o the doctnne of separation of powers is to allow for independent functioning of each co-equal
branch of government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control or intimidation by other
branches. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707
(1974); United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972).
Even prior to the adoption of our Constitution, judicial
review of legislative action was recognized in some instances
as necessary to maintain the proper checks and balances.
Den on the Dem. of Bayard & Wife v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42

~

~

..
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(N.C. 1787); Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 4
Call's 135 (1788). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803). It has not been used, however, to control or intimidate other branches. The proposed opinion correctly observes that judicial intrusion through private damage actions
improperly impinges on and hence interferes with the essential independence of a President. 1
Exposing a President to civil damage actions for official
acts within the scope of the Executive authority unduly subjects presidential actions to judicial scrutiny. The judiciary
always must be hesitant to probe into the elements of presidential decision-making and such judicial intervention is not
to be tolerated absent imperative constitutional necessity.
We found such intervention warranted in order to assure the
proper administration of justice. United States v. Nixon,
418 U. 8., at 709-716. 2 No such intervention is warranted
in the present case.
The enormous range and impact of presidential decisionsinescapably beyond that of any one Member of Congress-inevitably means that large numbers of persons will consider
themselves aggrieved by such acts. Absent absolute immunity, every person who feels aggrieved may bring a suit for
damages, and each suit-especially those that proceed on the
merits-will involve at least a minimum of judicial questioning of presidential acts, including the reasons for the action
and the information on which it was based. This kind of
scrutiny of day-to-day decisions of the Executive Branch
would inevitably occur if private civil damage actions are
' The separation of powers doctrine is implicated to the extent that the
courts entertain private damage actions for presidential acts taken in the
"outer perimeter'' of the President's official responsibility. Ante, at
19-20, n. 35. We do not consider here suits involving acts outside the
"outer perimeter" of official authority.
2
This concept emerged in the early years of our national existence as
well. United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch 469, 507 (1807).

79-173~MEMORANDUM
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brought to advance the private interests of the individual citizen. Although the individual who claims wrongful conduct
may indeed have sustained some injury, the need to prevent
inevitable large-scale invasion of the Executive function by
the judiciary far outweighs the need to vindicate the private
claims. We have decided that in precisely this same sense,
the need of a Member of both Houses of Congress and their
aides to be free from such judicial scrutiny outweighs the
need for private redress of one claiming injury from acts of a
Member or aide of a Member. 3
Judicial intervention would also inevitably inhibit the processes of Executive Branch decision-making and impede the
functioning of the Office of the President. Imposition of liability for damage actions would have a serious effect of diverting the attention of a President from his executive duties
since defending a lawsuit today-even a lawsuit ultimately
found to be frivolous-often requires significant expenditures
of time and money. There is a significant likelihood that a
President, whose unfettered discretion is absolutely essential
to the functioning of the Executive Branch, would have to
weigh the possibility of litigation in making or authorizing decisions. Many problems arise in which the choice of the Executive may be a "close call" on a particular decision or course
of action; fear of a lawsuit could well inhibit appropriate action. Ultimate vindication on the merits after trial is plainly
3
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 reflects this policy distinction; in
it Congress waived sovereign immunity for certain damage claims, but
pointedly excepted any "discretionary function or duty . .. whether or not
the discretion involved be abused." 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a) (1976). For
such injuries Congress may in its discretion provide separate non-judicial
remedies such as private bills.
In this case Fitzgerald received substantial relief through the route provided by Congress: the Civil Service Commission ordered him reinstated
with backpay. Joint App. 87a-88a. In addition, he has to date received
$142,000 in partial settlement of the suit. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at
11. Respondent can hardly argue that he has been denied relief.

79-1738-MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE
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a paper shield for a President.
In short, the constitutional concept of separation of coequal powers dictates that a President be immune from civil
damage actions based on acts within the broad scope of Executive authority. 4 Even when a President, acting in his official capacity, takes actions later held to be unconstitutional,
an aggrieved citizen's recovery must be by way of Congressional acts designed to limit intrusion of the judiciary into
presidential affairs.

'Human fallibility being a reality, Congress in the Federal Tort Claims
Act took pains to recognize that even when governmental action is in error,
sovereign immunity is preserved for discretionary acts. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2680(a) (1976).

.fu.prtmt Qf!turl!tf tlft ~tb .i'bttts

-as!fington. ~. <!f. 2ll&i~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 5, 1982
Re:

No. 80-945

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your proposed opinion.
I anticipate
writing a separate concurrence consisting of about one
paragraph.
Sincerely,

t~(/)IY

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 5, 1982
Re:

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in the most recent circulation of your
proposed opinion.

Sincerel~,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Blackmun

Circulated: _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ __ _'!___

1st PRINTED DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June-. 1982)

dissenting.
I join JUSTICE WHITE's dissent. For me, the Court leaves
unanswered his unanswerable argument that no man, not
even the President of the United States, is absolutely and
fully a ove the law. _ See Ullited States v. L~6,
22 (1882), a
arb11ry v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 163
2
(1803). Until today, I had thought this principle was the
foundation of our national jurisprudence. It now appears
that it is not.
Nor can I understand the Court's holding that the absolute
immunity of Lhe President is compelled by separation-of-powers concerns, when the Court at tl'ie same time expressly
leaves open, allte, at 16, and n. 27, the possibility that the
President nevertheless may be fully subject to congressionally-created forms of liability. These two concepts, it
JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

'"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law rna~· set that Ia\\· at defiance with impunity. All the officers of
the government. from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law,
and are bound to obey it."
2
"The very essence of civil Iibert~· certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, \\'henever -he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply \\'ith the judgment of his court."

I
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seems to me, cannot coexist.
I also write separately to express my unalleviated concern
about the parties' settlement agreement the key details of
which were not disclosed to the Court by counsel until the
veritable "last minute," and even then, only because the
Halperins' motion to intervene had directed the Court's attention to them. See ante, at 11, n. 24. The Court makes
only passing mention of this agreement in Part liB of its
opinion.
For me, the case in effect \\'as settled before argument by
petitioner's payment of $142,000 to respondent. A much
smaller sum of $28,000 was left riding on an outcome favorable to respondent, with nothing at all to be paid if petitioner
prevailed, as indeed he now does. The parties publicly
stated that the amount of any payment would depend upon
subsequent proceedings in the District Court; in fact, the
parties essentially had agreed that, regardless of this Court's
ruling, no further proceedings of substance would occur in
the District Court. Surely, had the details of this agreement
been known at the time the petition for certiorari came before the Court, certiorari would have been denied. I cannot
escape the feeling that this long-undisclosed agreement
comes close to being a wager on the outcome of the case, with
all of the implications that entails.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - (1982),
most recently-and , it now appears, most conveniently-decided, affords less than comfortable support for retaining the
case. 'l The pertinent question here is not whether the case
"The agreement in Hare 11 s was not final until approved by the District
Court, - - U. S., at - - (slip op. 6). In the present case, the parties
made their agreement and presented it to the District Court only after the
fact. Further, there was no preliminary payment in H a t'e 11 s. Each respondent there was to receiYe $400 if the Court denied certiorari or affirmed, and nothing if the Court reYersed . Here , $142,000 changed hands
regardless of the subsequent disposition of the case, with the much smaller
sum of $28,000 resting on the Court's ultimate ruling. For me, this is not

79-1738-DISSENT
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is moot , but whether this is the kind of case or controversy
over which we should exercise our power of discretionary review. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302 (1943).
Apprised of all developments, I therefore would have dismissed the writ as having been improvidently granted. The
Court, it seems to me, brushes by this factor in order to resolve an issue of profound consequence that otherwise would
not be here. Lacking support for such a dismissal , however,
I join the dissent.

the kind of case or
Constitution.

contro\'er s ~·

contemplated by Article III of the

June 1, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Fourth Nixon Draft

Pending word on changes that you might wish to make, I
have begun "marking up" a Fourth Nixon draft in light of
Justice White's and Justice Blackmun's recent circulations.
Except as indicated here, all changes are entirely
stylistic, based from my increasing familiarity with the
Court Style Book.
Page 18.

j

Justice White's latest draft (page 9) quotes

someone who had thought of suing the President for damages.
Accordingly I would just omit the sentence, which adds
little, that litigation of this kind may have been
"unthinkable."

~A

$

.~ age

~1A'he

19.

Justice White has toughened his claim about

relevant history.

See his opinion

eed to respond somewhat in kind.

a~l5.

I think we

Language is suggested.

~

Pages 23-25.

~ have

Now that Justice Blackmun has written, we

to identify the particular dissent to which we are

2.

responding.

Accordingly, I have sprinkled Justice White's

name throughout the footnotes.
Response to HAB.

I also have attached a draft

paragraph responding to the claim--asserted most clearly by
". ~ /

HAB--that we cannot "divide" the absolute immunity question

~~

so as to reserve the case where Congress had expressly

~r' :::t::::a::dc::e::::n:~:: ::::~l::y~0urt::::ki:ea::r::::::e

vr ~o do so.
tDA.~

(One consideration of course is whether it would

pass easily by SOC, WHR, and the Chief~ I don't see why it

wouldn't, but there is always a risk.) If you wish to
~- include somet h ingn along these(~~n)e:d, it cdould be: (i) added

~

~-

qr

to Footnote 2 7

0

page 1

6

or

11

roppe " as a new

footnote at the end of the Story quotation on page 17.
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. ;A

~~~VV>~/

vY(/
if\/

A

pe>s.f..
JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

~'

at 1, purports not to

understand how an express congressional creation of
Presidential liability could alter the separation-of-powers
analysis applicable to a President's claim of absolute
immunity. In Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433
U.S. 425, 433 (1977), we recognized that the separation of
powers doctrine would require a balancing approach to
competing claims of constitutional prerogative asserted by
two Branches of Government.

In the event of congressional

action explicitly creating Presidential liability, we may
assume that an argument for absolute Presidential immunity
would be supported by most of the factors on which we rely
today.

On the other hand, an express congressional

assertion of its legislative power would add an important
constitutional consideration to the factors weighing against
absolute Presidential immunity from suit under this
hypothetical statute.

We have no occasion to decide the

balance that would be constitutionally required in such a
case.
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powers doctrine would require a balancing approach to
competing claims of constitutional prerogative asserted by
two Branches of Government.

In the event of congressional

action explicitly creating Presidential liability, we may
assume that an argument for absolute Presidential immunity
would be supported by most of the factors on which we rely
today.

On the other hand, an express congressional

assertion of its legislative power would add an important
constitutional consideration to the factors weighing against
absolute Presidential immunity from suit under this
hypothetical statute.

We have no occasion to decide the

balance that would be constitutionally required in such a
case.
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June 1, 1982

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your dissent in the above.

Sincerely,
#.···oc

• .,..•

Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

/
June 2, 1982

Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Harry:
I have already joined BRW's dissent.
your dissent. n ' ,·;r·"i·.
Sincerely,

T.M.

..,

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

I now join

Rider A, p. 19 (Nixon)

lfp/ss 06/02/82
NIXON19 SALLY-POW

Justice White's dissent intimates that we
minimize the importance of this historical evidence by its
location in a footnote, rather than in text.
n. 2, at 6, and at 15.

See, post,

We had not supposed that the merit

of this sort of documentation depends upon its location in
a court opinion.

In light of the fragmentary character of

the materials - none of which addressed specifically the
then remote possibility of a damage suit liability of a
President - we do think the most compelling arguments for
abso-

/

..

•

2.

Rider B, p. 19 (Nixon)
The dissent supports its historical argument by reliance,
we think, on even more fragmentary materials, including
primary reliance on ambiguous comments at state ratifying
conventions.

If the weight of evidence is considered, we

place our reliance on the contemporary understanding of
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Oliver Ellsworth.
Moreover, other pow-

lfp/ss 06/07/82

DRAFT
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred.
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously
identified as unlawful.

Until this threshold immunity

question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.

If

the law was clearly established, however, the immunity
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct.
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard,
the defense should be sustained.

But again, the defense

would turn primarily on objective factors.

lfp,fss 06/08/82

CN SALLY-POW
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your personal letter, just
received.

I reply promptly as this case should be ready

to come down on Monday - after two long years.
Obtaining and holding four votes for an opinion
on this sensitive question has not been easy.

Although

John has been cooperative throughout, he has insisted from
the outset that we expressly leave open the constitutional
question that would arise if Congress

~~ i: s ~y

impose a damages liability on a President.

sought to

I am confident

that he would not join the opinion unless this issue were
left open.
Byron complicated the situation when he relied,
as he has, on the fact that - in the present posture of
the case - we must assume that an implied cause of action
exists against the President both under Bivens and the
statutes.

Thus, I had to address this in my opinion, and

working it out with the Justices who had joined me was not
easy.

Both John and Sandra were concerned, and it was

2.

necessary for me to rewrite the note several times.

I

cannot change it now.
I fully understand your view that Congress has
no authority to impose a damages liability on the
President.

Indeed, I am inclined to agree with you.

But

the issue is not here, and the probability is that it
never will arise.

Even if a bill to this effect were

adopted by both Houses of Congress, the President surely
would veto it.

Thus, the situation that concerns us will

never arise unless at least two-thirds of both houses wish
to create this sort of constitutional crisis.
Chief, in all seriousness
e wiser now to have a five Justice Court opinion,
specially one joined by the Chief Justice.

We have

xpressly left open the issue, but in view of the basic
ationale of the opinion I would have no doubt as to the
ltimate outcome.
I am concerned, however, that your absence from
the majority opinion may dilute its authority.

It will be

characterized, of course, as a plurality and one that did
not even attract the vote of the Chief Justice.

The fact

without a
For these reasons I very much hope you will join
the opinion expressly, adding whatever you wish to add in
your concurrence.

For example, you could, if you wish,

nr4

join the opinion except its reservation with respect to
-1

affirmative congressional action.

If you should do this,

I hope you will not refer to Harry's point as to whether
there is "anything to reserve".

I have had trouble enough

holding my "troops" together because of this and related
questions.
After two years, we are on the verge of settling
- I think for all time - a major constitutional question.

13 u_f
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the Chief Justice of the United States .. will add his;

v~e~·~o~j
'\

Sincerely,

~~

June 8, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
I do not believe you have ever expressly ioined
the Court opinion, although in your letter of March 18 you
said:
"In due time T will join you in 79-1738."
~s there now appears to be a fair chance of
bringinq ~ixon ann Harlow down on ~onday, I would like to he
sure of your JOtn.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

PERSONAL
June 8, 1982
Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lew is:
I am making a few stylistic changes in my concurring
opinion, but adding one that is more than stylistic. It is
really the entire point of my concurrence that the immunity is
Constitutional. That being so I do not see the basis for any
suggestion (your Note 27} that there is any reserved question.
My substantive footnote (N.7} will read as follows,
probably on the final page:
"In a footnote the Court suggests that 'we need not
address directly' whether Congress could create a damages action
against a President. However, once it is established that the
Constitution confers absolute immunity, as the Court holds today,
legislative action cannot alter that result. Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (1803}."
I had thought that was firmly settled law since Marbury v.
Madison. In short, Harry has a point at his page 1-2. In other
words, there is no question to "reserve."
You could solve this, of course, by omitting Note 27. It
is incongruous that a plurality of four "invites" Congress to
engage in an obviously futile act of passing a statute
unconstitutional on its face.
In short, we ought to "bite the bullet" after all the
travail you have borne for two Terms.
I would be glad to discuss.
11

Re, ards,

vt
Just ice Powell

June 8, 1982
PERSONAL
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzaerald

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your personal letter, just received.
I reply promptly as this case should be ready to come down
on Monday - after two long years.
Obtaining and holding four votes for an opinion on
this sensitive question has not been easy. Although John
has been cooperative throughout, he has insisted from the
outset that we expressly leave open the constitutional
question that would arise if Conqress sought to impose a
damages liability on a President. I am confident that he
would not join the opinion unless this issue were left open.
Byron complicated the situation when he relied, as
he has, on the fact that - in the present posture of the
case - we must assume that an implied cause of action exists
against the President both under Bivens and the statutes.
Thus, I had to address this in my opinion, and working it
out with the Justices who had joined me was not easy. Both
John and Sandra were concerned, and it was necessary for me
to rewrite the note several times. I cannot change it now.
I fully understand your view that Congress has no
authority to impose a damages liability on the President.
Indeed, I am inclined to agree with you. But the issue is
not here, and the probability is that it never will arise.
Even if a bill to this effect were adopted by both Houses of
Congress, the President surely would veto it. Thus, the
situation that concerns us wi.ll never arise unless at least
two-thirds of both houses wish to create this sort of
constitutional crisis.
I am concerned, however, that your absence from
the majority opinion may dilute its authority. It will be
characterized, of course, as a plurality and one that did
not even attract the vote of the Chief Justice. The fact
that you may have gone a bit farther than the plurality

2.

still leaves that opinion, with all of its basic analysis,
without a majority. A plurality on an issue as inflammatory
as this one (see opinions of dissenting judges here and in
Harlow), will invite future challenges when the composition
of the Court changes.
For these reasons I very much hope you wi.11 join
the opinion expressly, adding whatever you wish to add in
your concurrence. For example, you could, if you wish, join
the opinion except only its reservation with respect to
affirmative congressional action. If you should do this, I
hope you 'A' ill not refer to Harry's point as to whether there
is "anything to reserve". I have had trouble enough holding
my "troops" together because of this and related questions.
After two years, we are on the verge of settling think for all time - a major constitutional question. But
we need the agreement of the Chief Justice of the United
States.
I

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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June 10, 1982

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , .JR .

79-1738
Dear Chief:

·
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Nixon v. Fitzgerald
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As I wrote yesterday afternoon, I am entirely willing
to confer - as you suggest. It may possibly shorten our
discussion if I respond to what I now understand to be your
objection to note 27. You say that it "significantly
undermines the entire holding of the case", and that the
opinion "gives intimations that Congress - under some
circumstances -could change it".
Then you quote Harry's conclusory, off-hand statement
that my opinion is contradictory, and that the Court "cannot
have it both ways".
I respond to these points. Having devoted, in total,
more time on the Nixon case last Term, and on Nixon and
Harlow this Term, than on any half a dozen cases since I
have been on the Court, I have no intention of "undermining"
the end product of all of this labor. So far as I know, you
are the only member of the Court who entertains this view.
Nor do I find in the opinion any "intimations" that it would
be lawful for Congress to impose specifically a damages
liability.
I come now to what we will call Harry's "can't have it
both ways" dictum. As I have said to you and others with us
in this case, my own view is that it would be
unconstitutional for Congress to impose a damage liability
on the President.
But I cannot say that it is irrational to think that
reasonable minds may not differ if Congress were to enact
specific legislation, identifying certain limited types of
conduct that would justify a damages remedy if a President
knowingly violated the statute. Moreover, I followed your
opinion in the Nixon tapes case in applying what in effect
is a balancing type of analysis. A statute duly adopted by
Congress, and signed by an incumbent President, certainly
would be a new factor - not present in this case - that a
court would weigh. In the Nixon tapes case you engage in
precisely the same type of weighing constitutional and
policy considerations.

2.

Proceeding on the theory that we do not decide
constitutional issues not presented, ' I have included the
reservation - tb which you object in note 27 - in every
circulation since my first draft of March 17.
After Byron argued that we must assume that implied
private causes of action exist in this case (as is correct),
I enlarged note 27 as a response to him. Under the
collateral order doctrine, we are addressing only the
immunity issue. You will recall your insistence that we
write the case this way, rather than dispose of it on the
theory that there was neither a Bivens remedy nor an implied
cause of action. Therefore, our holding will be that at
least where there is only an implied cause of action, the
immunity of a President is absolute.
I repeat, however, that I will be happy to discuss all
of this further.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

lfp/ss 06/10/82
MEMORANDUM
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
In his dissenting opinion, Harry states he cannot
"understand the Court's holding that the absolute immunity
of the President is compelled by separation-of-powers
concerns, when the Court at the same time expressly leaves
open ..• the possibility that the President nevertheless may
be fully subject to congressionally-created forms of
liability."

The two concepts, he contends, "cannot

coexist."
In my view Harry is simply wrong.

His argument

misapprehends the balancing approach to separation-of-powers
questions prescribed by recent decisions of this Court. Our
unanimous opinion in the Nixon Tapes Case is a highly
relevant example.

In language substantially identical to

that used to describe the President's absolute immunity in
this case, the Court stated that the President's evidentiary
"privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution."

418

u.s.,

at 708. Nonetheless, in the Tapes

case, and despite finding that the privilege was
constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of
constitutional weight could be more weighty in a particular
case.

See pp. 711-712:

2.

"In this case we must weigh the importance
of the general privilege pf confidentiality
of Pr~sidential communications in performance
of the President's responsibilities against
the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice."
The reservation in this case merely represents an
application of the balancing analysis applied in United
States v. Nixon.

Like the President's evidentiary

privilege, absolute Presidential immunity fairly may be
described as "fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution."
immunity is

In this sense the President's absolute

"constitutional."

At the same time, however,

the constitutional factors mandating absolute immunity can
be described, under a balancing approach, as defining the
weight only on one side of the scale.
In this case at p. 16, my opinion says:
"We consider this immunity a functionally
mandated incident of the President's unique
office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers • . . . "
My opinion holds that the constitutional grounds
supporting absolute Presidential immunity outweigh the
arguments advanced by BRW for civil damages liability.
In the unlikely event that Congress acts directly
to impose liability, another constitutional factor would
have to be considered:

Namely, the fact that Congress had

enacted legislation approved by the encumbent President,
that purported to impose a damages liability.

The

3.

reservation in note 27 of my opinion merely acknowledges
this.

It does

no~

suggest that the cbnstitutional arguments

supporting immunity would be diminished in such a case.

Nor

does the reservation imply how the balance then would be
struck in such a case.

The reservation simply acknowledges

that direct congressional action would confront this Court
with a different case and a different constitutional
question--a question that need not be decided now, even
though the method of analysis would be the same.
My opinion's approach thus accords with the Court's
settled, prudent policy of avoiding unnecessary decisions of
constitutional questions.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
In Justice White's note 2 he suggests - prior to
today - Presidents, prosecutors, judges, congressional aides
and other officials, "could have been held liable for the
kind of cliam put forward by Fitzgerald - a personnel
decision made for unlawful reasons."
is simply not so.

(emphasis added)

This

The law has not heretofore permitted a

plaintiff to recite

"~agicw

words and have the incantation

operate to make the immunity vanish.

Moreover, and more

fundamentally, Justice White errs in treating all of the
above named officials as if the scope of their authority
were identical.

~he

authority of a President, head of the

executive branch of our aovernment - a wholly unique office
- is far broader than that of any other official.

As the

Court states a President has authority in the course of
personnel changes in an executive department to make
personnel decisions.

This is not to say that, in a given

case, it would not be appropriate to raise the question
whether an official - even the President - had acted "within
the scope of [the official's] constitutional and statutory
duties".

The doctrine of absolute immunity does not extend

beyond such action.

.i'u.p:rtntt Qfltltri ttl tqt ~tt~ .i'ta:ttg
Jfasfri:ttghtn. !l. <!}:. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

T HE CH I EF JUSTI CE

June 10, 1982
Re:

No. 79-J738- Nixon v . Fitzgerald

Dear Lew is:
I am amending my concurring opinion in this
case as follows:
(a) Insert on page 1, after first full
paragraph the following:
However, that does not
mean a President is "above the
law." Nixon v. United States,
418 U• S • 6 8 3 ( 19 7 4) • The
dissents are very wide of the
mark to the extent that they
imply that the Court today
recognizes a sweeping immunity
for a President for all acts.
The Court does no such thing.
The immunity, as spelled out by
the Court today, is limited to
decisions and actions within the
scope of a President's
constitutional and statutory
duties. Ante, at 20-22, n. 34.
A President, like a Member of
Congress, a judge , a prosecutor
or a congressional aide, all with
absolute immunity, is not immune
for acts outside official duties
that inflict injury on others .
"Straw men" are, of course, more
easily toppled than real ones.
{b) Insert on page 5 after line 2 (the final
sentence of the opinion), the following:
Far from placing a President
"above the law" the Court's
holding places a President on
essentially the same footing with
judges and the other officials
whose absolute immunity we have
recognized.

(c)

Footnote 6, page 5, now reads:
In footnote 27 the Court suggests
that "we need not address
directly" whether Congress could
create a damages action against a
President. However, the Court
has addressed that issue and
resolved it: once it is
established that the Constitution
confers absolute immunity, as the
Court holds today, legislative
action cannot alter that result.
Nothing in the Court's opinion is
to be read as suggesting that a
constitutional holding of this
Court can be legislatively
overruled or modified. Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
Regards,

Justice Powell

lfp/ss 06/10/82
MEMORANDUM
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
In his dissenting opinion, Harry states he cannot
"understand the Court's holding that the absolute immunity
of the President is compelled by separation-of-powers
concerns, when the Court at the same time expressly leaves
open ••• the possibility that the President nevertheless may
be fully subject to congressionally-created forms of
liability."

The two concepts, he contends, "cannot

coexist."
In my view Harry is simply wrong.
misapprehends the balanci.nq approach to
questions

prescribe~

Hi.s argument

s~paration-of-powers

by recent decisions of this Court. Our

unanimous opinton in the Nixon Tapes Case is a highly
relevant example.

In language substantially identical to

that used to describe the President's absolute immunity in
this case, the Court stated that the President's evidentiary
"privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution."

418

u.s.,

at 708. Nonetheless, in the Tapes

case, and despite finding that the privilege was
constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of
constitutional weight could be more weighty in a particular
case.

See pp. 711-712:

,,

2.

"In this case we must weigh the importance
of the general privilege of confidentiality
of Presidential communications in performance
of the President's responsibilities against
the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal iustice."
The reservation in this case merely represents an
application of the balancing analysis applied in United
States v. Nixon.

Like the President's evidentiary

privilege, absolute Presidential immunity fairly may be
described as "fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution."
immunity is

In this sense the President's absolute

"constitutional."

At the same time, however,

the constitutional factors mandating absolute immunity can
be described, under a balancing approach, as defining the
weight only on one side of the scale.
In this case at p. 16, my opinion says:
"We consider this immuni.ty a functionally
mandated incident of the President ' s unique
office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers • • • • "
My opinion holds that the constitutional grounds
supporting absolute Presidential immunity outweigh the
arguments advanced by BRW for civil damages liability.
In the unlikely event that Congress acts directly
to impose liability, another constitutional factor would
have to be considered:

Namely, the fact that Congress had

enacted legislation approved by the encumbent President,
that purported to impose a damages liability.

The

3.

reservation in n6te 27 of my opinion merely acknowledges
this.

It does not suggest that the constitutional arguments

supporting immunity would be diminished in such a case.

Nor

does the reservation imply how the balance then would be
struck in such a case.

The reservation simply acknowledges

that direct congressional action would confront this Court
with a different case and a different constitutional
question--a question that need not be decided now, even
though the method of analysis would be the same.
My opinion's approach thus accords with the Court's
settled, prudent policy of

avol~ing

constitutional questions.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

I

•

unnecessary decisions of
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NIXON25 SALLY-POW
The dissenters, reaching for authority to
support their position, cite a current edition of Time
magazine.

Apart from the novelty of citing a popular

mangazine on a constitutional issue, the article, of
course, made no reference to damages liability.

Rather,

its statement merely reflected the judgment of this Court
in the Nixon tapes case and the impeachment resolution of
the House Judiciary Committee.

Contrary to the contention

of the dissenters, and President's continuing amenability
to these forms of legal process demonstrates the
transparent fallacy - rather than the correctness - of the
dissenting view.

This case involves only immunity from

·..

private damage suit liability for decision and actions
within the scope of a President's authority.

~lune

11, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
As your revised concurring opinion has now b~en
circulated, I write to say that I am ready for the case to
come down - provided, of course, the dissenting Justi.ces
also are ready.
Is there a possibility that we could do this on

Tuesday?

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Jfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

.J U ST I CE BYRO N R . WH ITE

June 11, 1982

Re:

79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
I

shall

not

be

ready

Tuesday.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

in

Nixon

by
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CHAMBE RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 11, 1982
Re:

No . 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I will add to Note 2 page 2 the following:
"75000 public officers have absolute
i mmunity from civil damage suits for
acts within the scope of their
official function ."
Regards,

June 11, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Harlow

Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra:
First, we welcome the constructi.ve and supportive
changes made by the Chief. Justice in his concurring opinion.
I now ask your advice.
In Byron's latest
circulation, his note 2 on page 4 cites Time maqazine. This
presents a rather tempting "target". What would you think
of my adding a note - as encloseo - as a ~~parate paragraph
in note 42 at the end of our opinion on page 25?

As we may be able to bring this case down on
Tuesday, I would a~preci.ate your thoughts this morning if
convenient.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

79-1738---MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE
2

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

for acts outside official duties. 2
The immunity of a President from civil suits is not simply a
doctrine derived from this Court's interpretation of common
law or public policy. Of course we are "guided" by the Constitution, ante, at 15, but absolute immunity for a President
for acts within the official duties of the Chief Executive is to
be found in the constitutional separation of powers or it does
not exist. The Court today holds that the Constitution man- ~
dates such immunity and I agree.
The essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent functioning of each co-equal branch of
government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free
from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other
branches. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707
(1974); United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606, 617 (1972).
Even prior to the adoption of our Constitution, as well as
after, judicial review of legislative action was recognized in
some instances as necessary to maintain the proper checks
and balances. Den on the Dem. of Bayard & Wife v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787); Cases ofthe Judges ofthe Court
' In their "parade of horribles" and lamentations, the dissents also
wholly fail to acknowledge why the same perils they fear are not present in
the absolute immunity the law has long recognized for numerous other officials. The dissenting opinions manifest an astonishing blind side in pointing to that old reliable that "no man is above the law." The Court has had
no difficulty expanding the absolute immunity of Members of Congress,
and in granting derivative absolute immunity to numerous aides of Members. United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). We have since recognized absolute immunity for judges, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349
(1978), and for prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), yet
the Constitution provides no hint that either judges, prosecutors or Congressional aides should be so protected. Absolute immunity for judges
and prosecutors is seen to derive from the common law and public policy,
which recognize the need to protect judges and prosecutors from harassment. The potential danger to the citizenry from the malice of thousands
of prosecutors and judges is at once more pervasive and less open to constant, public scrutiny than the actions of a President.

\

79-1738-MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE
NIXON v. FITZGERALD

3

of Appeals, 4 Call's 135 (1788). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 J
Cranch 137 (1803). However, the Court's opinion correctly
observes that judicial intrusion through private damage actions improperly impinges on and hence interferes with the
independence that is imperative to the functions of the office
of a President.
Exposing a President to civil damage actions for official
acts within the scope of the Executive authority would inev- \
itably subject presidential actions to undue judicial scrutiny.
The judiciary always must be hesitant to probe into the elements of presidential decision-making and such judicial intervention is not to be tolerated absent imperative constitutional
necessity. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 709-716. ;)
No such intervention is warranted in the present case, as the
Court holds.
The enormous range and impact of Presidential decisionsfar beyond that of any one Member of Congress-inescapably
means that many persons will consider themselves aggrieved
by such acts. Absent absolute immunity, every person who
feels aggrieved would be free to bring a suit for damages, and
each suit-especially those that proceed on the meritswould involve some judicial questioning of Presidential acts,
including the reasons for the decision, how it was arrived at,
the information on which it was based, and who supplied the
information. Such scrutiny of day-to-day decisions of the \
Executive Branch would be bound to occur if civil damage actions were made available to private individuals. Although
the individual who claims wrongful conduct may indeed have
sustained some injury, the need to prevent large scale invasion of the Executive function by the judiciary far outweighs
the need to vindicate the private claims. We have decided \
that in a similar sense Members of both Houses of Congress-and their aides-must be totally free from judicial
scrutiny for legislative acts; the public interest, in other
3

See also United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch 469, 507 (1807).

79-1738-MEMORANDUM OF CONCURRENCE
4

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

words, outweighs the need for private redress of one claiming injury from legislative acts of a Member or aide of a Member.~ The Court's concern, and the even more emphatic concerns expressed by JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, over
"unremedial wrongs" to citizens by a President seem odd
when one compares the potential for "wrongs" which thousands of CongTessional aides, prosecutors, and judges can
theoretically inflict-with absolute immunity-on the same
citizens for whom this concern is expressed.
Judicial intervention would also inevitably inhibit the processes of Executive Branch decision-making and impede the
functioning of the Office of the President. The need to defend damage suits would have the serious effect of diverting
the attention of a President from his executive duties since
defending a lawsuit today-even a lawsuit ultimately found
to be frivolous-often requires significant expenditures of
time and money, as many former public officials have learned
to their sorrow. This very case graphically illustrates the
point.
When litigation processes are not tightly-controlled-and often they are not-they can and are used as
mechanisms of extortion. Ultimate vindication on the merits does not repair the damage. :;
} ....fL_...;
' United States v. Gravel, 408 U. S. 606 (1972). The Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946 reflects this policy distinction; in it Congress waived
sovereign immunity for certain damage claims, but pointedly excepted any
"discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion involved
be abused." 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a) (1976). Under the Act damage resulting from discretionary governmental action is not subject to compensation.
See, e. g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953). For such injuries Congress may in its discretion provide separate nonjudicial remedies
such as private bills.
In this case Fitzgerald received substantial relief through the route provided by Congress: the Civil Service Commission ordered him reinstated
with backpay. Joint App. 87a-88a.
•Judge Learned Hand described his feelings:
"After now some dozen years of experience I must say that as a litigant I
should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and
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I fully agree that the constitutional concept of separation of
independent co-equal powers dictates that a President be immune from civil damage actions based on acts within the
scope of Executive authority while in office. 6 Far from plac- l
ing a President above the law, the Court's holding places a
President on essentially the same footing with judges and
other officials whose absolute immunity we have recognized.

death." 3 Lectures on Legal Topics, Assn of the Bar of the City of New
York 105 (1926).
6
In footnote 27, ante, the Court suggests that "we need not address elirectly" whether Congress could create a damages action against a President. However, the Court has addressed that issue and resolved it; once
it is established that the Constitution confers absolute immunity, as the
Court holds today, legislative action cannot alter that result. Nothing in
the Court's opinion is to be read as suggesting that a Constitutional holding
of this Court can be legislatively oven·uled or modified. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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14, 1982

Personal
Nixon
Dear Chief:
It mi.ght be well to respond to BRW's attempt to
distinquish types of immunity on the ground of whether "a
personal decision allegedly was made for unlawful reasons".
BRW says this is a kind of claim "put forward by
Fitzgerald". Apparently BRW is saying that neither a judge
nor prosecutor would have immunity if there were such an
allegation. I can scarcely believe he is serious.
Prosecutors, in particular, make personal decisions every
day as to whom they will prosecute and who knows whether
their reasons would be viewed as lawful if immunity turned
on this! The same can be said as to judicial decisions,
particularly in close cases involving personal iudgments as
to morality, what will be popular with the public when a
judge is facing reelection, and the like.

If Nixon ordered Fitzgerald to be fired as part of
personnel changes in the Defense Department, this clearly
was within his Executive authority.
BRW states that you "fail to grasp (this] difference".
He deserves a response, and I hope you will give him one.
Perhaps the library could find for you a case involving
the prosecutor in New Orleans who was so controversial. His
name was Garrison. I think we had a cert petition filed
here by one of his victims who made a strong case that he
had been prosecuted purely for vindictive and personal
reasons.
If you elect to answer BRW, I may add a sentence at the
end of the final footnote in the Court opinion makinq a
cross reference to your response to the dissenters argument
that we are elevating the President "above the law".
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

June 14, 1982

Personal

79-1738 t.>Hxon

Dear Chief:
I must correct my letter delivered to you earlier, as I
had misread one word in Byron's opinion. He used
"personnele rather than "personal". The mountain of
material that we have to read induces mistakes!

You had a better perception of what Byron was saying.
He overlooks the central point that the President, vested by
the Constitution with the authority of the Executive Branch
of government, certainly has jurisdiction over personnel
matters. The scope of authority of judges and prosecutors
is more limited than that of a President. Yet all three
possess absolute immunity only when they act within their
authority.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde
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For insertion as a footnote on page 23, to be dropped from
the citation in text to

u.s.

v. Nixon.

In his dissenting opinion, post, at 1, Justice BLACKMUN
states he cannot "understand the Court's holding that the
absolute immunity of the President is compelled by
separation-of-powers concerns, when the Court at the same
time expressly leaves open

the possibility that the

President nevertheless may be fully subject to
congressionally-created forms of liability."
concepts, he contends, "cannot coexist."

The two

Id., at 2.

Justice BLACKMUN's argument misapprehends the balancing
approach to separation-of-powers questions prescribed by
such cases as Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433
U.S. 425, 443
683, 703-713

(1977) and United States v. Nixon, 418
(1974).

u.s.

In the Nixon Tapes Case, for example,

the Court stated that the Constitution mandated judicial
recognition of an evidentiary privilege protecting the
communications of the President of the United States.

In

language similar to that used today to describe the
President's absolute immunity, we characterized that
evidentiary privilege as "fundamental to the operation of
Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution."

418 U.S., at 708.

Nonetheless, despite finding that the privilege was

---------~----

2.
constitutionally mandated, we held that other factors of
constitutional weight could be so compelling as to overcome
the privilege in a particular case.

Our reservation in this

case is consistent with this balancing approach.

It

acknowledges that action by Congress might be considered a
factor of constitutional weight, which might require the
Court to reexamine the balance on the constitutional scale.

J

Cf. , Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635-638 (1952}

(Jackson, J., concurring}.

We do not suggest

that the constitutional arguments supporting Presidential

I

immunity would be diminished in such a case.
imply how the balance then would be struck.

Nor do we
We simply

acknowledge that explicit congressional action would
confront this Court with a different case.
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Reaching for authority to support the dissenting
position, Justice WHITE purports to derive su port from a
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current edition of Time magazine. ABut the issue that he
quotes does no more than report the unremarkable
proposition, with which we are in full agreement, that the
President is not above the law.

This unusual source thus

would provide legal support for the dissent only if Time
should share the dissent's persistent error--that of
confusing immunity from damages liability with being "above
the law."

The Time article of course made no reference to
~he-
damages liability. Rather, its statement referred to the

7

judgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes case and of the
House Judiciary Committee in voting an impeachment
resolution.

The President's continuing amenability to these

forms of legal process demonstrates that the President
remains as much subject to the law today as ever before.
~

The immunityA recognizef ~ extends only to private suits
for damages based on decisions and actions within the scope
of a President's authority.
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In Justice White's note 2 he suggests -prior to
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today - Presidents, prosecutors, judges, congressional aides
and other officials, "could have been held liable for the
kind of cliam put forward by Fitzgerald - a personnel
decision made for unlawful reasons."
is simply not so.

[emphasis added]

This

The law has not heretofore permitted a

plaintiff to recite "magic" words and have the incantation
operate to make the immunity vanish.

Moreover, and more

fundamentally, Justice White errs in treating all of the
above named officials as if the scope of their authority
were identical.

The authority of a President, head of the

executive branch of our government - a wholly unique office
- is far broader than that of any other official.

As the

Court states a President has authority in the course of
personnel changes in an executive department to make
personnel decisions.

This is not to say that, in a given

case, it would not be appropriate to raise the question
whether an official - even the President - had acted "within
the scope of [the official's] constitutional and statutory
duties".

The doctrine of absolute immunity does not extend

beyond such action.
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June 15, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Changes in Nixon

Your letter seems perfectly appropriate.

Attached are

the clean copies of the two suggested additions, with your
changes entered.

If you want to change the format before

circulating these to other Justices, either Sally or Ginny
would know how to "get" the files from my Atex.
make changes myself.

Or I could

June 15, 1982

79-1738

~ixon

v. Fitzqerald

Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra,
In view of Byron's additions on paqes 4-5 and 30
of his opinion, and the fact that this case now will not
come down until next week, I no lonqer can resist the
temptation to respond.
One of my ~reposed notes addresses specifically
Byron's reliance on Time magazine in his "eye-catching" note
2.
The se-cond suggested aodition i.s a response
primarily to Harry's statement that our opinion is
internally contradictory. Again, possible misunderstanding
here could be clarified, by empha.sizinq the parallel with
the Court's decision - and its rationale - in United States
v. Nixon.
If vou approve, I will add these notes to what I
hope will be a final circulated draft.
I am grateful to each of you for "stavinq with me"
during this long (and now boring!) process.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

.:§utrrttttt C!Jonrt of tltt 'Jltnittb ~ta±ts
..asfringtMT.. ;!8. <!f. 21lc?J.I.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

June 15, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra,
In view of Byron's additions on pages 4-5 and 30
of his opinion, and the fact that this case now will not
come down until next week, I no longer can resist the
temptation to respond.
One of my proposed notes addresses specifically
Byron's reliance on Time magazine in his "eye-catching" note
2.
The second suggested addition is a response
primarily to Harry's statement that our opinion is
internally contradictory. Again, possible misunderstanding
here could be clarified, by emphasizing the parallel with
the Court's decision - and its rationale - in United States
v. Nixon.
If you approve, I will add these notes to what I
hope will be a final circulated draft.
I am grateful to each of you for "staying with me"
during this long (and now boring!) process.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

PERSONAL
June 15, 1982
Re:
Dear

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Lew is:

I can't conceivably understand why you insist on rev1v1ng
the issue that, between us, we have blurred. You now emphasize:
4

We do not suggest that the
constitutional arguments supporting
Presidential immunity would be diminished in
such a case. [i.e., if Congress acted]. Nor
do we imply how that balance would be struck.
We simply acknowledge that explicit
congressional action would confront this
Court with a different case.
(A different case yes, but precisely the same result.)
For me this undoes virtually all the reconciling you and I
have struggled with for days now. And it is wholly unnecessary
since John found my opinion acceptable.
I am unwilling to hedge on this issue as the opinion now
does, and Jackson's sole view in Youngstown carries no weight
with me. I would not even cite it.
Let Byron "rant" on this point but don't fall into the
trap of answering him and rendering the opinion unacceptable to
me.
I'm ready to talk if you wish.
Regards,

Justice Powell

~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)
)

A. ERNEST FITZGERALD,

/

)

v.

)
)

Plaintiff,

ROBERT E. HAMPTON, et _!!:,

Defendants.

CML ACTION NO. 76-1486

)
)
)

FILED

)
)

JUN 151982
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
OI~T~ICT OF COLUMBIA

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The parties, through their counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

1.

The United States Air Force ("Air Force") shall assign A. Ernest

Fitzgerald to the position of Management Systems Deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force·(Financial Management) effective June 21, 1982. The
job description for this position is attached as. Exhibit 1 and incorporated into
this Settlement Agreement.

2.

The Air Force shall in good faith assign Fitzgerald tasks and work

assignments commensurate with the position of Management Systems Deputy to
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and provide
him with the appr6priate resources to carry out these assignments. Fitzgerald
shall in good faith perform the tasks assigned to him in this position.

3.

Pursuant to Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this

action is dismissed with prejudice subject only to the jurisdiction of the Court to
enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Should any party to this
Settlement Agreement believe, that any other party or parties have violated any
provision of the Agreement, that party ·may file a motion In Civil Action No•

.

76-1486 alleging violation of the Settlement Agreement and the Court shall

entertain such application to determine Its validity and whether relief is
appropriate.

4.

On February 6, 1984, the Air

~orce

shall file a. written report to this

Court describir1g in detail the assignments given Fitzgerald in the position of
Management Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Financial Management).

5.

Simultaneously herewith the parties have fiJed a joint motion asking

the Court to vacate the March 31, 1982, Memorandum and Order issued in this
ease. Whether this Court grants or denies this joint motion sha.ll not affect the
instant Settlement Agreement.

6.

The Air Force shall pay to Fitzgerald's counsel on the date of the

Court's approval of this Agreement the sum of $200,000 as attorneys' fees and
costs for legal services provided plaintiff in this action.
constitute full satisfaction of any and all claims

~or

This payment shall

attorneys' fees and costs,

and plaintiff and his counsel hereby waive any and all claims against defendants
for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with these proceedings.

7.

This Settlement Agreement does not constitute, and shall not be

construed, as an admission of liability by the defendants nor as a concession by
any party as to the correctness of any legal position or factual asserti on
advanced by any other party in this action.

~/~~
vnrn
BDNER,Rt

R . (~~
R. LAWRENCE DESSEM

Attorney, Department of Justice
lOth & Pennsylvania Ave., N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Tel: (202) 633-5108

HOWREY & SIMON
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 383-6899
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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

I.

INTRODUCTION:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The incumbent of this position acts for and assists the Principal Deputy
and Assistant Secretary for Financial Management as Management Systems Deputy
with r.esponsibility and authority necessary for the development of

improved

management controls and broader use of statistical analysis within the Air Force.
D.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
1. The Management Systems Deputy is responsible at the highest Air

Force

level for policies and procedures regarding:
(a) Integrated performance measurement, cost control and
reduction
(b) Economic cost effectiveness analysis
(c) Management information and control systems
(d) Productivity enhancement and measurement
(e) Statistical programs and analysis.
(f) Cost estimating and cost analysis.

2. Provides guidance and direction to the Air Staff and the Commands for
the development and/or implementation of management information and

control

systems, resource management systems and associated data bases.
3. Formulates, establishes and implements policies and procedures for the
Air Force productivity program including development of productivity
enhancement goals and necessary reporting systems.
.C. Responsible for Air Force integrated performance measurement including

cost control and reduction activities.

This responsibility includes supervision of

Air Force performance measurement activities including cost/schedules control
systems criteria (C/SCSC).

Responsible for development of new systems and

improvements of current systems for cost control and cost reduction, for
application of "should cost" and related analyses and synthesis · techniques to
Air Force cost estimating, and for Air Force economic cost effectiveness analysis.
5. Performs or directs analyses and reviews of Air Force operational plans,
mobilization plans, programs for foreign aid and other data, upon which financial
requirements for resources are based, in order to develop or direct the development
of effective management control systems.

EXHIBIT l

- - -~-.-

·.

- ~-'

6. Develops policies and procedures, and monitors the implementation of
Air Force statistical programs including methods of analysis and presentation.
7. Serves as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management)
while

~e

is

~ppearing

before congressional committees.

Serves on such committees

and boards as specified by the Principal Deputy/ Assistant Secretary.
B. Testifies before Congressional committees when requested.
9. Assures necessary program coordination between the Department of the
Air Force, Department of Defense and other government agencies.
10. Accomplishes management studies and special projects as assigned by
the Principal Deputy (Financial Management) or the Assistant Secretary (Financial
Management).
Supervision Exercised:

Incumbent is delegated necessary authority to carry

out assigned duties and has authority to utilize resources, including manpower, as
required to satisfactorily discharge the duties of his office.
lll.

CONTROLS OVER WORK:
Reports to the Principal Deputy/ Assistant Secretary (Financial Management).

Supervision is limited normally to status reports furnished to the Principal Deputy/
Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) for purposes of keeping them informed
and/or for further guidance and direction. Accomplishes assigned duties and
responsibilities with a high degree of individual initiative and creativity. Requires
a high degree of professional stature.
JV.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACTS:
This position requires access to TOP SECRET information.

paragraph 4b(2)(g), AFR 40-3.
authorized

~.ravel

Incumbent has direct access to information and is

to visit Air Force field activities

to perform duties described .herein.

,

Sensitive under

~nd

contractors as necessary

lfp/ss 06/16/82
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For addition at the end of footnote 42, p.25.

Reaching for authority to suoport the dissenting
positi.on, ,Justice WHI"''E purports to derive support from a
recent edition of Time magazine.

But the issue that he

quotes does no more than report the unremarkable
proposition, with which we are fn full aqreement, that the
President is not above the law.

This unusual source thus

would provide legal support for the tHssent only if Ti.me
should share the djssent•s persistent error--that of
confusinq immunity from damages liab)litv Nitb being "ahove
the law."

"~"he

'T'ime article of course made no reoference to

damages liability for official acts.

Rather, its statement

referred to the iudgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes
case and of the House

~lur'Hciary

impeachment resolution.

Commit tee in voting an

The President's continuing

amenability to these forms of legal process demonstrates
that the President remains as much subject to the
as ever before.

l~w

today

The immunity tecognized today extends only

to private suits for

damaqe~

based on decisions and actions

within the scope of a President ' s authority .

,.

June 16, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

ME"P-WHANDUM '!'0 'T'RE CONFRR"'.:NCE:

I prooose to add the attached paragraph at the end
of footnote 42 on page 25 of the Court's opinion.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

·'

June 16, 1982

Dear Byron:

In takinq a last look at my Nixon draft, it seems to me
that the O?inion is "heavier" on footnotes than I ordinarilv
would like an opinion to be.
Would it inconvenience you if I were to move F.ootnote
34 to text?

t would propose simply to elevate the note--

without any substantive chanqes--to text, probably under a
subhead "C," at the end of the the last sentence on page 23.

Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386·U. 8., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. 8. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is .
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. aJ
this Court's 1971 BiL·ens deci~ion, fe,rer than a handful of dam:Jgcs D.ction
ever were fiJed against the President. · None appears to have proceeded to
judgment on the merits .
""Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospe.ct that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand \\Tote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (C<\2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for .. . [den~ing reconry] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
' 'These dangers are significant even though there is no histmical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a 1ight to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional 'iolations ,,·as not even recognized until
ivens v. Six Unkuown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
In defining the scope of an official's absolute p1iYilege, this Cow-t has
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at

cl3.
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Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S., at 43~31. But the Court
also has refused to drav.: lines finer than history and reason would support.
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege
applicable ... . ");Stump v. Sp01·kman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial
privilege applies even to acts occun-ing outside "the normal att1ibutes of a
judicial proceeding''). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, ,,.e think it approp1iate to extend to him absolute immunity from damages actions based on acts within the "outer pe1-imeter" of
the area of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad Yaliety of areas, many of which are
highly ensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a lJarticular action . In this case, for
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress- a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the unclerlJing reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job,
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions,
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for ,,·hich acts
,,·ere taken. Inqui1ies of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the pe1-imeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was Ja,vfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such
cause as ·will promote the efficiency of the sen-ice." B1ief for Respondent
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 75l2(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could. ''ithin his authm-ity, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed \\-ithout satisfying this standard
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial

I

.'
. I

11

.i
''

I

I

.J

i

,j

'

! '

o ..:\-

79-1738-0PINION
22

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an_ official's evidentiary privile.ge, 36 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separation of po\vers under the Constitution." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See,
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 3' But our cases also ·
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction,
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
. served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General

Mo'Je.tl

t e,ct.,
-~.,.,~t~6

+o
e~,.-\

on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action ,,·as taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
· i~munity of its intended effect.
It clearly is \\lthin the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary \\ill "conduct the bu siness" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to· prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay ,,·ell within the outer perimeter of his authority.
a.; This tradition can l;>e traced far back into ow· constitutional history.
See, e. g., Jfississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 . 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through. the impeaching power.").
36
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss St![iung v. V.E.B. Ca1·/ Zeiss. -Je.na. 40 F ..R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F . 2d 979 (CADC), cert tlenied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
:r. Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
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Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers,
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supm, or to vindicate the publicjnterest
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v.
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38
3!! The Court has recognized befor
at there is a lesser public interest in
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 311-373 (1980); cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711- 712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals
\\·hose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of JusTJCE WHJTE's dissent, it is not true that our jurispruclence ordinarily supplies ·a remedy iri civil damages for eYery legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for
any official. Yet the di ssent makes no attack on the absolute immunity
recognized for judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages r~medy for every legal \\Tong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Cw-ran, - - U. S. - - (1982): Middlesex Collnty Sen-erage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); Califor·nia v. Sierra Club,
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JusTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknou:n Fedeml Agents, 403 U. S., at 396;
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S.; at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate").
Even the case on which JUSTJCE WHITE places principal reliance,
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79-1738 Nixon

v. Fitzgerald

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I propose to add the attached paragraph at the end
of footnote 42 on page 25 of the Court's opinion.

L.F.P., Jr.

lfp/ss 06/16/82
79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald
For addition at the end of footnote 42, p.25.

Reaching for authority to support the dissenting
position, Justice WHITE purports to derive support from a
recent edition of Time magazine.

But the issue that he

quotes does no more than report the unremarkable
proposition, with which we are in full agreement, that
President is not above the law.

th~

This unusual source thus

would provide legal support for the dissent only if Time
should share the dissent's persistent error--that of
confusing immunity from damages liability with being "above
the law."

The Time article of course made no reference to

damages liability for official acts.

Rather, its statement

referred to the judgment of this Court in the Nixon tapes
case and of the House Judiciary Committee in voting an
impeachment resolution.

The President's continuing

amenability to these forms of legal process demonstrates
that the President remains as much subject to the law today
as ever before.

The immunity recognized today extends only

to private suits for damages based on decisions and actions
within the scope of a President's authority.

•..

July 20, 1902
Re:

Nos. 79-1738 and 80 ·- 945 ,

Ni~<?.!!

and

I!a:t:~P.~

Dear Al ,
Thank you for your letter of July 7, that finally
reached me here in Richmond.
Justice White and I both agree with your recommendation
to apportion the total printing costs two·- thirds to Fi tz gerald and one-third to Harlow and Butterfield.
I

have initialed and return the Orders to this effect.
Sincerely ,

Enclosures:
Orders

r)J- Clerk
Alexander

L.

Stevas , Esquire

Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. c. 20543
cc :

Mr. Justice White
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. c. 20543
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Memorandum to the Conference
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald
No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas
In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program.
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay
from the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime,
however, he had instituted this damages action against
respondent, his administrative superior. The suit alleged a
conspiracy to deprive petitioner of First Amendment rights.
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an
alternative remedy under the Civil Service Act. This Court
then vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship
between the Federal Government and its civil service
employees is a special consideration which counsels
hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of
affirmative congressional action." The panel also noted
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to
bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in
favor of judicial relief.
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government
employee represented a "special factor" defeating his claim
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member
maJority in that case relies on a cumulation of factors not
all present here.

2.
The question raised is an important one. Moreover, the
CAS deicision in this case is in conflict with the decision
of CA7 in Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (1981).
I will vote to GRANT.
No. 81-872, Turner v. Jordan
The question here is whether the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency is absolutely immune from
damages liability for dismissing a CIA employee. The
employee was dismissed following his public criticism of the
Agency's personnel practices. His suit in the District
Court alleged a violation of costitutional rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments. Ruling on petitioner's claim of
absolute immunity, the District Court stated that absolute
immunity might be proper where "defense of a constitutional
tort action requires the disclosure of classified
information.• Here, however, the District Court found that
"the defendants have acknowledged that this case involves no
such issue of secrecy or security." App. 2la. The District
Court certified the case for interlocutory appeal under the
collateral order doctrine. CADC (Tamm, Robb, Edwards)
affirmed without opinion.
Harlow, No. 80-945, holds open the possibility that
federal officials might be entitled to absolute immunity in
connection with performance of functions "so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability." Slip op., at 12.
Under Harlow, petitioner thus could establish entitlement to
absolute immunity in this case if he could "demonstrate that
he was discharging a protected function when performing the
act for which liability is asserted." Ibid. Here, as
noted, the District Court has found that the case involves
no issue of •secrecy or security.• Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that the special functions of the
CIA director require an absolute immunity applicable to all
personnel actions. Nothing in Harlow suggests that the
special status of the CIA director might not raise a unique
and unsettled question. But this question--which does seem
to me to be unique--of course could be mooted by a decision
of the question presented in Bush v. Lucas, supra. If
government employment generally const1tutes a special factor
precluding inference of a Bivens action for adverse
personnel actions, that rat1onale would apply a fortiori to
suits against the Director of the CIA. Assuming that the
Court will vote to grant in Bush v. Lucas, supra, I will
vote to Hold this case for No. 81-469.

3.

No. 81-1010, Purtill v. Schweiker
Petitioner is a 53-year-old employee of HHS. When his
superiors failed to promote him, he filed suit in federal
court, alleging age discrimination. His complaint based one
count on a federal statute, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and one directly on the Constitution.
The District Court dismissed the Bivens count--which alone
is here--on grounds that it was preempted by the ADEA. See
Carlson v. Green, supra. CA3 agreed.
In this Court there are two possible questions
presented for decision. The first is the same as that
presented in No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas. That is whether the
government's employment relationsh1p with an employee is a
"special factor counseling hesitation" in the inference of a
Bivens action. The other is whether the ADEA preempts a
B1vens action that might otherwise exist. See Carlson v.
Green, 446 u.s. 14, 18-19 (1980). There appears to be a
split on the second question. See Sonntag v. Dooley, 650
F.2d 904 (CA7 1981) (upholding Bivens claim by a former
federal employee asserting age discrimination by her
superiors).
The preemption argument in this case, based on the
ADEA, appears to be stronger than that made under the
general civil service laws in Bush v. Lucas, supra. Yet the
Bush issue--whether federal employment is a special factor
precluding Bivens actions for employment decisions--is the
broader and more important issue. Viewing the "special
factor" question as the one the Court should reach first, I
would be inclined to Hold this case if Bush is granted.
Alternatively, I could vote to Grant this case and
consolidate it for argument with Bush, supra, No. 81-469.
No. 81-1134, Ashcroft v. National Org. for Women, Inc.
The petitioner in this case is the Attorney General of
Missouri. In that capacity he joined other state Attorneys
General in bringing an antitrust action against respondent
for its convention boycott of States that had not ratified
the ERA. Following dismissal of that action, respondent
sued petitioner under S 1983. Petitioner claimed absolute
immunity from suit, asserting that prosecutorial immunity
extended to his initiation of a civil action on behalf of
the State. Resondent claimed that petitioner's actions in
arranging for the filing of the civil action all occurred in
an executive capacity. The District Court denied
petitioner's immunity claim without opinion, and CAB, in a
brief per curiam order, concluded that the order appealed

4.

from was not final within the meaning. of 2B
and thus not appealable.

u.s.c~

S 1291

In No. 79-173B, United States v. Nixon, the Court
reaffirms that orders denying absolute immunity are
appealable collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949). Respondent
argues that there can be no conflict with this or other
cases, because the collateral order doctrine is inherently
flexible and not mandatory. But CAB did not put its
decision on this basis. It appears to have held as a matter
of law that there was no appealable, because not "final,"
order. Because our Nixon decision is incompatible with that
of CAB in this respect, I am inclined to vote to GV & R in
light of No. 79-173B.
No. Bl-15BO, Sanborn v. Wolfel
The petitioners in this S 19B3 suit are parole
officers. As a parolee under their supervision, respondent
was arrested for intoxication. He subsequently forfeited
bond when he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Upon
receipt of this and other information, petitioners took
respondent into custody for parole violations. There was no
on-site hearing to determine whether there was probable
cause to revoke his parole, as apparently should have been
held under our decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 40B u.s. 471
(1972). After he was released from incarceration 27 days
after his arrest, respondent brought suit against
petitioners under S 19B3, alleging a violation of due
process under Morrissey. A jury awarded damages of $1,000.
On appeal, CA6 rejected petitioners' argument that the trial
court had erred in imposing on them the burden of proving
that they had acted in good faith. And, after reviewing the
record, the CA found that the jury reasonably could have
found that petitioners did not act in subjective good faith.
As evidence of bad faith, the CA appears to have relied on
evidence that petitioners arrested respondent not in
response to parole violations, but to secure his detention
while more serious charges were investigaged. Judge Weick
dissented. He argued that the petitioners indisputably had
acted in accordance with the policies of the Audit Parole
Authority of Ohio and approved as lawful by the Attorney
General of Ohio. That policy was not to hold on-site
hearings where the parolee had jumped bail for an offense
committed while on parole. As laymen, petitioners were
entitled to rely on the policy adopted by their employer.
The Court opinion in No. B0-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
holds that an official is entitled to good faith immunity
insofar as his conduct does not violate "clearly established

5.

constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.• Slip op., at 17. Har!'ow further
provides that an official may establish entitlement to good
faith immunity where he can prove that he neither knew nor
should have known of the relevant legal standard. In light
of petitioner's claimed reliance on established Ohio
procedures, the immunity inquiry in this case may be in
tension with Harlow's reformulated standard.
Unlike Harlow, however, this case arises under S 1983,
and thus presents a technically unsettled question: whether
the Harlow standard should be applied to cases under that
statute.
But see Slip. Op., at 17, and n. 30 (suggesting
any distinction would be untenable).
I believe that the Harlow standard should be applicable
here. I therefore will vote to Grant, Vacate, and Remand in
light of No. 80-945, Harlow v. Butterfield. A judgment
order in this case might read as follows:
"The petition is Granted. The judgment is
vacated and the case remanded for
reconsideration in light of No. 80-945,
Harlow v. Butterfield. See Butz v. Economou,
438 u.s. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it
•untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under the S 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials").

L.F.P., Jr.

This is a private suit by respondent Fitzgerald to
I

recover damages from former President Nixon/ for .allegedly
conspiring

unla~fully /to

cause respondent's dismissal from a

I

government position.
The question presented, / not heretofore decided by
~

I

this Court, . is the extent of a President's immunity; when
...

sued for damages.

..

Respondent sought

under two

dam~ges

federal statutes, / neither of which expressly creates a
damages remedy,j~nd under the First Amendment to the
Constitution.
Our decisions have recognized two types of
immunity defenses:

establis~ /that

"qualified" and "absolute".

Prior cases

qualified immunity is the standardJ'generally

applicable to executive officials, whether state or federal.
Absolute immunity is expressly conferred by the
Constitution;'on members of

Congres~their

aides, in the

performance of legislative acts.

Our decisions also have

immunit~s

a defense for judges and

established absolute

prosecuting

attorneys~or

action in the course of their

official functions.
The District Court denied petitioner's claim of
absolute immunity.
District of

And the Court of Appeals for the

Columbia~ ismissed

his appeal.

We granted

certiorari, J'and now reverse.

-

we hold that a President is entitled to absolute
immunity;{rom civil damages
official

act~:

liability~n

We think this immunity is

suits based on his

inciden~o

a

Pr'"e: -l :=nt's constitutional office,/ rooted in the separation
of powers j'and supported by our history.
civil

dama~ its
Ill'-

Until recently;l

against a President were unknown.

The President occupies a unique position;lin the
constitutional scheme.

Article II of the Constitution vests

the entire "executive power" of the United States) n the
President.

His responsibilities include the management of

I

the Executive Branch, Ithe enforcement of all federal law,
the conduct of foreign affairs,J'and the defense of our
country.

He is required - sometimes almost daily - to make

decisions of the utmost discretion and senstivity.

3.

We th,ink it would be in toler able, / and , contrary to
the public interest,J'if ~h such decision were made in the

shadow of threatened damages sui{;by employees or citizens
who feel aggrieved.
A rule of absolute immunity will not leave the

nation; 'ithout adequate protection against serious
misconduct by the chief executive.
we compelled a

In the Nixon tapes case,

Presiden~to make evidence in his possession

available in a criminal prosecution.

The constitutional remedy of impeachment, of
~
course, remains available. Moreover, oversight by Congress
A

and the media)
~- normally will serve to deter presidential

abuse of office.
In conclusion, I emphasize the narrowness of our
holding.

It applies

~y

to private damage suits

j and

~y

to action taken/ within the scope of a President's official
authority.

The President, like judges and prosecutors, is

not immune for acts outside of his official duties.
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The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion.
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackrnun join.

Justice

Blackrnun also has filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall join.

,June 24, 1982

Nixon and Harlow

Dear John,
~his is merely to say •thank you"
with warmth and appreciation.

You were a helpful and steadfast
supporter through two long Terms of
struggle with these cases.
A.s

ever,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
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WASHINGTON, June 24- Followi"l are excerpts from the Supreme
Court's rulirt~ today givirt~ the President absolute immunity from civil
auits for damages. Associate Justice
Lewil F PoweU wrote the majority
opinion, and Auociate Justice Byron
R. White filed a dissenti"8 opinion.

By Justice Powell
The issue bFfore us is tbe scope of
the immunity possessed by tbe President of the United States.
1bia Court has recognized that BOV·
emment officials are entitled to some
form of immunity from IUlta for civil

~

~ou

v.
(1978), the
Court rejected an arJWDent that all
bigb Federal officiala have a rigbt to
absolute immunity from constitutiODAl damqe actions. In 10 doinl we
realflrmed our boldinp that aome oftldals, notably Judaes and Pf088CU.
ton, because of tbe special nature of
their respcmibilities, require a full
uemptioo from liability.
1bia cue now presents tbe claim
tbat the President of the United States
·il abielded by absolute immunity from
civil damaaee liability. Tbi8 inquiry
involvea policies and principles that
may be COillidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a syatem ltrUctured to achieve effective
pemment Wlder a constitutioaally
mandated aeparatioo of powers.

-

Ableoee of Leatslative Action
Here a former President asserts his
immunity from civil damages claims
of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the
Constitution and in two statutory actions under Federal laws of general
applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action
to subject the President to civil liability for his official acts . Consequently,
our holding today need only be that the
President is absolutely immune from
civil damages liability for his official
acts in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide
only thil constitutional issue, which il
necessary to disposition of the case before us.
We consider this immunity a tunc.
tionally mandated incident of the
President's unique office, rooted in
the constitutional tradition of the
aeparatioo of powers and lupported
by our history.
The President occupies a unique
position in the constitutional scheme.
Article II of the Constitution provides
that "the executive power shall be
vested in a President of tbe United
States."
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the
respondent relies on cases in which we
bave recognized immunity of thil
scope for pernors and cabinet officers. We find these cases to be inappc>site. 1be President's unique status .
Wlder the Constitution distinguishes
liim from other executive officlala.

--

--~

'AD Eully ldeatlftable Tarpt'
Because of the singular importance
of the President's duties·, diversion of
his energies by concern with private
lawsuits would raise unique risks to
the effective functioning of governA rule of absolute immunity for the
ment. Nor can tbe sheer prominence
the
i
nat on
of the President's office be ignored. In President will not leave
view of the vilibllity of his office and without sufficient protection against
the effect of his actions on countless .misconduct on the part of the chief _expeople, the President would be an ecutive. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachmen_t. In
easily identifiable target for suits for addition, there are formal and mforcivil damages. CoBDizance of thia per- • mal checks on Presidential action that
IOilal wlnerability frequently could do not apply with equal force to other
distract a President from his public executive officials. The President is
duties 1 tD the detriment not only of the lllbject to constant scrutiny by the
•
press. Vigilant oversight by Congress
also may serve to deter Presidential
President and his office but also the
nation that the Presidency was deabuses of office, as well as to make
signed to serve.
credible the threat of impeachment.
It is settled law that the separation
Other incentives to avoid misconduct
of powers doctrine does not bar every
may include a desire to earn re-elecexercile of jurisdiction over the Presition the need to maintain prestige as
dent of the United States. But our
an element of Presidential influence
cues also bave established. that a
and a President's traditional concern
pourt, before .exercisin8 jurisdiction,
for his historical stature.
Jllust balance the constitutional
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that
weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the
absolute immunity will not place the
authority and functions of the execuPresident "above the law." For the
ttve erancb. When judicial action is
President, as for judges and pi"Oit!CUneeded to serve broad public interest
tors, absolute immunity merely pre- u when the Court acta, not in deroeludes a particular private remedy
ption of the separtion of powers but
for alleged misconduct in order to adto maintain their proper balance, cf. vance compellin8 public ends.
!Younptown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw·
yer [the 111152 .steel seizure case1, or to
By Justice White,
vindicate the public interest in an ooaotn& crlminal prosecution, see
Dissenting
Vnited States v. Nixon [the lt74
Watergate tapes
the uercile
J do not agree that if the office of
bf jurildictioo has been held warrantPresident is to operate effectively, the
ed. In the cue of this merely private
bolder of tbat office must be permitIUit for damages based on a Presi- , ted without fear of liability and redent's official acta, we hold it is not.
, p,:.ness of the function he is performIn view of the special nature of the
1n3, deliberately to infUct injury on
President'• coostitutional office and
others by oonduct that be lmowl viofunctiuons, we think it appropriate to ! lates the law.
· -recosntze absolute Presidential im. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), the
munity from damages liability for
Court .oblerved that while there were
acts within tbe "outer perimeter" of
~ offici81 reaponsibility.
I
Protec1oa AplDit MIHGadiiCt
, • Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the outer peri.ter of his duties by ordering the discharge of an employee
1
who wu lawfully entitled to retain his
1
1bia construction would subject
the President to trial Oil virtually '
f/Yery allegation that an action was
amlawful or was taken for a forbidden
purpose. Adoption of this constroction
Jbus would deprive absolute immunity
of ita intended effect. We conclude
~t petitioner's alleged wrongful acts
lay well within the outer perimeter of
lUI.authority.

Immunity _

case]-

Job.

"important political pawers" committed to the President for tbe performance of which neither be nor hia
appointees were accountable in court,
"the question, whether the lepllty of
tbe act of the bead of a department be
ea.._lna~le In a court of jueUce or DOt,
mUit alwaya depend on tbe aatun of

tbeact."

The Court nevertbelea " " ' - to
. follow this COW'M with ..-pect to tbe
President. It malu!l no effort to diatlnauilh cateaories of Presidential ~
CJuct that lbould be absolutely immune from other cateaortes of ~
duct that abould not qualify for that
level of lmmUDity. Tbe Court ma-d
CODcludes that wbatever tbe Pl'Sdeot does aDd however caatrary to law .
be 1mowa bil conduct to be, be may,
. wttbout fear of .UabWty, injure Federal .nployees or any other per'IOI1
witbin or without the GoYemmeot.
Attadlin& at.olute immUDity to the
office of the Plaideot, ratber than to
putk:ular activitlee that the Pl'Sdeot milbt perform, pau. tbe Presideat abOve tbe law. It 18 a revmstou to
tbe old DOtion that the kial can do 110

, Wl"CCDD·

.

•A Frtwluw c.--dee'
The Court cuually, but candidly, I
ahandone the funct1onal approacb to
· tm . ~ty that bu run tbrouP all of
our deciaiona. Indeed, the majority
turDI this nJle on Ita bMd by cleclartDa
that becaute the fuDctiOal of tbe
Presldeot'a office are 10 YUied ud
dlverle aDd IOlDe ol them 10 ~
foundly important, the office II Uldque
ud muat be clothed with oftlc.wide,
~ute lmmUDity. 'lbllll policy, DOt

law, and In my view, very poor policy.
The suuestion that eofon:emeDt of
the nale of law - i.e., IUbJectin& the
President to nJles of pneral appUcabillty - does DOt further the Mpara. uon of powers, but rather II in deropuon of this pul'IQ8, II blzarn. Re~-of wbat the Court mJabt tbiJik
Of the meritl of Mr. Fttrprald'l
claim, the Idea that punult of lep1 redreu offends the doctrine of Mparatlon of powers Ia a frivolous conteotion
puatng u lepl aJ'IUII*lt. It canDOt
be 1er1auaay arsuect that the President
mUit be placed beyond the law ud be=~udldal enforcement ol CODititure.trainta upon aec::utM offtcenln order to impl.neat tbe priDclple of aeparation of powen.
Tbe maJOrltY
be Ciirrect bi
CODClUiion that "a rule of abiOluae tmmUDity 1rill not I•ve tbe D8tkiD without IUfflcient remedies fur llli8coD. duct on the part of tbe c:bief ..ec:.
'· tlve." 1be remedies ba wblcb the
' Court ftnds comfort ......... deatped to afford reUef fw IDdMdual
barml. Rather, thaywerecleltpedu
poUUcal aafety YaM. .. PoUUc:a ud
blltory, however, are DOt tbe domain
ol the OOUI'tl; the courtl alit to ...
lUre eacb Individual that be, u an tndlvtdual, bu eaforceable rtptl that
be may punue to ac:hHMt a peiCifu1
~of btl Jealtimate~.
I find It Ironic, u well u trqlc, that
tbe Court would 10 ~y dlllc:ard hi
· own role of uaur1aa '"die rflbt of
every Individual to ciatm tbe protec.
tlon of the laWI" (Manury V. M8di101l), In the name of P*~ tbe
prtnciple of aeparatlon ofpowen.

may
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Court Rules for Nixon, 5·4

Presidents Given Immunity From Suits
By Fred Barbash ·-

ruling in a complaint brought by
Fitzgerald against Nixon aides Bryce
A bitterly divided Supreme Court N. Harlow and Alexander P. Butterruled yesterday that presidents may field.
Justice Byron R. White, writing
not be sued for monetary damages
even if they break the law or violate the dissent on the Nixon ·ruling,
called Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.'s
citizens' constitutional rights.
The 5-to-4 de(ision, sought by majority opinion on presidential imformer president Richard M. Nixon munity "tragic." It "is a reversion to
after being sued by one-time Pen- the old notion that the king can do
tagon cost analyst A. Ernest Fitzger- no ·wrong," he said. It "places the
ald, created an absolute presidential president above the law." Justices
William J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood
im~nunity from civil damages suits
and, the majority said, from the in- Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun
hibiting and time-consuming results joined White in dissent.
In the course of ruling on the two
of the thousands of such suits that
could be brought against a chief ex- • complaints yesterday, the court
made another major change in laws
ecutive.
The court refused to similarly designed to deter official misconshield top aides to the president, duct: the justices, apparently in re·
WW!hln11ton Post St.att Writer

action to thousands of damages
claims now swamping state, local
and federal officials as well as·police
officers, gave judges new authority tO
weed out frivolous or insubstantial
suits without requiring lengthy and
costly trials.
Trials will be permitted only
where a judge agrees that a "clearly
established" breach of a law or constitutional right is involved, the
court said in an 8-to-1 vote on Harlow us. Fitzgerald.
Fitzgerald was the analyst with
the Air Force who drew national attention as "the Pentagon whistle
blower" when he testified before a
Senate subcommittee in 1968 conSee COURT, A6, Col. 1
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Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented in Harlow us. Fitzgerald, saying
that presidential aides should share pres- '
tmexpected technical difficulties on the
idential immunity, as Capitol Hill aides
C5A transport plane.
are sometimes allowed under court rulThe Nixon administration eliminated
ings to share legislative immunity.
Fitzgerald's job in 1970, claiming his reJustices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmoval was only part of an Air Force remun, White and William H. Rehnquist
·1>rganization. At a 1973 news conference,
joined in separate statements, but with
Nixon took personal credit for FitzgerJohn Paul Stevens and Sandra Day
ald's dismissal: "It was a decision that
O'Connor, also agreed with Powell's mawas submitted to me," the president said
jority opinion.
on Jan. 31, 1973. "I made it and I stick
In Nixon us. Fitzgerald, the absoluteby it."
immunity decision, Blackmun, joined by
. Nixon later retracted the comment.
Brennan and Marshall, wrote a dissent in
But Fitzgerald sued him for damages in
addition to White's.
1978 for violating his free speech rights,
The court attempted unsuccessfully to
adding the former president as a defenresolve these same questions last year in
dant to the suit he had already brought
Halperin's case. It resulted in a 4-to-4
against the two Nixon White House aides
split, when Rehnquist disqualified himhe said participated in the decision, Butself because he had been a member of
terfield and Harlow.
the Nixon Justice Department. That case
Nixon claimed total immunity as presis still in the U.S. District Court in
ident from such suits. Harlow and ButWashington, awaiting yesterday's ruling
terfield claimed that they shared that
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
. .. calls immunity decision frightening
for further action.
immunity.~. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
Some justices thought the issue should
the District of Columbia rejected all the
claims, just as it had earlier in a suit tection to all other public officials rang- have been left unresolved again this
brought against Nixon, Henry A. Kiss- ing from Cabinet officers to police offi- term, because of an out-of-court settleinger and others by former National Se- cers to dog catchers. They may not be ment between Nixon and Fitzgerald.
Under that agreement Nixon agreed to .
curity Council staffer Morton Halperin.
sued for actions taken in "good faith."
In ruling on the Harlow and Butter- pay $142,000 to Fitzgerald in exchange
The immunity granted by the court
yesterday extends to all "official" acts of field case, the court said they and other for the dropping of the suit. Nixon
the president. But Powell disputed the top presidential aides ordinarily enjoy agreed to pay Fitzgerald another $28,000
contention that he was placing the preR- only that same "good faith" immunity should Fitzgerald win the immunity issue
at the Supreme Court. Thus, no matter
ident "above the law," saying that there that protects the other officials.
are still adequate deterrents to presidenExcept in special circumstances, per- how the court ruled yesterday, there
tial misconduct, including impeachment. haps involving foreign policy or national would be no trial ' of Nixon under the
He noted that, as in the- Watergate tapes security decisions and where they func- agreement.
Blackmun, with Brennan and Mar case, the president could be subjected to tion as "alter egos" of the president, these
subpoenas, to "constant scrutiny by the top-level White House assistants should . shall, called this a "wager" yesterday,
press" and to "vigilant oversight" by Con- be treated like Cabinet members, Powell which, they said, made the case inapprop'riate for review .
gress.
.said.
· At the same time, he said the ConstiBut in an important victory for these
Fitzgerald, who won a :;eparate legal
tution, in its separation of powers provi- aides and holders of public office every- battle for reinstatement on Jut:te 15, said
sions, requires that the chief executive be where, the court radically altered the de- yesterday that the immunity decision
allowed to exercise his powers. "The pres- finition of "good faith." In the past, they "ought to frighten anyone who loves libident's unique status under the Consti- lost their protection if they acted "with erty. If the king can do no wrong, we're
tution distinguishes him from other ex- malicious intention" to break a law or in a lot of trouble." His suit against Harecutive officials," Powell said. "Because of violate a citizen's rights. Powell said that low and Butterfield goes back to the Disthe singular importance of the president's was too subjective and often resulted in trict Court for further consideration.
duties, diversion of his energies by con- trials or lengthy and expensive fact-gathArthur Spitzer, an American Civil Libcern with private lawsuits would raise . ering expeditions just to resolve the im- erties Union official here, said the deciunique risks to the effective functioning munity issue.
sion "puts the president. above the law."
of government."
A Nixon lawyer, R. Stan Mortenson,
Yesterday, the court said they could be
The chief executive now joins a select sued only when the law or constitutional praised the ruling, saying that t.he presgroup of officials immunized by the Su- safeguard breached "was clearly estab- idency should have the same immunity
enjoyed by the top officials in the other
preme Court, including Supreme Court lished at the time an action occurred."
justices, other judges and prosecutors.
If not, Powell said the judge should branch~s of government.
Elliot L. Richardson, representing
The Constitution explicitly protects dismiss the case without a trial. He said
members of Congress from having to an- this frees ofticials from harassment Harlow and Butterfield, applauded the
swer in the courts for official decisions. through frivolous or insubstantial suits: ruling in his clients' case and said "public
Presidential immunity, under Powell's "The social costs include expenses of lit- officials from local school board members
ruling, appeared to be even broader than igation, the diversion of official energy to White House advisers and the public
theirs, reachipg, as . he put it, to "the from pressing public issues, and the de- itself" should also applaud it.
Washington Post researcher Carin
terrence of able citizens from acceptance
outer perimeter" of the presidency.
Pratt contributed to this artic:le.
The court has extended much less pro- of public office."
cerning $2 billion in cOBt overruns and
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survived in this co~mtry only in the form of not leave the nation without. sufficient remsovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses edies for misconduct on the part of the chief
suit against the government itself and executive."
against government officials, but only when
Such a rule will, however, leave Mr. Fitzthe suit against the latter actually seeks re- gerald without an adaquate remedy for the
lief against the sovereign.
·
harms that he may have suffered. More imSuit against an officer, however, may be portantly, it will leave future plaintiffs withmaintained where it seeks specific relief out a remedy, regardless of the substantiality
against him for conduct contrary to his stat- . of their claims.
utory authority or to the Constitution. Now,
The remedies in which the court finds
however, the court clothes the office of the comfort were never designed to afford relief
president with sovereign immunity, placing for individual harms. Rather, they were deit beyond the law . . . .
signed as political safety-valves. Politics and
The scope of immunity is determined by history, however, are not the domain of the
function, not office. The wholesale claim that courts; the courts exist to assure each indi.
the president is entitled to absolute immu- vidual that he, as an individual, bas enforcenity in all of his actions stands on no firmer able rights that he may pursure to achieve a
ground than did the claim that all presiden- peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances.
tial communications are entitled to an abI find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the
solute privilege, which was rejected in favor court would so casually discard its own role
of a functional analysis, by an unanimous of assuring "the right of every individual to
court in United States vs. Nixon, supra - claim the protection of the laws," Marbury
us. Madison, in the name of protecting the
principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I dissent.

an Easily Identifiable Target for Suits'

-

ient protection against misconduct on the
rt of the chief executive. There remains
e constitutional remedy of impeachment.
addition, there are formal and informal
ecks on presidential action that do not
ply with equal force to other executive
ficials.
The president is subjected to constant
rutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight by
ongress also may serve to deter presidential
uses of office, as well as to make credible
e threat of impeachment.
Other incentives to avoid misconduct may
clude a desire to earn reelection, the need
maintain prestige as an element of presential influence, and a president's tradional concern for his historical stature . . . .
Excerpts from the dissent of Justice
yron R. White.
Attaching absolute immunity to the office
the president, rather than to particular
tivities that the president might perform,
aces the president above the law. It is a
version to the old notion that the king can
o no wrong. Until now, this concept had
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C~mpanion.

Decision Upholds
'Qualifjed' Protection for
Chief Executive's Aides
8J LINDA GREENHOUSE

., .......n.,.._Yift,_.
WASHINGTON, JUDe 24- Tbe Supreme Court nded 5 to 4 today tbat DO
P!Sdent may-be IU8d for cSamape for
any otftcial actiGil be takes wbile in offlee.
OYertumin& a lower court ruUn& in a
IUft lpinlt former Prelident Richard
M. Nixao, the Court declared tbat "ab.Excerpta from the rult,.,s, page Al2.

IOlute PrSdeotial immunity" Ia a
"functiooally mudated inddent of the
Premdent'aiiDique office, rooted In the
9QIWtitutioaal traditiOil of tbe eepara. tAm of powers al)d supported by our JU.
lOry."
ID a compaid011 l'llliD&. tbe Court r&fuled, 8 to 1, to accord tbe same abeolute immunity to top Presidential advts.... But the Justices effectively rewrote
tbe law of "quallfied immunity" tbat
appU• to most Federal aDd ltate otri-

clall, JDaldDa it IIUbstantially more
llbly tbat courts wtl.l dlamiu IUita
apinlt IIUCb officials before trial.

CGart Bitterly DIYidecl

.

I

· Becauae officials covered by "qualified immunity" are sued much more
often tban tbe President, tbe companiOD
ruUna bu more practical llplficance
tban the ru.Ung Oil Presidential immunity.
But It was the decision 011 P!Sdentlal immunity tbat left the Court bitterly divided after almost teveo IDOiltbs
of arappJJD& with the Cue. Tbe rulin&
wu 011 a damqe IU!t by a former Air
Force budpt analyst, A. Er1*t Fltz..
wboc:blqec( tlllltlle . . . . . bil
job a a nnlt of a White Bo.e CC1118ptracy to deprive b1m of bil dvll rtpta. Be
wu dlamlued after apo~inl a.t overniDI mtbe CS-A tnmport pl&De.
Tbe ruHnp CDDCemed Ollly immunity
from dvlllllita for damlpa, DOt from
crtminal proMICUti0111 or from other
types of judicial actt011. Tbe majority
made c:1eu tbat it ... DOt cuttna any
doubt Oil tbe Court'• 1874 rulin& tbat 1'&- quired Pr'811deut Nlml to tum over the
Waterpte tapel. Today'1 ruUq wu
bued larply 011 what Aaoclate JUitlce
Lewla F. PonD h . called tbe- '"pablic

...-ud.

Ceatlaaed• .... AU,

Cel-·

High Court Rules President.ls Immune From Civil

Suits

CGntfnued From Pqe Al
interest" in permitting a President to
· act as he aees fit without fear of being
sued, 1
Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger and Associate Justices William H. Rebnquiat, Jolm Paul Stevens
and Sandra Day O'Connor.
Aasoclate Justice Byron R. White's
diaaenting opinioa, which labeled the
majority Nling "tragic" and "bizarre," was joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr., ThW"Jood
Marsball and Harry A. Blackmun.
The Supreme Court has accorded abeolute immunity from civil suits to
j~es and prosecutors, and Justice
Powell said tbat, like tboee officiala, "a
President must coocem himself with
matters likely to arouse the moat intense feelings."
"Yet, as obr decisions have recognized," he continued, "it is In precisely
such cases that there exists the greatest
public interest in providing an official •
the maximum ability to deal fearlessly
and ims-rtially with the duties of his office. This concern is compelling where
the offtcebolder must make the most
sensitive and far-r.cbin& deciaioos eo-

trusted to any official wxler our coostitutioaal system."
Tbe majority rejected the argument
that the scope of a President's immunity sbould be limited to particular
functions, concluding that absolute immunity extends to all "acts within the
'outer perj.meter' of his official responsibillty." Mr. Fitzgerald' bad argued
that whatever immunity a President
might enjoy should not extend to disc:barJinlcivilservants.
Mr. FitzBerald recently settled a
separate suit against the Federal Govemment, winning back ~ job and
S3QO,OOOinlegal fees.
Earlier, be and Mr. Nixon bad entered into an agreement to avoid a trial
of his damage suit no matter bow the
Supreme Court ruled on the Immunity
issue. Mr. Nixon paid him $142,000 and
would have paid him $28,000 more bad
the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of
the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia that the Prelldent did not have absolute Immunity.
[1be Associated Press quoted a
IQ)Okesman for Mr. Nixon in New
York. Nicholas Ruwe as saying,
"Foriner President NtxOO's custom is
1 not to comment on court decisions."
Mr. fitzprald at a news conference,
'

· "8Ui_t.D_niuna that Mr. Harlow and Mr.
Butterfield were entitled oaly to the
"qualified immunity" the Court bas
previously accorded to Cabinet officers,
pemors and other officiala, .the Justices aave "qualltied Immunity" a new
definition.
. ·
In the past, Justice Powell noted, an
official claiming "qualified immunity"
bad to meet both an objective &Dd a~
jectlve teat.
Objectively, the official bad to prove
tbat be did not know, or CfJU)d not reasooably have been upected to know,
that be bad violated the plaintiff's lepl
~ ,constitutional rtahts. Subjectively,

Aaodate Justlee Lewis F. Powell
Jr. wrote tbe majority opbdoa.
- - - - ,= =====-- - - -

be also had to prove that be bad

DOt

acted "With malicious intent."
While the objective test can often be
met by demonstrating that the law wu
unclear or the constitutional right UDd~
said he was "obviously not" pleased
fined at the time of the events, It bas
with the ruling, which he said "ought
to frighten anyone wbo loves lib- been much harder for offldals to prove
erty."]
i their lack of malice.
Justice Powell said that the decision
Subjeetlve Alpeet Eadld
"will not leave the nation without suffi. ·
The Court today abollsbed the subjeccient protection against ~uct on
,
the part of the chief executive." The 1m- tive aspect of qualified immunity.
Justice Powell said: "Government
peachment process, as well as "coostant scrutiny by the press" and "vtgi- officials performing discretioaary func..
lant oversight by Congress," be said, tioos &enerally are shielded from liabilwill insure that "abeolute immunity Ity for civil damages insofar u their
wtll not place the Prelident 'above the conduct does not violate cl~ establaw.' "
lilbed statutory or conatltuti
rilbts
In his dissenting opinion, Justice of which a reasonable pei'BOil would
White disagreed with that analysis. The bave lmown."
majority, he said, "CODCludel that
In practical terms, the new definition
whatever the President does and bow- means that officials wbo are sued will
ever contrary to law ·he knows his coo- be much more likely to succeed in bavduct to be, he may, Without fear of u. in&lluits dismiued on "summary judgability, injure Federal employees or ment" before trial. Judi• oow relate
any other per&Qil wi~ or without the to grant ~ judgment because
Government."
the official's state of mind is an issue
"Attaching abeolute immunity to the that typically has to be decided by a
office of the President, rather than to
jury after conflictln& evldeoce is beard.
particular activities that the President State of m1Dd will no DO loDpr be an
might perform, places the Prelident
~.
above the law," Justice White 'oontinAs a result of the ruling 011
ued. "It is a revenion to the old notion
tiallmmunlty, ln the cue of NIJon v.
l that the king can do no WI'OIII·"
Fitzgerald (No. '19-1738), Mr. Pttz&erI
Aldie Al8o Named Ill Suit
ald's lawsuit will be clismiued by tbe
.
appeala court. 1n the second rullna, ln
' In his $3.5 million lawsuit, Mr. Fltz..
the cue of Harlow and Butterfleld v.
\ geral~ also named two of President
Fitzgerald (No. 80-MS), the Supreme
Nixoo s senior &Idee, Bryce N. Barlow
1
Court vacated the appeals CllJU!t's Nland Aluander · P. Butterfteld. They
inl Oil qualified immunl~ordered
argued that they, too, were entitled to
lt to take "twtber actioD COIIIIIttDt
abeolute immunity "derivative" of the
with this oplnlon."
-/
President's.
·
The Court rejected that &rJWDent in a
Elliot L. Rlchardlon, wbo repr.
separate opinion by Justice Powell, sented the two officiala in the Supreme
with oaly Chief Justice Burpr &l'IUing Court, said today that be was "CODSin dissent that abeolute Immunity was
dent" that the suit qaiJult tbem would
necessary to protect the President's
oow be dlamtsaed.
"alter egos" from the same Pl'eiiiW'el
from which immunity protected the
President.

PI_..

June 30, 1982

JUL 1 .. 1982

The Honorable Harry A. Blackmun
Supreme Court of the United States
c/o the Clerk of the Supreme Court
of the United States
One First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.
20543
Dear Justice Blackmun:
It has come to my attention that there is a
factual error in the letter I sent to you on June 29, 1982.
I stated in the first paragraph of that letter that I no
longer represented Mr. Fitzgerald when the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari was filed on Mr. Nixon's behalf in
the Supreme Court.
In fact, the Petition was filed on
May 2, 1~80, and I ceased representing Mr. Fitzgerald on
July 20, 1981. I apologize for the error.
While this change makes no difference at all in
terms of the points I was making in my letter, I did want
to make certain that the letter was in all respects accurate.
Sincerely yours,

~:E.~.

Suite 600
815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20006
EBP;pmd
cc:

All Members of the Court
Clerk of the Court

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UN'ITED STATES ·
WASHINGTON , D . C ., 20543

July 7, 1982
Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No. 79-1738; and
Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald,
No. 80-945

In the above cases I have prepared judgments pursuant
to Rule 50.2 dealing with costs. There was only one joint
appendix prepared by petitioners Harlow and Butterfield for
use in both of the cases for a total cost of $26,649.57. I am
concerned with the award of total costs against Mr. Fiizgerald.
Certainly, in the Nixon case, which is a true reversal, Mr.
Fitzgerald should bear the costs. In the Harlow, et al., case,
while the opinion provides that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is vacated (The Court of Appeals apparently dismissed
petitioners' appeal from the denial of their immunity defense),
the Supreme Court has remanded the case so the District Court
may reconsider respondent's pretrial showing, in connection
with petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Hence, it does
not truly appear that petitioners prevailed in this Court.
It might be more equitable to apportion the total
printing cost so that Fitzgerald would pay costs in the Nixon
case and split the cost with respect to the Harlow, et al.,
case for a total of two-thirds of the costs of printing the
joint appendix. Petitioners Harlow and Butterfield would bear
the additional one-third printing cost. I have prepared a proposed judgment that provides Harlow and Butterfield to recover
$17,766.38 from Fitzgerald which would represent the printing
cost of petitioner Nixon and one-half of the cost of printing in
the Harlow, et al., case. I am also attaching a proposed judgment that awards total costs against Fitzgerald.
Respectfully submitted,

Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk
Attachments

dfl 07/08/82

To: Justice Powell
From: David
Re: Costs in Harlow and Nixon--## 80-945 and 79-1738
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Fitzgerald won one case and lost

He should pay Nixon's half or $13,474.79.

July 12, 1982

Nos. 79-1738 and 80-945,

Nixo~

and

~~rlow

cases

Dear Byron,
In enclose copies of Al Stevas' letter of July 7
and of two drafts of proposed judgments: one that would
impose the total $26,900.57 costs on Fitzgerald, and the
other that would split the costs two-thirds to Fitzgerald
and one third to Harlow and Butterfield.
Al recommends the latter (i.e. the division of the
costs). I am inclined to agree with his recommendation.
I doubt the fairness of imposing the total costs on
Fitzgerald. He did not clearly lose in Harlow. The
judgment below was vacated, and normally this would
result in Fitzgerald paying the costs. Yet, Harlow and
Butterfield failed in their claim of absolute immunity.
They are better postured to preva 1 on the remand in view
of the ~ed standard.
What do you think?
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20543

'

.
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CHAMBERS 0 F

JUSTICE BYRON R . WH ITE

July 16, 1982

Re: 79-1738 and 80-945:
Nixon and Harlow cases

Dear Lewis,
Your

recommendation on the division of

costs in these cases is fine with me.
No

big

deal

in Utah,

disliked being blind-sided.

but

I've

always

Fred Graham was

on the spot and helped subdue the aggressor.
Fred

apparently

was

protecting

Amendment right to speak.
Best regards to Jo.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell

my

First

July 20, 1982

Dear Al T
Thank you for your letter of July 7, that finally
reached me here in Richmond.
Justice White and I both agree with your recommendation
to apportion the total printing costs two- thirds to Fitzgerald and one-third to Harlow and Butterfield.
I have initialed and return the Orders to this effect.
Sincerely ,

Enclosures:
Orders
~11"·

(j}J. Clerk
Alexander L.

Stevas, Esquire

Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. c. 20543
cc :

djb

Mr. Justice White
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. c. 20543

.iu.pumt <!J:llltti of t4t ~b, .itatts:
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CH A M B E RS OF

T H E C HIEF JU ST I CE

June 9, 1982
Re:

~

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lew is:
The "closing crunch" is always bad and worse this year.
But the pressures must not lead us into grave errors of
constitutional dimensions. I cannot believe that Bill and Sandra
like Note 27 1 for it significantly undermines the entire holding
of this case. For the Court to make a ConscDEutional holding and
then give intimations that Congress -- under some circumstances
-- could change it, does even more than undermine the immediate
holding. It would inevitably add a new dimension to the now
dormant drive in Congress to curtail the Court's jurisdiction.
So far as I am concerned Congress can no more alter or modify the
basic holding of this case than it can modify or overrule Marbury
v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education, or Nixon v. u.s .. Had
the matter remained dormant I could have joined the opinion with
a reservation that I did not agree with Footnote 27. But Har~'s
opinion flushed the point directly . we simply cannot have it
both ways. Perhap~next sfep is to have a session with the
five who are in the majority and see if this can ' t be hammered
out . I will make myself available at any time .
Regards,

Just ice Powell

<!fouriltf tlrt 'Jiittittb ,jtatts
'J»a~fringtut4 !9. <!f. 21l~.l1,;l

,juvutttt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald
If we are to continue the two year debate (happily
outside of our opinions!), the Time magazine article
confirms that, indeed, a President is not above the law.
The Nixon Tapes Case and the imminent impeachment
resolution, made this clear. I could find nothing in the
Time review about private damage suit actions.
L.F.P.,Jr.
ss

June 9, 1982
PERSONAL

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief:
You will not bP. surprised that vour letter of this
afternoon, requiri.ng that we carry this case over, comes as
more than a little disappointing - especially as it comeR in
the "closing crunch" of the Term.
But, of course, any member of this Court has this
privilege, and I appreciate that you have reservations about
the opinion - although it has been substantially in this
form for some time.
In any event, I am agreeable to getting the five
of us together to discuss your concern. I hope this can he
done on Fridav or Mondav at the latest.
I assume that at Conference tomorrow you will say
simply that you are not ready for Nixon and Harlow to come
down.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

9 JUN 1982

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The four dissenting members of the Court in Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), argued that all federal officials are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for any action they take in connection with their official duties. That
immunity would extend, even to actions taken with express
knowledge that the conduct was clearly contrary to the controlling statute or clearly violative of the Constitution. Fortunately, the majority of the Court rejected that approach:
We held that although public officials perform certain functions that entitle them to absolute immunity, the immunity
attaches to particular functions-not to particular offices.
Officials performing functions for which immunity is not absolute enjoy qualified immunity; they are liable in damages only
if their conduct violated well-established law and if they
should have realized that their conduct was illegal.
The Court now applies the dissenting view in Butz to the
office of the President: A President acting within the outer
boundaries of what Presidents normally do may, without liability, deliberately cause serious injury to any number of citizens even though he knows his conduct violates a statute or
tramples on the constitutional rights of those who are injured. Even if the President in this case ordered Fitzgerald
fired by means of a trumped-up reduction in force, knowing
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that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws,
he would be absolutely immune from suit. By the same token, if a President, without following the statutory procedures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other federal officials, orders his subordinates to wiretap or break into
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and
the officers comply with his request, the President would be
absolutely immune from suit. He would be immune regardless of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of
the statute and of the Constitution he knew his conduct to be,
and regardless of his purpose. 1
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the President. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do
not agree. that if the office of President is to operate effectively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is performing, deliberately to inflict injury on others by conduct that he
knows violates the law.
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional immunity does not extend to those many things that Senators
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re' This, of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v.
Halperin , aff'd by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981).
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peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they
are not immune if in connection with such activity they deliberately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legislative investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away
records. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972).
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they
are subject to criminalliablity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U. S. 24, 31 (1980), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is likewise
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who directs that an investigation be carried out in a way that is patently illegal is not immune.
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court, speaking through the
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important political powers" committed to the President for the performance of which neither he nor his appointees were accountable in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that
should be absolutely immune from other categories of conduct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The
Court instead concludes that whatever the President does
and however contrary to law he knows his conduct to be, he
may, without fear of liability, injure federal employees or any
other person within or without the government.
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President,
rather than to particular activities that the President might
perform, places the President above the law. It is a rever-
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sion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong. Until
now, this concept had survived in this country only in the
form of sovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses suit
against the government itself and against government officials, but only when the suit against the latter actually seeks
relief against the sovereign. Larsen v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). Suit against an officer, however, may be maintained where it seeks specific relief against him for conduct contrary to his statutory
authority or to the Constitution. ld., at 698. Now, however, the Court clothes the office of the President with sovereign immunity, placing it beyond the law.
In Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 163, the Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, observed that the "Government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to observe this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right." Until now, the Court
has consistently adhered to this proposition. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), a unanimous Court held that
the governor of a state was entitled only to a qualified immunity. We reached this position, even though we recognized
that
"[i]n the case of higher officers of the executive branchthe inquiry is far more complex since the range of decisions and choices-whether the formulation of policy, of
legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day decisions-is virtually infinite-in short, since the options which the chief
executive and his principal subordinates must consider
are far broader and far more subtle than those made by
officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion
must be comparably broad." Id., at 246, 247.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 252 (dissenting opinion), "The principle
that our government shall be of laws and not of men is so
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strongly woven into our constitutional fabric that it has found
recognition in not just one but several provisions of the Constitution" (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JUSTICE
said in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S. 401,
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion):
"Accountability of each individual for individual conduct
lies at the core of all law-indeed, of all organized societies. The trend to eliminate or modify sovereign immunity is not an unrelated development; we have moved
away from 'the king can do no wrong.' The principle of
individual accountability is fundamental if the structure
of an organized society is not to be eroded to anarchy and
impotence, and it remains essential in civil as well as
criminal justice."
Unfortunately, the Court now abandons basic principles
that have been powerful guides to decision. It is particularly unfortunate since the judgment in this case has few, if
any, indicia of a judicial decision; it is almost wholly a policy
choice, a choice that is without substantial support and that
in all events is ambiguous in its reach and import.
We have previously stated that "the law of privilege as a
defense to damage actions against officers of government has
'in large part been of judicial making."' Butz v. Economou,
438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S.
564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that the Court has
simply "enacted" its own view of the best public policy. No
doubt judicial convictions about public policy-whether and
what kind of immunity is necessary or wise-have played a
part, but the courts have been guided and constrained by
common-law tradition, the relevant statutory background
and our constitutional structure and history. Our cases deal- .
ing with the immunity of members of Congress are constructions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are guided by the
history of such privileges at common law. The decisions
dealing with the immunity of state officers involve the ques-
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tion of whether and to what extent Congress intended to
abolish the common law privileges by providing a remedy in
the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional violations by state officials. Our decisions respecting immunity
for federal officials, including absolute immunity for judges,
prosecutors and those officials doing similar work, also in
large part reflect common law views, as well as judicial conclusions as to what privileges are necessary if particular functions are to be performed in the public interest.
Unfortunately, there is little of this approach in the Court's
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 34. Indeed, the majority turns
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is policy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy.
I

In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from
suit for any deliberate and knowing violation of the Constitution or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immunity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and supported by our history" 2 Ante, at 17. The
decision thus has all the earmarks of a constitutional pronouncement-absolute immunity for the President's office is
mandated by the Constitution. Although the Court appears
to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to read the opinion
coherently as standing for any narrower proposition: Attempts to subject the President to liability either by Congress through a statutory action or by the courts through a
Bivens proceeding would violate the separation of powers. 3
2

Although the majority opinion initially claims that its conclusion is
based substantially on "our history," historical analysis in fact plays virtually no part in the analysis that follows .
3
On this point, I am in agreement with the concurring memorandum of
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Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be sustained
when examined in the traditional manner and in light of the
traditional judicial sources.
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus, 4 rely
principally on two arguments to support the claim of absolute
immunity for the President from civil liability: absolute immunity is an "incidental power'' of the Presidency, historically recognized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute
immunity is required by the separation of powers doctrine.
I will address each of these contentions.
A
The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, guarantees absolute immunity to members of Congress; nowhere, however,
does the Constitution directly address the issue of presidential immunity. 5 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the early history
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit assumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of
this position, petitioner relies primarily on three separate
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discussion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in
The Federalist; second, remarks made during the meeting of
the first Senate; and third, the views of Justice Story.
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the President should be impeachable did touch on the potential dangers of subjecting the President to the control of another
branch, the Legislature. 6 Governor Morris, for example,
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
4

The Solicitor General relies entirely upon the brief filed by his office in

Kissinger v. Halperin, supra.
5

In fact, 'insofar as the Constitution addresses the issue of Presidential
liability, its approach is very different from that taken in the Speech or Debate Clause. The possibility of impeachment assures that the President
can be held accountable to the other branches of Government for his actions; the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar criminal prosecution.
6
The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Con-
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complained of the potential for dependency and argued that
"(the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors
who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 7 Col. Mason responded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Justice" and argued that this was least appropriate for the man
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 8 Madison
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should
be made for defending the Community against the incapacity,
negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." 9 Pinkney responded on the other side, believing that if granted the
power, the Legislature would hold impeachment "as a rod
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his
independence." 10
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant impeachment to be the exclusive means of holding the President
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral
politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported by
the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed concern over limiting presidential independence, the delegates
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently
shared, to insulate the President from political liability in the
impeachment process.
Moreover, the Convention debate did not focus on wrongs
the President might commit against individuals, but rather
on whether there should be a method of holding him accountable for what might be termed wrongs against the state. 11
vention of 1787, 64-69 (1934).
' I d., at 64.
8
I d., at 65.
9
Ibid.
10
I d., at 66.
11
In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as follows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denomi-

-

-----
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Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tumults and insurrections" by the people in response to such
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the
other branches and that there was no general desire to insulate the President from the consequences of his improper
acts. 12
Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reliance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the people-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitutional plan met this test because it subjected the President to
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment,
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner concludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger political abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President
nated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the
society itself."
12
The majority's use of the historical record is in line with its other arguments: It puts the burden on respondent to demonstrate no presidential
immunity, rather than on petititoner to prove the appropriateness of this
defense. Thus, while noting that the doubts of some of the Framers were
not sufficient to prevent the adoption of the Impeachment Clause, the majority nevertheless states that "nothing in [the] debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to [civil damages actions]."
Ante, at n. 31. Of course, nothing in the debates suggests an expectation )
that the President would not be liable in civil suits for damages either.
Nevertheless, the debates are one element that the majority cites to support its conclusion that "[t]he best historical evidence clearly supports the
Presidential immunity we have upheld." Ante, at n. 31.
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might commit. He did not consider what legal means might
be available for redress of individualized grievances. 13
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions with
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina ratifying convention, for example, there was a discussion of the
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding executive officers accountable for their misdeeds. Governor Johnson defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three
legal mechanisms of accountability:
"If an officer commits an offence against an individual,
he is amenable to the courts of law. If he commits
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and punished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 14
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the availability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the
method of accountability was to be a function of the character
of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would
13
Other commentary on the proposed Constitution did, however, co sider the subject of presidential immunity. In fact, the subject was discussed in the first major defense of the Constitution published in the
United States. In his essays on the Constitution, published in the Independent Gazetteer in September 1787, Tench Coxe included the following
statement in his description of the limited power of the proposed office of
the President: "His person is not so much protected as that of a member of
the House of Representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any
other man in the ordinary course of law." Quoted in II The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 141 (1976) (emphasis in
original).
14
4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 43.
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remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from injuries caused by presidential acts:
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any maladministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose
that the President should give wrong instructions to his
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common
law." 15
A similar distinction between different possible forms of
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
"[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character
as a citizen, and in his public character by
impeachment." 16
There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitutional convention; both were instrumental in securing the
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly,
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements.
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not
support this inference.
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petitioner
is an exchange at the first meeting of the Senate, involving
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay.
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi16
16

I d., at 47.
2 Elliot 480.
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dent" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs,
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn,
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two.
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the
proposition that
"the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought
against him; was above the power of judges, justices,
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the
whole machine of government." 17
In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive
form of process available against the President. Senator
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a
President ·committing "murder in the street." In his view,
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather,
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 18 In his view,
Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully comprehended the difference in the political position of the American
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of
presidential accountability, including the question whether
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no
clearer then than it is now.
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his position, but is of such late date that it contributes little to under" W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969).
8
' Ibid.

-----

-
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standing the original intent. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the
"incidental powers" of the President:
"Among these must necessarily be included the power to
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or
impediment whatsoever. The President cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and
for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases
at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the exercise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion,
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is
subject to no control, and his discretion, when exercised,
is conclusive." 19
While Justice Story may have been firmly committed to
this view in 1833, Senator Pinckney, a delegate to the Convention, was as firmly committed to the opposite view in
1800. 20
Senator Pinckney, arguing on the floor of the Senate, contrasted the privileges extended to members of Congress by
the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges extended to the President. 21 He argued that this was a delib2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 372 (1873).
It is not possible to determine whether this is the same Pinckney that
Madison recorded as Pinkney, who objected at the Convention to granting
a power of impeachment to the Legislature. Two Charles Pinckneys attended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina. See 3 M.
Farrand, supra, at 559.
21
Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress
69-83. Petitioner contends that these remarks are not relevant because
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of
an allegedly libelous newspaper article. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 7.
Although this was the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did discuss the
immunity of members of Congress as a privilege embodied in the Speech or
Debate Clause: "our Constitution supposes no man ... to be infallible, but
considers them all as mere men, to be subject to all the passions and frail19

20
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erate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no
such authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore,
"[n]o privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive,
nor any except that ... for your Legislature." 22
In previous immunity cases the Court has emphasized the
ties, and crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the
trial of such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature, for their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to
public opinion.... " This, then, was one of the privileges of Congress that
he was contrasting with those extended (or not extended) to the President.
22
The majority cites one additional piece of historical evidence, a letter
by President Jefferson, which it contends demonstrates "that Jefferson believed the President not to be subject to judicial process." Ante, at n. 31.
Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to the judicial
process are, however, not quite so clear as the majority suggests. Jefferson took a variety of positions on the proper relation of executive and judicial authority, at different points in his career. It would be suprising if
President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such immunity from judicial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief Justice Marshall.
Jefferson's views on this issue before he became President would be of a
good deal more significance. In this regard, it is significant that in Jefferson's second and third drafts of the Virginia Constitution, which also proposed a separation of the powers of government into three separate
branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive be subject to judicial
process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to personal restraint for private duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 350, 360. Also significant is the fact that when Jefferson's followers tried to impeach Justice
Chase in 1804-1805, one of the grounds of their attack on him was that he
had refused to subpoena President Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper
for sedition. See Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" 113. Finally, it is worth noting that even in the middle of the debate over Chief
Justice Marshall's power to subpoena the President during the Burr trial,
Jefferson looked to a legislative solution of the confrontation: "I hope however that ... at the ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice]
may have means provided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testimony of the [Executive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of
Thomas Jefferson, 407 n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to George Hay, United States District Attorney for
Virginia).

I~
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importance of the immunity afforded the particular government official at common law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U. S. 409, 421 (1976). Clearly this sort of analysis is not possible when dealing with an office, the presidency, that did not
exist at common law. To the extent that historical inquiry is
appropriate in this context, it is constitutional history, not
coinmon law, that is relevant. From the history discussed
above, however, all that can be concluded is that absolute immunity from civil liability for the President finds no support
in constitutional text or history, or in the explanations of the
earliest commentators. This is too weak a ground to support
a declaration by this Court that the President is absolutely
immune from civil liability, regardless of the source of liability or the injury for which redress is sought. This much the
majority implicitly concedes since history and text, traditional sources of judicial argument, merit only a footnote in
the Court's opinion. Ante, at n. 31.

B
No bright line can be drawn between arguments for absolute immunity based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers and arguments based on what the Court refers
to as "public policy." This necessarily follows from the
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine:
"[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977).
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707
(1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Petitioner argues that public policy favors absolute immunity because absent such immunity the President's ability to execute his constitutionally
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mandated obligations will be impaired. The convergence of
these two lines of argument is superficially apparent from the
very fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has
been characterized as a "functional" analysis.
The difference is only one of degree. While absolute immunity might maximize executive efficiency and therefore be
a worthwhile policy, lack of such immunity may not so disrupt the functioning of the presidency as to violate the separation of powers doctrine. Insofar as liability in this case is
of congressional origin, petitioner must demonstrate that
subjecting the President to a private damages action will prevent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned
functions." Insofar as liability is based on a Bivens action,
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropriate. Petitioner has surely not met the former burden; I do
not believe that he has met the latter standard either.
Taken at face value, the Court's position that as a matter of
constitutional law the President is absolutely immune should
mean that he is immune not only from damages actions but
also from suits for injunctive relief, criminal prosecutions
and, indeed, from any kind of judicial process. But there is
no contention that the President is immune from criminal
prosecution in the courts under the criminal laws enacted by
Congress or by the states for that matter. Nor would such a
claim be credible. The Constitution itself provides that impeachment shall not bar "Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and
Punishment, according to Law." Article I, Section II,
Clause VII. Similarly, our cases indicate that immunity
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal
prosecution. Supra, at 3.
Neither can there be a serious claim that the separation of
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial review or insulates the President from judicial process. No argument is made here that the President, whatever his liability for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctive
powers. See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra;
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Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's attempt to draw an analogy to the Speech or Debate Clause,
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that
"for any Speech or Debate" congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other Place," and, thus, assures that congressmen, in their official capacity, shall not be the subject of the
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited above indicate, it is
the rule, not the exception, that executive actions-including
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are
subject to judicial review. 23 Regardless of the possibility of
money damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of the President's actions or their legality under the applicable statutes can and will be subject to review. Indeed,
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set
aside by the Civil Service Commission as contrary to the applicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted by
Congress.
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the
ground that such claims would involve the President personally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presidential
actions. The President has been held to be subject to judicial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25 Fed.
Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit justice). Burr "squarely ruled that a subpoena may be directed
'"' The Solicitor General, in fact, argues that the possibility of judicial review of presidential actions supports the claim of absolute immunity: Judicial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the
President's power," making private damages actions unnecessary in order
to achieve the same end. Brief, at 31 (see n. 3).
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to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 709 (DC
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected any suggestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an
unwarranted interference in the Presidency:
"The guard, furnished to this high officer, to protect him
from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after
those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance
which is to precede their being issued." 25 Fed. Cas.,
at 34.
This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974):
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances."
These two lines of cases establish then that neither subjecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Similarly, neither has been held to be sufficiently intrusive to justify a judicially declared rule of immunity. With respect to
intrusion by the judicial process itself on Executive fpnctions,
subjecting the President to private claims for mon.!y damages involves no more than this. If there is a separation of
powers problem here, it must be found in the nature of the
remedy and not in the process involved.
We said in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should
know he is acting outside the law, and . . . insisting on an
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d.
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No.
80-945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to
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civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was illegal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such
circumstances, the question that must be answered is who
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer
or the victim.
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 163 (1803). Much more recently, the Court considered
the role of a damages remedy in the performance of the
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed
rights: "Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388, 395 (1971). 24 To the extent that the Court denies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the
protection of the laws." 25
That the President should have the same remedial obligations toward those whom he injures as any other federal officer is not a surprising propc )ition. The fairness of the remeSee also Justice Harlan's discussion of the appropriateness of the damages remedy in order to redress the violation of certain constitutional
rights. Bivens v. Six Unknov.m Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
407-410 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring).
25
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, ante, at n. 38, I do not
suggest that there must always be a remedy in civil damages for every
legal wrong or that Marbury v. Madison stands for this proposition.
Marbury does, however, suggest the importance of the private interests at
stake within the broader perspective of a political system based on the rule
of law. The functional approach to immunity questions, which we have
previously followed but which the majority today discards, represented an
appropriate reconciliation of the conflicting interests at stake.
24

79-173~DISSENT

20

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

dial principle the Court has so far followed-that the
wrongdoer, not the victim, should ordinarily bear the costs of
the injury-has been found to be outweighed only in instances where potential liability is "thought to injure the governmental decisionmaking process." Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The argument for immunity is that the possibility of a damages action will, or at least should, have an effect on the performance
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter unconstitutional, or otherwise illegal, behavior. This may,
however, lead officers to be more careful and "less vigorous"
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not
always a virtue and undue caution is to be avoided.
The possibility of liability may, in some circumstances, distract officials from the performance of their duties and influence the performance of those duties in ways adverse to the
public interest. But when this "public policy" argument in
favor of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it applies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should
perform their responsibilities without regard to those personal interests threatened by the possibility of a lawsuit.
See Imbler, supra, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). 26
Inevitably, this reduces the public policy argument to nothing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which
c. .ficers should be encouraged to perform their functions with
"vigor," although with less care. 27
The Court's response, until today, to this problem has been
to apply the argument to individual functions, not offices, and
26

The Court has never held that the "public policy" conclusions it
reaches as to the appropriateness of absolute immunity in particular instances are not subject to reversal through congressional action. Implicity, therefore, the Court has already rejected a constitutionally-based,
separation of powers argument for immunity for federal officials.
27
Surely the fact that officers of the court have been the primary beneficiaries of this Court's pronouncements of absolute immunity gives support
to this appearance of favoritism.
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to evaluate the effect of liability on governmental decisionmaking within that function, in light of the substantive ends
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case,
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated
by the causes of action at issue here and the effect of potential liability on the performance of those functions.
II

The functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions 28 converge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is determined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that
the President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his actions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute privilege, which was rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a
unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra. Therefore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad
immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility, 29 the
only question that must be answered here is whether the dismissal of employees falls within a constitutionally assigned
executive function, the performance of which would be substantially impaired by the possibility of a private action for
damages. I believe it does not.
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes----5
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 .u. S. C. § 1505--and the First
Amendment. At this point in the litigation, the availability
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the correctness of the the lower court's determination that the two
See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States, 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Butz, supra. at 511.
29
I will not speculate on the presidential functions which may require
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which the
President participates in prosecutorial decisions.
28
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federal statutes create a private right of action, I find the
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of
action to be unconvincing. The attempt to found such immunity upon a separation of powers argument is particularly
unconvincing.
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211, states that
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... furnish information to
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member
thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second,
18 U. S. C. § 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional
testimony. It does not take much insight to see that at least
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional access to information in the possession of the Executive
Branch, which Congress believes it requires in order to carry
out its responsibilities. 30 Insofar as these statutes implicate
a separation of powers argument, I would think it to be just
the opposite of that suggested by petitioner and accepted by
the majority. In enacting these statutes, Congress sought
to preserve its own constitutionally mandated functions in
the face of a recalcitrant Executive. 31 Thus, the separation
See, e. g. , 48 Cong. Rec. 4653 (1912) ("During my first session of Congress I was desirous of learning the needs of the postal service and inquiring into the conditions of the employees. To my surprise I found that
under an Executive order these civil service employees could not give me
any information.") (remarks of Rep. Calder); id. , at 4656 ("I believe it is
high time that Congress should listen to the appeals of these men and provide a way whereby they can properly present a petition to the Members of
Congress for a redress of grievances without the fear of losing their official
positions") (remarks of Rep. Reilly); id. , at 5157 ("I have always requested
employees to consult with me on matters affecting their interest and believe that it is my duty to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.")
(remarks of Rep. Evans). Indeed, it is for just this reason that petitioners
in No. 8~945 argue that the statutes do not create a private right of action:
"5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 were designed to protect the legislative process, not to give one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek damages." Brief for petitioners, at 26, n. 11.
31
Indeed, the impetus for passage of what is now 5 U. S. C. § 7211 was
30
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of powers problem addressed by these statutes was first of all
presidential behavior that intruded upon, or burdened, Congress' performance of its own constitutional responsibilities.
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action
would disrupt the President in the furtherance of his responsibilities. That approach ignores the separation of powers
problem that lies behind the congressional action; it assumes
that presidential functions are to be valued over congressional functions.
The argument that by providing a damages action under
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has
adopted an unconstitutional means of furthering its ends,
must rest on the premise that presidential control of executive employment decisions is a constitutionally assigned
presidential function with which Congress may not significantly interfere. This is a frivolous contention. In United
States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held
that "when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest." Whatever the rule may be with respect to high
officers, see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935), with respect to those who fill traditional bureaucratic positions, restrictions on executive authority are
the rule and not the exception. 32 This case itself demonstrates, the severe statutory restraints under which the
President operates in this area.
Fitzgerald was a civil service employee working in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Although his position
the imposition of "gag rules" upon testimony of civil servants before congressional committees. See Exec. Order No. 402 (Jan. 25, 1906); Exec.
Order No. 1142 (Nov. 26, 1909).
32
Thus, adverse action may generally be taken against civil servants
only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5
U. S. C. §§ 7503, 7513 and 7543.
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was such as to fall within the "excepted" service, which
would ordinarily mean that Civil Service rules and regulations applicable to removals would not protect him, 5 CFR
Part 6, § 6.4, his status as a veteran entitled him to special
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain Civil Service
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C.
§ 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C.
§7513(a): "An agency may take [adverse action] against an
employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service." Similarly, his veteran status entitled Fitzgerald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation.
5 U. S. C.
§§ 3501-3502. It was precisely those procedures that the
Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission found had
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable
authority.
This brief review is enough to illustrate my point: Personnel decisions of the sort involved in this case are emphatically
not a constitutionally assigned presidential function that will
tolerate no interference by either of the other two branches
of government. More important than this "quantitative"
analysis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decisionmaking permitted in this area, however, is the "qualitative"
anaylsis suggested in § I(B) above.
Absolute immunity is appropriate when the threat of liability may bias the decisionmaker in ways that are adverse to
the public interest. But as the various regulations and statutes protecting civil servants from arbitrary executive action
illustrate, this is an area in which the public interest is demonstrably on the side of encouraging less "vigor'' and more
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the very
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executive employees will be able freely to testify in Congress and to assure
that they will not be subject to arbitrary adverse actions indicate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justi-
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fled absolute immunity are not applicable here. Absolute
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting civil
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations.
If respondent could, in fact, have proceeded on his two
statutory claims, the Bivens action would be superfluous.
Respondent may not collect damages twice, and the same injuries are put forward by respondent as the basis for both the
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before,
"were Congress to create equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages relief [directly under the Constitution] might be obviated." Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S.
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides
that the President is absolutely immune from a Bivens action
as well, I shall express by disagreement with that conclusion.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals who have suffered
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guaranteed them by the Fourth Amendment may invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a
suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles:
First, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws," 403 U. S., at 397, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803); second, "[h]istorically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 403 U. S., at 395. In Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument
of the federal government that federal officers, including cabinet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized
would substantially undercut our conclusion in Bivens. We
held there that although the performance of certain limited
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immunity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state officers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Davis v.

---- ·~-----
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Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-type suit brought
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guaranteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view,
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the
Bivens apsect of this case.
These cases established the following principles. First, it
is not the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch to
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.
In the absence of adequate legislatively prescribed remedies,
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equitable, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, exercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legislative officers subject to this judicially created cause of action
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the
traditional function of judicial review. Third, federal officials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is inconsistent with the proper performance of the official's duties
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments implicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress.
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court
has already done in this area. Under the above principles,
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will substantially impair his ability to carry out particular functions
that are his constitutional responsibility. For the reasons I
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have presented above, I do not believe that this argument
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this
case.
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the
functions for which he has constitutional responsibility would
be substantially impaired by the possibility of civil liability.
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason
that the function involved here does not have this character.
Which side of the line other presidential functions would fall
on need not be decided in this case.
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument.
It argues, not that every presidential function has this character, but that distinguishing the particular functions involved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n.
34. 33 Even if this were true, it would not necessarily follow
that the President is entitled to absolute immunity: That
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instances, it
is likely to be the case that one of the functions implicated deserves the protection of absolute immunity. In this particular case, I see no such function. 34
33
The majority also seems to believe that by "function" the Court has in
the past referred to "subjective purpose." See ante, at n. 34 ("judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were
taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U. S. 349, 362 (1978), we held that the factors determining whether a
judge's act was a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunity "relate to
the nature of the act itself, i.e, whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties." Neither of these factors required any analysis of the purpose the judge may have had in carrying out the particular action. Similarly in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S.
478, 512-516 (1977), when we determined that certain executive functions
were entitled to absolute immunity because they shared "enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process," we looked to objective qualities and
not subjective purpose.
34
The majority seems to suggest that responsibility for governmental reorganizations is one such function. Ante, at n. 34. I fail to see why this
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I do not believe that subjecting the President to a Bivens
action would create separation of powers problems or "public
policy" problems different from those involved in subjecting
the President to a statutory cause of action. 35 Relying upon
the history and text of the Constitution, as well as the analytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these problems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the
President in general, nor under the circumstances of this case
in particular.
III
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion.
The opinion suffers from serious ambiguity even with respect to the most fundamental point: How broad is the immunity granted the President? The opinion suggests that its
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the asserted
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official
acts." Ante, at 16. We are never told, however, how or
why Congressional action could make a difference. It is not
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon by the majority to immunize the President would not apply equally to
such a statutory cause of action; nor does the majority indicate what new principles would operate to undercut those
propositions.
In the end, the majority seems to overcome its initial hesitation, for it announces that, "[w]e consider [absolute] immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history," ante, at
should be so.
85
Although our conclusions differ, the majority opinion reflects a similar
view as to the relationship between the two sources of the causes of action
in this case: It does not believe it necessary to differentiate in its own analysis between the statutory and constitutional causes of action.
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16-17. See also ante, at 24 ("A rule of absolute immunity for
the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient
remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief executive."). 36 While the majority opinion recognizes that "[i]t is
settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not
bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the
United States," it bases its conclusion, at least in part, on a
suggestion that there is a special jurisprudence of the presidency. Ante, at 22. 37
But in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we upheld the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena
duces tecum against the President. In other cases we have
enjoined executive officials from carrying out presidential
,. THE CHIEF JusTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the majority opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is absolutely immune under the Constitution:
"I write separately to underscore that the presidential immunity spelled
out today derives from and is mandated by the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers." Concurring opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ante,
at 1.
37
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions:
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection,
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime."
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judicial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringement upon the Executive Branch:
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act,
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control."
Id., 'a t 610.

--- ------
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directives. See e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name appearing on the complaint was more important in resolving
separation of powers problems than the substantive character of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions.
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doctrine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their
proper balance." Ante, at 23. Without explanation, the
majority contends that a "merely private suit for damages"
does not serve this function.
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e.,
subjecting the President to rules of general applicabilitydoes not further the separation of powers, but rather is in
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of
this sort, to the extent that it is based upon a statutorily created cause of action, is the ability of Congress to assert legal
restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regardless of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitzgerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention
passing as legal argument.
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a constitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to assure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallimits on his authority-may offend separation of powers
concerns. This is surely a perverse approach to the Constitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immunity may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the President to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique"
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriously argued that the President must be placed beyond the law and

----
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beyond judicial enforcement of constitutional restraints upon
executive officers in order to implement the principle of separation of powers.
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds
suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity
questions.
First, the majority informs us that the President occupies·
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign affairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President.
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to absolute immunity either in general or in this case in particular.
For some reason, the majority believes that this uniqueness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply. The
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, because the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers.
Ante, at 18. Even if this were true, it would not follow that
the President is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only
mean that a particular argument is out of place. But the fact
is that it is not true. There is nothing in the President's
unique role that makes the arguments used in those other
cases inappropriate.
Second, the majority contends that because the President's
"visibility" makes him particularly vulnerable to suits for civil
damages, ante, at 20, a rule of absolute immunity is required.
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The force of this argument is surely undercut by the majority's admission that "there is no historical record of numerous
suits against the President." Id, at n. 33. Even granting
that a Bivens cause of action did not becomes available until
1971, in the eleven years since then there have been only a
handful of suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with
in a routine manner by the courts and the Justice Department. There is no reason to think that, in the future, the
protection afforded by summary judgment procedures would
not be adequate to protect the President, as they currently
protect other executive officers from unfounded litigation.
Indeed, given the decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v.
Fitzgerald, No. 80-945, there is even more reason to believe
that frivolous claims will not intrude upon the President's
time. Even if judicial procedures were found not to be sufficient, Congress remains free to address this problem if and
when it develops.
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability "frequently could distract a President from his public duties."
Ante, at 20. Unless one assumes that the President himself
makes the countless high level executive decisions required
in the administration of government, this rule will not do
much to insulate such decisions from the threat of liability.
The logic of the proposition cannot be limited to the President; its extension, however, has been uniformly rejected by
this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow & Butterfield, supra.
Furthermore, in no instance have we previously held legal
accountability in itself to be an unjustifiable cost. The availability of the courts to vindicate constitutional and statutory
wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the virtues of our system of delegated and limited powers. As I argued in§ I, our concern in fashioning absolute immunity rules
has been that liability may pervert the decisionmaking process in a particular function by undercutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. Except for the empty generality that the President should have "'the maximum ability to
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deal fearlessly and impartially with' the duties of his office,"
ante at 20, the majority nowhere suggests a particular, dis. advantageous effect on a specific presidential function. The
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has
never before been counted as a cost.
IV
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief executive." Ante, at 24. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr.
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds comfort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms.
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Politics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts;
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an individual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances.
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting
the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I
dissent.
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~
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- 1 ) '2-office of the President: A President acting within the outer
~
boundaries of what Presidents normally do may, without li~ ~ ·"~
~
ability, de~se serious injury to anynumber of citL> -,.--7~ L.I.u ~ ~zen~ even though he knows his conduct violates a statute or
~ ,- ----..... ~les on the constitutional rights of those who are in- z. 0 -2%..
jured. Even if the President in this case ordered Fitzgerald

-:J

r

/

'/J

/f:e,~~

''J~

,

k

"71'_

~

~·

~ ----./ _
~V

~
L.1.)? 36

4

JL)

@

{$) ~~~fiJf liaWN~up~ ~4 ~/lb.j

ci5
~~ 4-L-~"(!'Zt.>
~~ ~~~~~u~~~~C?~
""-'2$)

~~-~ ~'~-~/ t~ ~~~""'l/4l.w-<-~~?)

~cv ~~~~~~ ?~~~<'4J-:.Z.2

{A) p/(W$

r.

1,1(1,~~\..r-v~ ~-Z3

~

<a
T

79-1738-DISSENT
2

(

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws,
he would be absolutely immune from suit. (By the same token, if a President, without following the "S'tatutory procedures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other federal officials, orders his subordinates to ~retap or ~into
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and
the officers comply with his request, the President would be
absolutely immune from suit] He would be immune regardless of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of
the statute and of the Constitution he knew his conduct to be,
and regardless of his purpose. 1
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the President. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do
not agree that if the office of President is to operate effectively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is performing, d~ury on others by conduct that he
knows violates the law.
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional immunity does not extend to those many things that Senators
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re' This, of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v.
Halperin, aff' d by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981).
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peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they
are not immune if in connection with such activity they deliberately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legislative investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away
records. Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972).
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they
are subject to criminal liablicy. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U. S. 24, 31 (19'SO), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is likewise
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who directs that an investigation be carried out in a way that is patently illegal is not immune.
In Marbury v. Mad is on, the Court, speaking through the
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important political powers" committed to the President for the performance of which neither he nor his appointees were accountable in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that
should be absolutely immune from other categories of conduct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The
Court instead concludes that whatever the President goes
and however contrail: to law he knows hls conduct to be, he
may, WittfoUt fear of liability, injure federal employees or any
other person within or without the government.
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President,
rather than to particular activities that the President might
perform, places the President above the law. It is a rever--------------------~

---
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sion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong. Until
now, this concept had survived in this country only in the
form of sovereign immunity. That doctrine forecloses suit
against the government itself and against government officials, but only when the suit against the latter actually seeks
relief against the sovereign. Larsen v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). Suit against an officer, however, may be maintained where it seeks specific relief against him for conduct contrary to his statutory
authority or to the Constitution. ld., at 698. Now, however, the Court clothes the office of the President with sovereign immunity, placing it beyond the law.
In Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 163, the Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, observed that the "Government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to observe this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right." Until now, the Court
has consistently adhered to this proposition. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), a unanimous Court held that
the governor of a state was entitled only to a qualified immunity. We reached this position, even though we recognized
that
"[i]n the case of higher officers of the executive branchthe inquiry is far more complex since the range of decisions and choices-whether the formulation of policy, of
legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day decisions-is virtually infinite-in short, since the options which the chief
executive and his principal subordinates must consider
are far broader and far more subtle than those made by
officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion
must be comparably broad." Id., at 246, 247.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN observed in McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 252 (dissenting opinion), "The principle
that our government shall be of laws and not of men is so
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strongly woven into our constitutional fabric that it has found
recognition in not just one but several provisions of the Constitution" (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JUSTICE
said in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S. 401,
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion):
"Accountability of each individual for individual conduct
lies at the core of all law-indeed, of all organized societies. The trend to eliminate or modify sovereign immunity is not an unrelated development; we have moved
away from 'the king can do no wrong.' The principle of
individual accountability is fundamental if the structure
of an organized society is not to be eroded to anarchy and
impotence, and it remains essential in civil as well as
criminal justice."
Unfortunately, the Court now abandons basic principles
that have been powerful guides to decision. It is particularly unfortunate since the judSlEent in this case has few, if
any, indicia of a_judicial decision; it is almost whol'JYiPolicy
choice, a choicetliat is without substantial support and that
in a11 events is ambiguous in its reach and import.
I agree with the Court's observation that "the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against officers of government has 'in large part been of judicial making."' Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that
the Court has simply "enacted" its own view of the best public policy. No doubt judicial convictions about public policy-whether and what kind of immunity is necessary or
wise-have played a part, but the courts have been guided
and constrained by common-law tradition, the relevant statutory background and our constitutional structure and history.
Our cases dealing with the immunity of members of Congress
are constructions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are
guided by the history of such privileges at common law. The
decisions dealmg with the immunity of state officers involve

cr~£,~
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the question of whether and to what extent Congress intended to abolish the common law privileges by providing a
remedy in the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional violations by state officials. Our decisions respecting
immunity for federal officials, including absolute immunity
for judges, prosecutors and those officials doing similar work,
reflect common law views, as well as judialso in large part ...----.
cial conclusions as to what privileges are necessary if particular functions are to be performed in the public interest.
Unfortunately, there is little of this appro~ch in the Court's
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 35. Indeed, the majority turns
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is pol~ not law, and in my view, very poor policy.
;...--I

In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from
suit for any deliberate and knowing violation of the Constitution or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immunity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and justified by considerations of public policy."
Ante, at 17. The decision thus has all the earmarks of a constitutional pronouncement-absolute immunity for the President's office is mandated by the Constitution. Although the
Court appears to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to
read the opinion coherently as standing for any narrower
proposition: Attempts to subject the President to liability either by Congress through a statutory action or by the courts
through a Bivens proceeding would violate the separation of
powers. 2 Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be
2

On this point, I am in agreement with the concurring memorandum of
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sustained when examined in the traditional manner and in
light of the traditional judicial sources.
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus, 3 rely
principally on two arguments to support the claim of absolute
immunity for the President from civil liability: absolute immunity is an "incidental power" of the Presidency, historically recognized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute
immunity is required by the separation of powers doctrine.
I will address each of these conten
!!t!digon[!]S:;i,.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, guarantees absolute immunity to members of Congress; nowhere, however,
does the Constitution directly address the issue of presidential immunity. 4 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the early history
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit assumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of
this position, petitioner relies primarily on three separate
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discussion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in
The Federalist; second, remarks made during the meeting of
the first Senate; and third, the views of Justice Story.
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the President should be impeachable did touch on the potential dangers of subjecting the President to the control of another
branch, the Legislature. 5 Governor Morris, for example,
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
3

The Solicitor General relies entirely upon the brief filed by his office in
Kissinger v. Halperin, supra.
' In fact, insofar as the Constitution addresses the issue of Presidential
liability its approach is very different from that taken in the Speech or Debate Cfause. The possibility of impeachment assures that the President
can be held accountable to the other branches of Government for his actions; the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar criminal prosecution.
'""The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 64-69 (1934).
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complained of the potential for dependency and argued that
"[the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors
who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 6 Col. Mason responded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Justice" and argued that this was least appropriate for the man
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 7 Madison
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should
be made for defending the Community against the incapacity,
negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate." 8 Pinkney responded on the other side, believing that if granted the
power, the Legislature would hold impeachment "as a rod
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his
independence." 9
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant impeachment to be the exclusive means of holding the President
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral
politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported by
the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed concern over limiting presidential independence, the delegates
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently
shared, to insulate the President from political liability in the
impeachment process.
Moreover, the Convention debate did not focus on wrongs
the President might commit against individuals, but rather
on whether there should be a method of holding him accountable for what might be termed wrongs against the state. 10
I d., at 64.
!d., at 65.
8
Ibid.
9
I d., at 66.
10
In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as follows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the
6

7
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Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tumults and insurrections" by the people in response to such
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the
other branches and that there was no general desire to insulate the President from the consequences of his improper
acts.
Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reliance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the people-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitutional plan met this test because it subjected the President to
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment,
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner concludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger political abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President
might commit. He did not consider what legal means might
be available for redress of individualized grievances.
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions with
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina ratifying convention, for example, there was a discussion "Or-the
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding executive officers accountable for their misdeeds. GovernorJolmson defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three
legal mechanisms of accountability:
society itself."

'
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"If an officer commits an offence against an
he isamellable to the courts of law. If he commits

crimes against the state, he may be indicted and punished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 11
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the avail- ;
ability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the
method of accountability was to be a function of the character
of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would
remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from injuries caused by presidential acts:
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any maladministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose
that the President should give wrong instructions to his
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common
law." 12
A similar distinction between different possible forms of
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:

~

"[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character
as a citiz;e11, and in his public character by impeachment."13
4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 43.
!d., iir4T.
13
2 Elliot 480.

11

12
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There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitutional convention; both were instrumental in securing the
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly,
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements.
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not
support this inference.
The s~cond 2_iece of historical e':_idence cited by petitioner
is an exchangeat the first meetmg ofthe Senate, involving
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay.
The debate started over whether or not the words "the President" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs,
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn,
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two.
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the
proposition that
"the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought
against him; was above the power of judges, justices,
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the
whole machine of government." 14
In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive
form of process available against the President. Senator
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a
President committing "murder in the street." In his view,
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather,
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded
"W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969).
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the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 15 In his view,
Senator .Ellsworth.and his supporters had not fully comprehended the difference in the political position of the American
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of
presidential accountability, including the question whether
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no
clearer then than it is now.
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his position, but is of such late date that it contributes little to understanding the original intent. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the
"incidental powers" of the President:
"Among these must necessarily be included the power to
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or
impediment whatsoever. The President cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and
for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases
at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the exercise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion,
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is
subject to no control, and his discretion, when exercised,
is conclusive." 16
ly committed to
egate to the Cone opposite v!ew in
Ibid.
2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 372 (1873).
17
It is not possible to determine whether this is the same Pinckney that
Madison recorded as Pinkney, who objected at the Convention to granting
15

16
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Senator Pinckney, arguing on the floor of the Senate, contrasted the pri~eges extended to members of Congress by
the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges extended to the President. 18 He argued that this was a deliberate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no
such authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore,
"[n]o privilege of this kind was intended for your Executive,
nor any except that . . . for your Legislature."
In previous immunity cases the Court has emphasized the
importance of the immunity afforded the particular government official at common law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U. S. 409, 421 (1976). Clearly this sort of analysis is not possible when dealing with an office, the presiUency, thatdrd not
extsfat cbmmon raw.~o the" extent that historica~is
appropriate in this context, it is constitutional history, not
common law, that is relevant. From the history discussed
above, however, all that can be concluded is that absolute immunity from civil liability for the President finds no firm support in constitutional text or history, or in the explanations of
a power of impeachment to the Legislature. Two Charles Pinckneys attended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina. See 3 M.
Farrand, supra, at 559.
' ~ Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress
69-83. PetitiOner contends that these remarks are not relevant because
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of
an allegedly libelous newspaper article. Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 7.
Although this was the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did discuss the
immunity of members of Congress as a privilege embodied in the Speech or
Debate Clause: "our Constitution supposes no man ... to be infallible, but
considers them all as mere men, to be subject to all the passions and frailties, and crimes, that men generally are , and accordingly provides for the
trial of such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature , for their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to
public opinion .... " This, then , was one of the privileges of Congress that
he was contrasting with those extended (or not extended) to the President.
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the early commentators. This is too weak a ground to support a declaration by this Court that the President is absolutely immune from civil liability, regardless of the source of
liability or the injury for which redress is sought. This much
the majority implicitly concedes since history and text, traditional sources of judicial argument, rrr;;rr-only a brief foot~ in the Court's opinion. Ante, at n-:-s2._
B

-

No bright line can be drawn between arguments for absolute immunity based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers and arguments based on what the Court refers
to as "public policy." This necessarily follows from the
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine:
"[l]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977).
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707
(1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Petitioner argues that public policy favors absolute immunity because absent such immunity the President's ability to execute his constitutionally
mandated obligations will be impaired. The convergence of
these two lines of argument is superficially apparent from the
very fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has
been characterized as a "functional" analysis.
The difference is only one of degree. While absolute immunity might maximize executive efficiency and therefore be
a worthwhile policy, lack of such immunity may not so disrupt the functioning of the presidency as to violate the separation of powers doctrine. Insofar as liability in this case is

--
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of congr:essi~nal origin, petitioner must demonstrate that
srtbjecting the President to a private damages action will prevent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned
functions." Insofar as liability is based on a Bivens action,
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropriate. Petitioner has surely not met the former burden; I do
not believe that he has met the latter standard either.
Taken at face value, the Court's position that as a matter of
constitutional law the President is absolutely immune should
mean that he is immune not only from damages actions but
also from suits for injunctive relief, criminal prosecutions
and, indeed, from any kind of judicial process. "Thrt there is
no contention that the President is immune from criminal
prosecution in the courts under the criminal laws enacted by
Congress or by the states for that matter. Nor would such a
claim be credible. The Constitution itself provides that impeachment shall not bar "Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and
Punishment, according to Law." Article I, Section II,
Clause VII. Similarly, our cases indicate that immunity
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal
prosecution. Supra, at 3.
Neither can there be a serious claim that the separation of
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial review or insulates the President from judicial process. No argument is made here that the President, whatever his liability for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctive
powers. See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama
R efining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's attempt to draw an analogy to the Speech or Debate Clause,
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that
"for any Speech or Debate" congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other Place," and, thus, assures that congress-

~
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men, in their official capacity, shall not be the subject of the
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited above indicate, it is
the rule, not the exception, that executive actions-including
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are
subject to judicial review. 19 Regardless of the possibility of
money damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of the President's actions or their legality under the applicable statutes can and will be subject to review. Indeed,
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set
aside by the Civil Service Commission as contrary to the applicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted by
Congress.
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the
ground that such claims would involve the President personally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presidential
actions. The President has been held to be subject to iudicial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25 Fed.
Cas. 30 (iBo7) (clilef'"Justi;;"Marshall, sitting as circuit justice). Burr "squarely ruled that a subpoena may be directed
to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 709 (DC
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected any suggestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an
unwarranted interference in the Presidency:
"T~rd, furnished to this high officer, to protect him
from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessaary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after
those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance
whichis toprecede the1r'being issued." 25 Fed. Cas.,
at 34.
9
' The Solicitor General, in fact, argues that the possibility of judicial review of presidential actions supports the claim of absolute immunity: Judicial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the
President's power," making private damages actions unnecessary in order
to achieve the same end. Brief, at 31 (see n. 3).
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This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974):
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances."
These two lines of cases establish then that neither subjecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Similarly, neither has been held to be sufficiently intrusive to justify a judicially declared rule of immunity. With respect to
intrusion by the judicial process itself on Executive functions,
sub"ectin the President to private claims for mone damages invo~m~e t ant 1s.
ere IS a separation of
powers problernnere, it must be found in the nature of the
remedy and not in the process involved.
We said in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should
know he is acting outside the law, and ... insisting on an
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d.
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No.
8~945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to
civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was illegal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such
circumstances, the question that must be answered is who
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer
or the victim.
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in tfie right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 163 (1803). Much more recently, the Court considered
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the role of a damages remedy in the performance of the
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed
rights: "Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U. ~ 395 (1971). 20 To the extent that the Court denies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the
protection of the laws."
That the President should have the same remedial obligations toward those whom he injures as any other federal officer is not a surprising proposition. The fairness of the remedial principle the Court has so far followed-that the
wrongdoer, not the victim, should ordinarily bear the costs of
the injury-has been found to be outweighed only in instances where potential liability is "thought to injure the governmental decisionmaking process." Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The argument for immunity is that the possibility of a damages action will, or at least should, have an effect on the performance
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter unconstitutional, or otherwise illegal, behavior. This may,
however, lead officers to be more careful and "less vigorous"
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not
always a virtue and undue caution is to be avoided.
The possibility of liability may, in some circumstances, distract officials from the performance of their duties and influence the performance of those duties in ways adverse to the
public interest. But when this "public policy" argument in
favor of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it applies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should
20

See also Justice Harlan's discussion of the appropriateness of the damages remedy in order to redress the violation of certain constitutional
rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
407-410 (1971) (Harlan, J . concurring).
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perform their responsibilities without regard to those personal interests threatened by the possibility of a lawsuit.
See Imbler, supra, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). 21
Inevitably, this reduces the public policy argument to nothing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which
officers should be encouraged to perform their functions with
"vigor," although with less care. 22
The Court's response, until today, to this problem has been
to apply the ~rgument to individual functiol}§, not offices, and
to evaluate the ert'ect orliabiiity on governmental decisionmaking within that function, in light of the substantive ends
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case,
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated
by the causes of action at issue here and the effect of potential liability on the performance of those functions.
II
The functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine and the e-ourt's more recent immunity decisions 23 converge on the following principle: The scope of immunitti_s dete:r.:._mined by functign, not office. Tfie wholesale claim that
the President is entitled1o absolute immunity in all of his actions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute privilege, which was rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a
unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra. There21

The Court has never held that the "public policy" conclusions it
reaches as to the appropriateness of absolute immunity in particular instances are not subject to reversal through congressional action. Implicity, therefore, the Court has already rejected a constitutionally-based,
separation of powers argument for immunity for federal officials.
22
Surely the fact that officers of the court have been the primary beneficiaries of this Court's pronouncements of absolute immunity gives support
to this appearance of favoritism.
23
See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States, 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Butz, supra. at 511.
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fore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad
immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility,24 the
only uestion that must be answe ed here is whether the dismissal of emp o~es f~ s wit ~const~ a y asswed
executive function, the performance of which would be substantially Tmpafred by the possibility of a private action for
damages. I believe it does not.
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes-5
U. S. C. §7211 and 18 U.S. C. § 1505--and the First
Amendment. At this point in the litigation, the availability
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the correctness of the the lower court's determination that the two
federal statutes create a private right of action, I find the
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of
action to be unconvincing. The attempt to found such immunity upon a separation of powers argument is particularly
unconvincing.
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211, states that
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... furnish information to
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member
thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second,
18 U. S. C. § 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional
testimony. It does not take much insight to see that at least
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional access to information in the possession of the Executive
Branch, which Congress believes it requires in order to carry
out its responsibilities. 25 Insofar as these statutes implicate

I
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not speculate on the presidential functions which may require
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which the
President participates iripFOsecutorial decisions.
25
See, e. g. , 48 Cong. Re~'During my first session of Congress I was desirous of learning the needs of the postal service and inquiring into the conditions of the employees. To my surprise I found that
under an Executive order these civil service employees could not give me
any information.") (remarks of Rep. Calder); id., at 4656 ("I believe it is
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a separation of powers argument, I would think it to be just
the opposite of that suggested by petitioner and accepted by
the majority. In enacting these statutes, Congress sought
to preserve its own constitutionally mandated functions in
the face of a recalcitrant Executive. 26 Thus, the separation
of powers problem addressed by these statutes was first of all
presidential behavior that intruded upon, or burdened, Congress' performance of its own constitutional responsibilities.
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action
would disrupt the President in the furtherance of his responsibilities. That approach ignores the separation of powers
problem that lies behind the congressional action; it assumes
that presidential functions are to be valued over congressional functions.
The argument that by providing a damages action under
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has
adopted an unconstitutiOiial m eans of furthering its ends,
must rest on the premise that presidential control of executive employment decisions is a constitutionally assigned
presidential function with which Congress may not significantly interfere. This is a frivolous contention. In United
States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held
high time that Congress should listen to the appeals of these men and provide a way whereby they can properly present a petition to the Members of
Congress for a redress of grievances without the fear of losing their official
positions") (remarks of Rep. Reilly); id., at 5157 ("I have always requested
employees to consult with me on matters affecting their interest and believe that it is my duty to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.")
(remarks of Rep. Evans). Indeed, it is for just this reason that petitioners
in No. 80-945 argue that the statutes do not create a private right of action:
"5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 were designed to protect the legislative process, not to give one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek damages." Brief for petitioners, at 26, n. 11.
26
Indeed, the impetus for passage of what is now 5 U. S. C. § 7211 was
the imposition of "gag rules" upon testimony of civil servants before congressional committees. See Exec. Order No. 402 (Jan. 25, 1906); Exec.
Order No. 1142 (Nov. 26, 1909).

79-1738---DISSENT

22

~.~

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

that "when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest." Whatever the rule may be with respect to high
officers, see Humphrey's E xecutor v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935), with respect to those who fill traditional bureaucratic positions, restrictions on executive authority are
the rule and not the exception. 27 This case itself demonstrates, the \ eve:r_:e _statutory r~str~in!§'' ~nder which the
President operates i~a.Fitzgerald was a civil service employee working in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Although his position
was such as to fall within the "excepted" service, which
would ordinarily mean that Civil Service rules and regulations applicable to removals would not protect him, 5 CFR
Part 6, § 6.4, his status as a veteran entitled him to special
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain Civil Service
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C.
§ 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C.
§7513(a): "An agency may take [adverse action] against an
employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service." Similarly, his veteran status entitled Fitzgerald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation.
5 U. S. C.
§§ 3501-3502. It was precisely those procedures that the
Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission found had
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable
authority.
This brief review is enough to illustrate my point: Personnel decisions of the sort involved in this case are em hatically
not a constitutionally ass1gne presidentm function that will

-

Thus, adverse action may generally be taken against civil servants
only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5
U. S. C. §§ 7503, 7513 and 7543.
27
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tolerate no interference by either of the other two branches
of government. More important than this "quantitative"
analysis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decisionmaking permitted in this area, however, is the "qualitative"
anaylsis suggested in § I(B) above.
Absolute immyni.U: is appropriate when the threat of ~abil
ity may bias the decisionmakg,r Wwax_s tfiat are adverse to
the public interest. But as the various regulations and statutes protecting civil servants from arbitrary executive action
illustrate, this is an area in which the public interest is demonstrably on the side of encouraging less "vigor" and more
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the very
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executive employees will be able freely to testify in Congress and to assure
that they will not be subject to arbitrary adverse actions indicate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justified absolute immunity are not applicable here. Absolute
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting civil
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations.
If respondent could, in fact, have proceeded on his two
statutory claims, the Bivens action would be superfluous.
Respondent may not collect damages twice, and the same injuries are put forward by respondent as the basis for both the
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before,
"were Congress to create equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages relief [directly under the Constitution] might be obviated." Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S.
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides
that the President is absolutely immune from a Bivens action
as well, I shall express by disagreement with that conclusion.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals who have suffered
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guaranteed them by the Fourth Amendment may invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a
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suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles:
First, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws," 403 U. 8., at 397, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803); second, "[h]istorically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 403 U. S., at 395. In Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument
of the federal government that federal officers, including cabinet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized
would substantially undercut our conclusion in Bivens. We
held there that although the performance of certain limited
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immunity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state officers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-type suit brought
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guaranteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view,
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the
Bivens apsect of this case.
These cases established the following principles. First, it
is not the exclusiVe"prerogative
the legislative branch to
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.
In the absence of adequate legislatively prescribed remedies,
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equitable, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, exercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legislative officers subject to this judicially created cause of action
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the

or
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traditional function of judicial review. Third, federal officials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is inconsistent with the proper performance of the official's duties
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to (
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments implicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress.
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court
has already done in this area. Under the above principles,
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will substantially impair his ability to carry out particular functions
that are his constitutional responsibility. For the reasons I
have presented above, I do not believe that this argument
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this
case.
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the
functions for which he has constitutional responsibility would
be substantially impaired by the possibility of civil liability.
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason
that the function involved here does not have this character.
Which side of the line other presidential functions would fall
on need not be decided in this case.
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument.
It argues, not that every presidential function has this character, but that distinguishing the particular functions involved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n.
35. 28 Even if this were true, it would not necessarily follow
The majority also seems to believe that by "function" the Court has in
the past referred to "s~ose." See ante, at n. 35 ("judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were
28

?
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that the President is entitled to absolute immunity: That
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instances, it
is likely to be the case that one of the functions implicated deserves the protection of absolute immunity. In this particular case, I see no such function. 29
I do not believe that subjecting the President to a Bivens
action would create separation of powers problems or "public
policy" problems different from those involved in subjecting
the President to a statutory cause of action.
Relying upon
the history and text of the Constitution, as well as the analytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these problems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the
President in general, nor under the circumstances of this case
in particular.
III
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion.
The opinion suffers from ~erious ambizyit;y even with respect to the most fundamental point1io""w broad is the immu3{)

taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In ~2!P v. Sparkman, 435
U. S. 349, 362 (1978), we held that the factors etermining whether a
judge's act was a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunity "relate to
the nature of the act itself, i. e, whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties." Neither of these factors required any analysis of the purpose the judge may have had in carrying out the particular action. Similarly in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S.
478, 512-516 (1977) , when we determined that certain executive functions
were entitled to absolute immunity because they shared "enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process," we looked to objective qualities and
not subjective purpose.
29
The majority seems to suggest that responsibility for governmental reorganizations is one such function. Ante, at n. 35. I fail to see why this
should be so.
30
Although our conclusions differ, the majority opinion reflects a similar
view as to the relationship between the two sources of the causes of action
in this case: It does not believe it necessary to differentiate in its own analysis between the statutory and constitutional causes of action.
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nity granted the President? The opinion suggests that its
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the asserted
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official
acts." Ante, at 17. We are never told, however, how or
why Congressional action could make a difference. It is not
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon by the majority to immunize the President would not apply equally to
such a statutory cause of action; nor does the majority indicate what new principles would operate to undercut those
propositions.
In the end, the majority seems to overcome its initial hesitation, for it announces that, "[ w]e consider [absolute] immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public
policy," ibid. See also id., at 23 ("A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief executive."). 31 There is even a disturbing suggestion that the
President may be immune from judicial process in general:
"Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the
Court, there have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity of the President from judicial orders." Ante, at 21 n. 36. 32 Yet, on the very next page the
31
THE CHIEF JUSTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the majority opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is absolutely immune under the Constitution:
"I write separately to emphasize that the presidential immunity spelled out
today derives from and is mandated by the Constitution. Absolute immunity for a President is either implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers or it does not exist." Memorandum of Concurrence, at 1.
32
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions:
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection,
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majority recognizes that this issue has long been resolved: "It
is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not
bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the
United States." Ante, at 22.
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime."
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judicial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringement upon the Executive Branch:
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act,
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control."
!d., at 610.
The majority also contends that "strong historical considerations" support this view. The history cited is for the most part that reviewed in
§I of this opinion. In addition, it cites a letter by President Jefferson,
which it contends demonstrates that "Jefferson believed the Presiaent not
to be subject to judicial process."
Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to the judicial
process are, however, not quite so clear as the majority suggests. Jefferson took a variety of positions on the proper relation of executive and judicial authority, at different points in his career. It would be suprising if
President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such immunity from judicial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief Justice Marshall.
Jefferson's views on this issue before he became President would be of a
good deal more significance. In this regard, it is significant that in Jefferson's second and third drafts of the Virginia Constitution, which also proposed a separation of the powers of government into three separate
branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive be subject to judicial
process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to personal restraint for private duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 350, 360. Also significant is the fact that when Jefferson's followers tried to impeach Justice
Chase in 1804-1805, one of the grounds of their attack on him was that he
had refused to subpoena President Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper
for sedition. See Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" 113. Fi-
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In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we upheld
the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena duces
tecum against the President. In other cases we have enjoined executive officials from carrying out presidential
directives. See e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name appearing on the complaint was more important in resolving
separation of powers problems than the substantive character of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions.
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doctrine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their
proper balance." Ante, at 22. Without explanation, the
majority contends that a "merely private suit for damages"
does not serve this function.
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e.,
subjecting the President to rules of general applicabilitydoes not further the separation of powers, but rather is in
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of
this sort, to the extent that it is based u on a statutoril cr ated cause of ac wn,
is the ao1 1ty of Congress to assert legal
......
nally, it is worth noting that even in the middle of the debate over Chief
Justice Marshall's power to subpoena the President during the Burr trial,
Jefferson looked to a legislative solution of the confrontation: "I hope however that ... at the ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice]
may have means provided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testimony of the [Executive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of
Thomas Jefferson, 407 n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to George Hay, United States District Attorney for
Virginia).
Only by virtue of brevity of its analysis can the majority plausably put
forth the claim that this history provides "strong" support for a proposition
that it admits to being demonstrably untrue one page later.

I\
r?
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restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regardless of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitzgerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention
passing as legal argument.
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a constitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to assure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallimits on his authority-may offend separation of powers
concerns. This is surely a perverse approach to the Constitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immunity may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the President to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique"
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriously argued that the President must be p~cEld beyond the law and
beyond judicial enforcement oT constitutional restraints upon
executive Officers in order to implement the principle of separation of powers.
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds
suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity
questions:-~'---"
First,the majority informs us that the President occupies
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign affairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President.
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to absolute immunity either in general or in this case in particular.

-

I
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For some reason, the majority believes that this uniqueness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply:- The
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, because the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers.
Even if this were true, it would not follow that the President
is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only mean that a
particular argument is out of place. But the fact is that it is
not true. There is nothing in the President's unique role
that makes the arguments used in those other cases
inappropriate.
Second, the majority contends that because the President
is "particularly vulnerable to suits for civil damages," ante, at
19, a rule of absolute immunity is required. The force of this
argument is surely undercut by the majority's admission that
"there is no historical record of numerous suits against the
President." ld, at n. 34. Even granting that a Bivens
cause of action did not becomes available until 1971, in the
eleven years since then there have been only a handful of
suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with in a routine
manner by the courts and the Justice Department. There is
no reason to think that, in the future, the protection afforded
by summary judgment procedures would not be adequate to
protect the President, as they currently protect other executive officers from unfounded litigation. Indeed, given the
decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, No.
80--945, there is even more reason to believe that frivolous
claims will not intrude upon the President's time. Even if
judicial procedures were found not to be sufficient, Congress
remains free to address this problem if and when it develops.
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability could
"distort the process of decisionmaking" because executive behavior would necessarily be somewhat defensive in character
to guard against this possibility. Unless one assumes that
the President himself makes the countless high level executive decisions required in the administration of government,
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this rule will not do much to insulate such decisions from the
threat of liability. The logic of the proposition cannot be limited to the President; its extension, however, has been uniformly rejected by this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow &
Butterfield, supra. Furthermore, in no instance have we
previously held legal accountability in itself to be an unjustifiable cost. The availability of the courts to vindicate constitutional and statutory wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the virtues of our system of delegated and
limited powers. As I argued in§ I, our concern in fashioning
absolute immunity rules has been that liability may pervert
the decisionmaking process in a particular function by undercutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. The
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has
never before been counted as a cost.
IV
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the part of t~e chief executive." Ante, at 23. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr.
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds comfort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms.
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Politics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts;
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an individual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances.
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting
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the principle of separation of powers.
dissent.

Accordingly, I

--
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May 12, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

BRW's draft dissent contains few surprises.

Under the

circumstances I think we should not attempt to provoke a long
series of exchanges before the opinion issues.
needed, however.

Some changes are

I haye marked suggestions on the attached

draft, beginning at page 15 of our opinion.

In this cover memo I

explain--page by page--what I think the suggested changes would
accomplish.

J3 J

}1.A

Page 15.

~~ier

by JPS--is that the opinion has included too much

£~policy"

~_!3-ere

I think BRW' s strongest charge--anticipated

language, too few of the indicia of a judicial opinioh .• ;

is no loss from dropping this "policy" sentence."

Page 16.
paragraphs.

"Insert A" is a suggested re-write of the deleted
It has three aims:

"policy" language;

(1) to omit certain excess

(2) to pin the origin of the "policy" language

on BRW's own Butz opinion; and (3) to explain the "policy"

.-

~

inquiry in terms of structural and functional presuppositions of
our institutions of government.

Page 17.

The change in text lets us cite Story "upfront" as

an exposition of the kind of functional/policy concern on which a
court, consistently with the "judicial" role, can rely.

The

language added to note 27 responds to BRW's claim that Congress
must be able to restrain the President in order to protect its
own role in the separation of powers.

The point essentially is

that, whatever its general intentions, it has not shown that it
meant to subject the President to damages liability.

Page 19.

BRW claims that we present no "arguments" in

support of absolute immunity--merely shift the burden of proof.
"Insert B" does little more than move the sentences in the
paragraph as originally written.

It does, however, put the case

a bit more affirmativelys--the reason I would recommend its
adoption.

Page 20.
stylistic.

The change in text is very close to being

The footnote change responds to the dissent's claim

that there would be no need to inquire into the President's
motives to perform a division of his functions.

Page 21.

BRW alleges that the historical recitation of the

footnote engages in overstatement.

This seems to me precisely

the kind of debate we should avoid--whether a footnote, of only

marginal importance, is shaded a bit too harshly.

I think the

best way to deal with this criticism is to defuse it.

Page 23.

Insert C, to be added to the footnote, responds to

BRW's major premise that our jurisprudence assumes a damages
remedy for every wrong.

In many ways I think this is the ground

on which we must meet BRW in order to be persuasive.

Page 24.

The suggested footnote--"Insert D"--deals with

BRW's rhetorical charge that the Court puts the President "above
the law."

~uprtmt <!fou.rt of

tltt ~b ~tafte

Waalyington. ~.

<!f.

20,?'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHAL\-

May 12, 1982

Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

z.:fttt .
T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 05/15/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Dick

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 14, 1982

79-1738 Nixon
My tentative comments - subject to discussion - on
suggested changes in our opinion, are as follows:
Pages 15 and 16 - I do not view the fulminating
of the dissent about "public policy" necssarily suggests a
deemphasis by us on what the Court has said before about
reliance on policy in immunity cases.
more heavily on it than BRW himself.

No one has relied
In effect, we are

relying on stare decisis.
Having said this, and on a second reading of your
changes on 15 and 16, I believe they are an improvement.

I

suggest we revise the beginning of subpart B along
thefollowing lines:

"Our decisions concerning the immunity of
government officials from civil damages
liability have been guided primarily by the
Constitution, federal statutes/ and history.
QAdditionally, at least in the absence of
__.,.. explicit~ constitutional or congressional
guidance, / immunity decisions have been
~/- informed by the common law o (for example, in
cases arising under the inexplicit language ~
of
§1983). Tht s Court also neG-e,ssaril-y h as
~e_ weighed
concerns of public policy1 in light- of e ft"c. • tly
history and the structure of our .
, II .,,.v"'t; V\ 1), f.e ol ~1 our
government.
(Dick, here cite "public policy"
statements from Butts, etc.).

2.

At this point we 'can pick up - if you agree - the second
full paragraph in your insert A.

Page 17.

Apart from minor editing, the only

change is in note 27.

Page 19.

Your insert B is a fine substitute for

the present language.

Note 35.

I will address this below.

I have done minor editing.

Although you have made no change in note

35 (not at bottom of your rider B-2), I am not at all sure
now thatwe should say that where an official possesses
absolute immunity (e.g., a judge), it extends only "to acts
in performance of particular function".

We hold in this

case that presidential immunity extends only to action taken
within the scope of his authority- i.e., official duties.
If he committed a personal fraud (conspired with a friend to
defraud a widow for personal gain), or a personal tort
(assault and battery of the President of Americans for
Democratic Action), the President would no more have
immunity than would the Texas judge who conspired to commit
a fraud.

See the draft of a footnote that I have dictated.

Page 20.
20.

I like the new sentence beginning page

I also like the insert proposed for the footnote.

If

we decide to take the position that I mention above with
respect to "functional" analysis, other changes would have

3.
'

to be made in this note.
remain the same:

The central point, however, would

namely, that because of the scope of the

executive power of the United States under our Constitution,
the official acts of a President embrace the spectrum of
government.

Nevertheless, in so acting within the scope of

his authority, his motives would be as irrelevant as those
of a judge or prosecutor acting judicially or
prosecutorially.

Drawing distinctions near the "outer

perimeter" would be difficult but not impossible.

Page 21.

The editing changes are good.

I would

like to take a look at what we wrote last Term about history
before deciding whether to say anything further about it.

Page 23, n. 41.

I think your insert is quite good

- and an effective answer to BRW.

Page 24, n. 45.

This also is helpful.

* * * * *
Now, Dick, I come to your memo of May 14, with the
suggested long revision of note 27.

we need to talk about

this, but my initial reactions are as follows:
I agree that we need to respond to the dissent's
implied cause of action theory.

In general terms, we could

start by saying that the dissent injects into this case the
argument that a damages cause of action against the
President may be implied from the statutes on which

4.
'

respondent relies.
why).
on it.

The issue is not before us (stating

We address it briefly only because the dissent relies
Then, Dick, I would make in summary form the

"intent" argument that you made so persuasively in Merrill
Lynch.

Cite the Court's opinion in Merrill Lynch that

turned entirely on intent, Sea Clammers and other relevant
cases.
After making clear that intent must be
established, I would repeat what we have in present note 27,
and follow this with strong statements that there is not a
word in the statutes or legislative history that supports an
intention to impose a damages liability on the President of
the United States.

Nor were thre any prior court decisions,

such as those relied upon in Merrill Lynch.

We might add

that in view of other remedies provided expressly in these
statutes, our cases also militate against even implying
causes of action
I

against~

officials.

See, e.g. Bush (?).

would reserve for a final paragraph the answer

you have given with respect to a Bivens claim.

L.F.P., Jr.,
ss

May 14, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Nixon

Attached is some language drafted as a substitute for the
current Footnote 27 of the Nixon opinion.
I believe that it should be included.
agrees.

For what it is worth,

David has seen it, and he

On the other hand, you of course must worry whether it

would offend the Chief.

Note 27.
The Court previously has suggested that separation-of-powers
concerns might make it inappropriate for a court to "infer" a
Bivens cause of action against an official of the President's
constitutional stature.

See Carlson v. Green, supra, at 19 (in

direct constitutional actions against officials with independent
status in our constitutional scheme .•• judicially created
remedies ••. might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, supra, at 396 (inference of a
constitutional damages remedy would be inappropriate

in~

case

involving "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress").

Similar concerns, discussed in test infra, counsel
hesitation in concluding that Congress intended a statute of
general reference to subject the President to damages liability
for his official acts.

We know of no instance in which Congress

explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to damages
liability, and we have no occasion to consider the serious
constitutional issues that would arise if Congress should do so.
•st~~U, ... ~ ~
JUSTICE WHITEA s~gge~ts that the statutes on which respondent
relies should be construed as intended to create a damages action
against the President.

lk~ .... H.At

Ia a~

the purpose of these statutes

was to control Executive behavior.

Post, at 21.

And from this

purpose he would infer that Congress must have intended to
subject the President, as the principal Executive officer, to
private suits for damages.
In the present posture of the case we must assume that
~4..4...... ~-~~("4~-1.4
causes of action may be inferretl under 5 u.s.c.
7211 and 18

..

u.s.c.

§

1505.

"

See note 20 supra.

Even assuming that damages

actions may be inferred against some wrongdoers, ..QgueveP"-J we eo
oA&t

~114J,..,.
~ ...... ~..,_.
ehtl'\ok it followsf that an intent to impose liabiity on the
1
~
~
.

President

d.

The legislative history cited by

~4-f_./,.,..... ~ ;-/ ~ •·111/.t I

JUSTICE WHITE, post, at 20-2l,J\~~y. ~!Te.e~~Fa:liy.

That history principally involves the enactment of Section 6 of
the Post Office Appropriations Act of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat.
539.

The predecessor of 5

u.s.c.

§

7211, this legislation was

passed by Congress partly to override "gag rules" imposed by
executive orders prior to that time.

In terms the statute

provided that civil service employees had a right to report to

l4c.. /Z...:t-',

'

Congress and that they should not be punished for doing so.

Yet

there is no indication on the face of the statute that Congress
intended to impose damages liability on the President.

And, in

the historical context, it is implausible that Congress in 1912
could have intended to create a damages remedy against the
President by mere implication.

Only a few years earlier, in

1896, this Court had held that the Postmaster General was
absolutely immune from civil suits arising from "action having
more or less connection with the general matters committed by law
to his control or supervision."
498 (1896).

Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,

The rationale of Spalding, see id., at 498-499,

would have applied to the President a fortiori.

Accordingly, we

cannot accept that "Congress •.• would [have meant to] impinge on
a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert
inclusion in the general language before us." Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341

u.s.

367, 376 (1

1).

Nor is any indication of

intent supplied by the floor debates.

On the contrary, these

suggest that congressional oversight--not a remedy in damages
from the President--would be the principal enforcement mechanism.
See 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (19121 ("Supervisory officials will
hesitate to trump up charges •.. as all cases of removals will be
submitted to Congress each year, and if an employee can produce
satisfactory evidence that he has not received the protection
afforded in this bill his case can be made the subject of a
special inquiry if Congress so decides)

(remarks of Rep. Calder);

id., at 4656 ("Men in official position will hesitate to trump up

charges against some employee ... , as ail the cames of removals
and reductions will be submitted to Congress each year

.. .. .
II )

The other section from which respondent would infer a cause
of action against the President is a criminal statute, 18
§

1505, originally enacted in 1940.

expressly to the President.

u.s.c.

It of course does not refer

And even the respondent fails to

argue that the legislative history suggests any intent to create
a damages remedy enforceable against the President on the basis
of his official acts.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Dick

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 14, 1982

79-1738 Ni.xon
My tentative comments - subject to discussion - on
suggested changes in our opinion, are as follows:
Pages 15 and 16 - I do not view the Fulrninatina
of the dissent about "public policv" necssarily sugqests
deemphasis by us on what the

~ourt

has said before about

reliance on policy in immunity cases.
more

h~avilv

~

on it than Bml himself.

No one has relied
In effect, we are

relying on stare decisis.
Having said this, and on a second reading ot your
changes on 15 and 16, I believe they are an improvement.
suggest we revise the beqinning of subpart B alonq
thefollowing lines:

"Our dec:i.sions concerning the bnrnuni ty of
government officials from civil damages
liability have been guided primarily by the
Constitution, federal statutes and history.
Additionally, at least in the absence of
explicity constitutional or congressional
guidance, immunity decisions have been
informed by the common law (for example, in
cases arising under the inexplicit language
of §1983). This Court also necessarily has
weighed concerns of public policy in liqht of
our history and the structure of our
government. (Dick, here cite "public pol icy"
statements from Butts, etc.).

I

2.

At this point we can pick up - if you agree - the second
full paragraph in your insert A.

Page 17.

Apart from minor editing, the only

change is in note 27.

Page 19.

Your insert B is a fine substitute for

the present language.

Note 35.

l will address this below.

I have done minor editing.

Although you have made no change in note

35 (not at bottom of your rider B-2), I am not at all sure
now thatwe should

~ay

that where an official possesses

absolute immunitv (e.g., a judge}

1

it extends onlv "to acts

in performance of particular function".

We

hol~

in this

case that presidential immunity extends only to action taken
with in the scope of hi.s authority - i.e.

1

official duties.

If he committed a personal fraud (conspired with a friend to
defraud a widO\tl for personal gain), or a personal tort
(assault and battery of the President of

~mericans

for

Democratic Action), the President would no more have
immunity than would the rrexas judge who conspired to commit
a fraud.

See the draft of a footnote that I have dictated.

Page 20.
20.

I like the new sentence beginning page

I also like the insert proposed for the footnote.

we decide to take the

po~ition

If

that I mention above with

respect to "functional" analysis, other changes would have

3.

to be made in this note.
remain the same:

The central point, however, would

namely, that because of the scope of the

executive power of the United States under our Constitution,
the official acts of a President embrace the spectrum of.
government.

Nevertheless, in so acting within the scope of

his authority, his motives would be as irrelevant as those
of a judge or prosecutor acting judicially or
prosecutorially.

Drawing distinctions near the "outer

perimeter" would be difficult but not impossible.

Page 21.

The editing changes are good.

T. would

like to take a look at what we wrote last Term about history
before decirHnq whether to say anvthing further about it.

Page 23, n. 41.

I think your

inse~t

is quite good

- and an effective answer to BRW.

Page 24, n. 45.

Thls also is helpful.

* * * * *
Now, Dick, I come to your memo of Mav 14, with the
suggested long r.evi.sion of note 27.

We need to talk about

this, but my initial reactions are as follows:
I agree that we need to respond to the dissent's
implied cause of action theory.

In qeneral terms, we could

start by saying that the dissent injects into this case the
argument that a damages cause of action against the
President may be implied from the statutes on which

4.

respondent relies.
why).
on it.

The issue is not before us (stating

We address it briefly only because the dissent relies
Then, Dick, I would make in summary form the

"intent" argument that you made so persuasively in Merrill
Lynch.

Cite the Court's opinion in Mer.r :U.l Lynch that

turned entirely on intent, Sea Clammers and other. relevant
cases.
After making clear that intent must be
established, I would repeat what we have in present note 27,
and follow this with strong statements that there is not a
word in the statutes or legislati.ve history that supports an

intention to

impo~e

the United States.

a damages liability on the President of

Nor were thre any prior court decisions,

such as those relied upon in Merr i 11 Lynch.

_we might add

that in view of. other remedies provided expressly in these
statutes, our cases also militate against even implying
causes of action against
I

.!!!!Y_

officials.

See, e.g. Bush

(?).

would reserve for a final paragraph the answer

you have given with respect to a Bivens claim.

L.F.P., Jr.,

ss

------,----------,~------------..
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May 18, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Oear Chief, Bill, John and Sandra:
I send to each of you herewith, a third draft of
my opinion for the Court, which you have joi.ned.
Byron's dissent, persuasive from his viewpoint,
tempted me to respond to a number of points. On reflection,
however, I concluded that he had made only two suhRtantial
arguments: (i) that in resolving this ca~e, we had to
"assume" that there is an implied cause of action against a
President under both Bivens and the Civil Service statutes1
and (ii) that we relied too heavily on "public oolicy".
I therefore have confined responses to his opini.on
almost exclusively to these two points. I think Byron
perhaps is correct that I had overeompha.s i z~d "pol icv", when
the fundamental support for absolute t.mmuni ty comes from the
Constitution, and the structure and history of our
government. Changes in the text, marked in the marqin of my
third drCift, have attempted to make this clear.
The "imPlied cause of action" point is peculiar in
the present posture of the case. You may recall tha.t there
was a majority (including Byron) to decide this case on the
ground that there is no implied cause of action against a
President either under Bivens or the statutes. But a
majority of you argued that we had taken the case to decide
the immunity question, and accordingly I have written it
that way. Byron, however, has relied on the statutes in a
way that I think both damaging and unjustified. I think it
necessary to respond, and I have done so in footnote 27, p.
16.

As indicated above, I am not replying to Byron's
"parade of horribles" as to what a President may do to
innocent people. I was tempted to cite from some of his own
language in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 u.s. 349, 355-356, in

,.

2.

which he quoted from Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, at 347.
But this seems profitless. My response, therefore, is
confined primarily to the foregoinq T;>Oints. t think Rvron's
criticism with respect to "public policy" was a constructive
one. It has helped me, I think, to strengthen the opinion.
I hope you agree.
I

As you have joined, I will await your views before
recirculate.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

_,

...-

Rider A, p. 16 (Nixon)

lfp/ss 05/20/82
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we know of no instance in which Congress

6-;f~o.

~~~

explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to
damages liability.

~

~
/

And in this case we have no occasion ~6jlzl

'

to consider the serious constitutional issues that would
arise if Congress should do so.

We are reviewing this

case under the "collateral order" doctrine, the issue
submitted thereunder being only the immunity of a
President.

The dissenting opinion appears to argue that

even though Congress has not spoken expressly, an
intention to create a private cause of action against all
officials nevertheless may be inferred both under Bivens
and the two statutes in issue.

For the purpose of

reviewing this case under the collateral order before us,

2.

we may assume that causes of action may be inferred
against some officials.

It does not follow, however, that

we must - in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a
~

I'

statute in light of the immunity doctrine - maAe a similar
assumption with respect to the President.

If, as we have

concluded, a President enjoys absolute immunity from civil

~liability

in the absence of explicit affirmative

action by Congress, the question raised by the dissent is
answered.

A damages remedy may not be implied against a

President for his official acts.

~uvrtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 19, 1982

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,

~-

Thank you for the opportunity to review your proposed
changes in the court's opinion. It is a major opinion, and a
very significant one. You have tackled it well.
I am concerned, however, about two major points. In
footnote 27, the opinion seems to say that there are neither
statutory nor First Amendment implied causes of action. However,
if this is so, there is no need to reach the immunity issue. As
you know, my first preference was to hold there is no implied
cause of action. It seems to me the Court must make up its mind
which issue to reach, but if we hold there is no implied cause of
action, the rest is dicta.

~

zl

~
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Second, if we hold the President enjoys absolute
immunity from damage suits, then we are holding in effect that
Congress may not enact a statute holding the President liable for
civil damages. There is no express discussion, however, of the
limitation we are impos~ g on Congress. Inasmuch as the
President is subject t ~ ub~ na duces tecum in a crimianl case,
and has been held subject ~ njunction, there should be a
clearer discussion of why Congress is restricted in this one
regard, and the extent to which it is restricted.
Finally, you have opted not to expand the historical
analysis. Byron made some good points in that regard and perhaps
it would help the opinion to deal with it more fully.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

(

__''Lf

May 20, 1982
PERSONAL

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Chief, Bill

an~

John:

As a result of ~iscussions with Sandra, I expect
to rewrite - and condense - footnote 27 (pp. 16-17) of my
third oraft sent you on May 19.
This contains changes that seemed appropriate in
light of Byron's dissent. As I indicated in my letter of
transmittal, note 27 Has new. Sanclra has mane some helpful
suggestions.
I

this that I

suggest, therefore, that you a'"'a it a change in
will make, an~ recirculate.

orob~bly

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist
,Just ice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice O'Connor

,jnprnnt <!fltllri of tqt ~b .i\tattg
~ag!finght~ 10. <ij. 2llp-'1~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 21, 1982
Re:

No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lew is:
I am glad you have moved away from the "policy" aspect and
put the immunity holding squarely on the Constitution. This may
lead me to modify my concurring opinion somewhat.
I may be in a position to deal with some of Byron's
opulent rhetoric. On some of it he is just dead wrong both as to
history and the Court's early utterances.
I'll get to work.
Regards,

/N\0
Justice Powell
cc:

Justice Rhenquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

jltJlrttttt Qfltltrf ltf tqt 11fuUtb jbdt~
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 21, 1982

Re:

No.

79-1738~.

Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
In view of the importance of this op1n1on, I have
continued to work at it in light of the concerns I expressed
previously. Perhaps it would be possible to condense footnote 27
even more so as to avoid some of the anomaly resulting from
extend ~ absolute immunity and also finding no implied cause of
action~ suggestion is attached for your consideration.
With reference to my concern about the matter of other
exercises of jurisdiction over the President, I am attaching a
~suggested substitution of Section IV B, pages 21-24. The purpose
of the substitution is my concern that the present section could
confuse the reader regarding the courts' exercise of jurisdiction
over the President. My suggested changes attempt to make clear
that we are not subtly altering our past decisions.
In addition to the changes in the text, I suggest
footnotes 35 and 37. The citations in the first
foo n te are dated and may be of limited value in light of
Youngstown. The references in the second footnote are not needed
because of references to Youngstown in the text. Because of the
~()direct reference to United States v. Nixon in the text, I would
~ delete
first sentence (and c1tation) in footnote 40.
Finall~ suggest integrating the substance of footnote 36 with
your historical discussion in footnote 31.
~

~d f Oi~ing

?

helpful.

I stand ready to discuss this further if it would be
This "end of term" drafting is not easy.
Sincerely,

Sandra D. O'Connor

Attachment

27.
In the present case, therefore, we are presented only with
implied causes of action, and we do not address directly the
immunity issue in the context of express causes of action against
the President. Consequently, our holding today extends to the
President absolute immunity from civil damages liability in the
absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress.

pp. 21-24

-B-

Courts traditionally have recognized the President's
constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. For example, while courts
generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of
an official's evidentiary privilege,[n. 38] in considering such
claims by the President, we have recognized that presidential
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683, 708 (1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra (holding
that under most circumstances the President must produce
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); United States
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 187, 191 (1807) (ordering the President to
produce a letter subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial);
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 (1952)
(holding invalid a presidential order to seize property because
it was not authorized by either Congress or the Constitution) .[n.
39] But in deciding to exercise jurisdiction, a court must
balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions
of the executive branch. See Nixon v. General Services
Administration, 433 u.s. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon,
418 u.s. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to
serve broad public interests--as when the court acts to maintain
the proper balance of the separation of powers cf., Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to ensure that a criminal
trial may proceed, United States v. Nixon, su~ra--the exercise of
jurisdiction is warranted. In the case of th1s merely private
suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it
is not. [n. 40]

~ttvntttt
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

May 21, 1982

Re:

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

..

Dear Lewis,

In view of the importance of this opinion, I have
continued to work at it in light of the conc ~ s I expressed
previously. Perhaps it would be possible to condense foot o
even more so as to avoid some of the anomaly resulting from
extending absolute immunity and also finding no implied cause of
action. A suggestion is attached for your consideration.
With reference to ~y concern about the matter of other
exercises of jurisdiction ~ ~er the President, I am attaching a
suggested substitution of Section _IV B, pa ~
gl-24.
The purpose
of the substitution is my concern that the
esent section could
confuse the reader regarding the courts' e ercise of jurisdiction
over the President. My suggested changes attempt to make clear
that we are not subtly altering our past decisions.
In additi ~ o the changes in the text, I suggest
dropping footnotes ~ and 37. The citations in the first
footnote are dated and may be of limited value in light of
Youngstown. The re erences in the second footnote are not needed
because of referenc s to Youngstown in the text. Because of the
direct reference to United States v. Nixon in the text, I would
delete th ~first s ntence (and citation) in footnote 40.
Finally, ~ suggest integrating the substance of footnote 36 with
your historical d'scussion in footnote 31.
helpful.

I stan ready to discuss this further if it would be
This "end of term" drafting is not easy.
Sincerely,

Sandra D. O'Connor

Attachment

·27.
In the present case, therefore, we are presented only with
implied causes of action, and we do not address directly the
immunity issue in the context of express causes of action against
the President. Consequently, our holding today extends to the
President absolute immunity from civil damages liability in the
absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress.

pp. 21-24

-B-

Courts traditionally have recognized the President's
constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial d~ference and restraint. For example, while courts
generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of
an official's evidentiary privilege,[n. 38] in considering such
claims by the President, we have recognized that presidential
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683, 708 {1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra (holding
that under most circumstances the President must produce
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial); United States
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 187, 191 {1807) {ordering the President to
produce a letter subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial);
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s. 579 {1952)
(holding invalid a presidential order to seize property because
it was not authorized by either Congress or the Constitution) .[n.
39] But in deciding to exercise jurisdiction, a court must
balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions
of the executive branch. See Nixon v. General Services
Administration, 433 u.s. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon,
418 u.s. 683, 703-713 {1974). When judicial action is needed to
serve broad public interests--as when the Court acts to maintain
the proper balance of the separation of powers cf., Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to ensure that a criminal
trial may proceed, United States v. Nixon, supra--the exercise of
jurisdiction is warranted.
In the case of this merely private
suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it
is not. [n. 40]

May 22, 1982
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Nixon Footnote 27

Later this afternoon I'll show you draft language
accommodating all of SOC's requests, as I understand them.
This draft of Footnote 27 is an early installment--and more
troubling than what will follow.
As I don't "like" all of the language, I call your
attention to three sentences included for particular
purposes.

Two are very minor rewrites of Justice O'Connor's

suggested language.
are included.

It may help if you can tell her they

They are the first sentence ("In the present

case ••• " and the next to the last ("Consequently, our
holding today •••. ).

The last sentence, though somewhat

redundant, is included for Justice Rehnquist and the Chief.
It is intended to clarify that the decision is of a
"constitutional issue" and is not a housekeeping rule of
judicial policy.

May 25, 1982

79-1738 Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Sandra:
I am grateful for your continued interest in this
case. The enclosed draft - now ready for circulation substantially adopts each of the three suggestions made in
your letter of May 21.
On pages 21-23 I have "tracked• your draft
language almost word-for-word. Footnote 31 now includeR the
historical discusRion we both thought appropriate. In
accord with the third paragraph of your letter, the
substance of the former note 36 now has been "integrated"
into footnote 31.
I believe we now have footnote 27 in satisfactory
form. I have accepted your two suggested sentences as
explanations of the opinion's approach to the questions
presented. Your first sentence hegi.ns the footnote. I then
have added a few sentences of my own, explaining that the
approach is consistent with the Court's prior practice.
Your second sentence then provides a kind of summary. The
last sentence has been added to make clear that our holding
fairly can be called "constitutional" - a matter of great
concern to the Chief Justice.
As perhaps you sense, I am anxious to conclude
work on this opinion - but only with a Court. Last Term,
both Byron and I must have devoted the better part of two
months to the question of presidential immunity. We ended
up with a 4-4 ti.e, with WHR not participating. There are
differences between the Kissinger case last Term and the
present one as a wiretap was involved in it.
But the basic
question of absolute immunity was the centerpiece of our
long debate. Potter, John and I worked directly together in
support of the absolute immunity view, that was joined also
by the Chief. At one point Thurgood agreed, but in the end

2.

he defected. I think, as does John, that this year's
opinion is an improved and stronger exposition of the
absolute immunity view for the President of the United
States.
I particularly appreciate your interest and
support, and your suggestions have been constructive. I
very much hope you will renew your join. Certainly as much
as any other case this Term, it is necessary to have a soli.d
Court for one opinion.

Although I am ready to recirculate,
sure that the changes have your approval.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss

I

want to make
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 26, 1982

Re:

No. 79-1738

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Dear Lewis,
In my view, you have strengthened and improved
the opinion in this important case. I gladly continue
to join it.
I fear I have added to your burdens with
the suggestions. Thank you for all the consideration you
have shown.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
P.S.

On page 16 in footnote 27, second sentence from the
end, I believe the word "immunity" may be a
typographical error. Should it be "immune"?
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May

J . BRENNAN, JR.

No. 79-1738 -- Nixon v. Fitzgerald.

Dear Byron,
Please join me.

Sincerely,
of

, -2~(
W. J. B. , Jr.

Justice White.
Copies to the Conference.

27, 1982.

,.:%u:p-rttttt <!Jo-u:.rt ~f tire ~mtd j;tat.cg
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CHAMBERS OF

May 31, 1982

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/

Re: No. 79-1738 - Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
I am writing a brief separate dissent .
This will not
hold you or Lewis up , for I suspect that you will be making
some revisions in response to Lewis' third draft of May 26.
Sincerely,

~

Justice White
cc: The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Mar:'-hall
~tice Blackmun
~ ustice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice SteYens
Justice O'Connor

\

From:

_ Stylistic changes throughout;
pp. 5-6,9,14-15,19,28-29,31-33

Justice \Yhite

Circulated: __

No. 79- 1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD

L' .

ON" WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE Ft\ITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June - , 1982)

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The four dissenting members of the Court in B11tz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), argued that all federal officials are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for any action they take in connection with their official duties. That
immunity would extend, eYen to actions taken with express
knowledge that the conduct was clear!~· contrary to the controlling statute or clearly violatiYe of the Constitution. Fortunately, the majorit~· of the Com·t rejected that approach:
We held that althoug·h public officials perform certain functions that entitle them 0 absolute immunit~· , the immunit~·
attaches to particular functions-not to particular offices.
Officials performing functions for which immunit~· is not absolute enjoy qualified immunity; they are liable in damages only
if their conduct violated \Yell-established law and if the~·
should have realized that their conduct was illegal.
The Court now applies the dissenting view in B11tz to the
office of the President: A President acting within the outer
boundaries of what Presidents normall~· do ma:v , without liability, deliberate!~· cause serious injury to any number of citizens eYen though he kno"·s his conduct violates a statute or
tramples on the constitutional rights of those who are injured. EYen if the President in this case ordered Fitzgerald
fired by means of a trumped-up reduction in force, knowing

79-1738--DISSENT
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that such a discharge was contrary to the civil service laws,
he would be absolutely immune from suit. By the same token, if a President, without following the statutory procedures which he knows apply to himself as well as to other federal officials, orders his subordinates to wiretap or break into
a home for the purpose of installing a listening device, and
the officers comply with his request, the President would be
absolutely immune from suit. He would be immune regardless of the damage he inflicts, regardless of how violative of
the statute and of the Constitution he kne\\' his conduct to be,
and regardless of his purpose. 1
The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the
Constitution. If that is the case, Congress can not provide a
remedy against presidential misconduct and that the criminal
laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the President. I find this approach completely unacceptable. I do
not agree that if the office of President is to operate effectively, the holder of that office must be permitted, without
fear of liability and regardless of the function he is performing, deliberately to inflict injury on others by conduct that he
knows violates the law.
We have not taken such a scatter-gun approach in other
cases. Butz held that absolute immunity did not attach to
the office held by a member of the President's Cabinet but
only to the specific functions performed by that officer for
which absolute immunity is clearly essential. Members of
Congress are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution, but the immunity extends only to
their legislative acts. We have never held that in order for
legislative work to be done, it is necessary to immunize all of
the tasks that legislators must perform. Constitutional immunity does not extend to those many things that Senators
and Representatives regularly and necessarily do that are
not legislative acts. Members of Congress, for example, re'This, of course, is not simply a hypothetical example. See Kissinger v.
Halpain, a.frd by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981).
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peatedly importune the executive branch and administrative
agencies outside hearing rooms and legislative halls, but they
are not immune if in connection with such activity they deliberately violate the law. United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501 (1972), for example, makes this clear. Neither is a
Member of Congress or his aide immune from damage suits if
in order to secure information deemed relevant to a legislative investigation, he breaks into a house and carries away
records. Gmvel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972).
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but
only when performing a judicial function, and even then they
are subject to criminalliablity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U. S. 24, 31 (1980), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503
(1974). The absolute immunity of prosecutors is like\vise
limited to the prosecutorial function. A prosecutor who directs that an investigation be carried out in a way that is patently illegal is not immune.
In Marbury v. Madison, the Court, speaking through the
Chief Justice, observed that while there were "important political powers" committed to the President for the performance of which neither he nor his appointees were accountable in court, "the question, whether the legality of the act of
the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice
or not, must always depend on the nature of that act." 1
Cranch, 137, 165 (1803). The Court nevertheless refuses to
follow this course with respect to the President. It makes
no effort to distinguish categories of presidential conduct that
should be absolutely immune from other categories of conduct that should not qualify for that level of immunity. The
Court instead concludes that whatever the President does
and however contrary to law he knows his conduct to be, he
may, without fear of liability, injure federal employees or any
other person within or without the government.
Attaching absolute immunity to the office of the President,
rather than to particular activities that the President might
perform, places the President above the law. It is a rever-

:\L\0:\
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sion to the olclnotion that the King can do no \\Tonp:. Until
now. this concept hacl suniYed in thi~ country only in the
form of soYereign immunit~·. That doctrine forecloses :mit
against the goYernment ibelf and against go\'ernment officials. but on!~· \Yhen the suit ag·ainst the latter actuall~· seekrelief against the soYereign. Lurs('ll \'. Doiii('Sfic u11d Forei_qll C'o1·p., 337 U.S. 682. 687 (1~1-1~1). Suit against an officer, ho\YeYer, ma~· be maintained "·here it seeks specific relief against him for conduct contrar~· to hi~ statutory
authorit~· or to the Constitution.
Id .. at 69~. Now, howeYer, the Court clothes the office of the President \\'ith soYereign immunit~·. placing it be~·oncl the law.
In Jlatbi!J'.If Y. Madi.'WII. SIIJn·a. at 163. the Chief Justice.
speaking for the Court. obsen-ed that the "Gowmment of
the Unit eel States ha~ been emphaticall~· termed a goYernment of laws, and not of men. It \Yill certain!~· cease to obsene this high appellation. if the laws furnish no remed~· for
the \'iolation of a ,·ested legal right." Until now. the Court
has consistently adhered to thi~ proposition. In Sclte11C1· Y.
Rlludes . 416 U. S. 2:32 (1~7-1). a unanimous Court held that
the goYernor of a state was entitled on!~· to a qualified immunit~·.
We reached this position. e\·en though \\'e recognized
that
''[i]n the case of higher officers of the executi,·e branchthe inquir~· is far more complex since the range of decisions and choices-whether the formulation of polic~·. of
legislation. of budget:;, or of da~·-to-day decisions-i" Yirtuall~· infinite-in short, since the options which the chief
executiYe and his principal subonlinates must consider
are far broader and far more subtle than those made b~·
officials \Yith less re~ponsibilit~·. the range of discretion
must be comparabl~· broad." !d., at 2-16, 2-17.
As JCSTICE BRE!\!\AK obserYed in .1lcGallfl/({ Y. C'a//f(n·-102 U. S. 18:3, 2;)2 (dissenting opinion). "The principle
that our goYernment shall be of la\\·s ancl not of men is so
11 iu.
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strong!~· \YOYen into our constitutional fabric that it has found
recognition in not just one but seYeral proYisions of the Constitution'' (footnote omitted). And as THE CHIEF JesTICE
said in Co111plete Auto Tmnsit. l11c. Y. R eis . 451 U.S. 401,
429 (1981) (dissenting opinion):

"Accountabilit~·

of each indiYiclual for indiYidual conduct
lies at the core of all law-indeed. of all organized societies. The trend to eliminate or modify soYereign immunit~· is not an unrelated deYelopment: we haYe moYed
awa~· from 'the king can do no \\Tong.' The principle of
indiYidual accountabilit~· is fundamental if the structure
of an organized societ~· is not to be eroded to anarch~· and
impotence. and it remains essential in ciYil as \Yell as
criminal justice.,.
Unfortunately. the Court now abandons basic principles
that ha,·e been po,Yerful guides to decision. It is particular!~· unfortunate since the judgment in this case has few. if
an~·, indicia of a judicial decision: it is almost wholl~· a polic~·
choice, a choice that is \Yithout substantial support and that
in all e\'ents is ambig;uous in its reach and import.
We haYe preYiously stated that "the la\Y of priYilege as a
defense to damage actions against officers of go,•ernment has
'in large part been of judicial making."' B11t:: ' '· Ecoi/011/0it,
438 U. S. at 501-502 (1978), quoting BaiTY. Mat eo, 360 U. S.
564, 569 (1959). But this does not mean that the Court has
simpl~· "enacted" its 0\\'11 \'iew of the best public polic~·.
No
doubt judicial conYictions about public policy-\Yhether and
\Yhat kind of immunit~· is necessar~· or \Yise-ha\'e pla~·ed a
part. but the courts haYe been guided and constrained by
common-la\Y tradition. the releYant statutor~· backp:round
and our constitutional structure and histor~·. Our cases dealing \Yith the immunit~· of members of CongTess are constructions of the Speech or Debate Clause and are guided b~· the
histor~· of such priYileges at common law.
The decisions
dealing with the immunity of state officers im·olYe the ques-

l

7~173~DISSENT

6

\·\
'\

I

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

tion of whether and to what extent Congress intended to
abolish the common law privileges by providing a remedy in
the predecessor of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for constitutional violations by state officials. Our decisions respecting immunity
for federal officials, including absolute immunity for judges,
prosecutors and those officials doing similar work, also in
large part reflect common law views, as well as judicial conclusions as to what privileges are necessary if particular functions are to be performed in the public interest.
Unfortunately, there is little of this approach in the Court's
decision today. A footnote casually, but candidly, abandons
the functional approach to immunity that has run through all
of our decisions. Ante, at n. 34. Indeed, the majority turns
this rule on its head by declaring that because the functions of
the President's office are so varied and diverse and some of
them so profoundly important, the office is unique and must
be clothed with office-wide, absolute immunity. This is policy, not law, and in my view, very poor policy.
I
In declaring the President to be absolutely immune from
suit for any deliberate and kno·wing violation of the Constitution or of a federal statute, the Court asserts that the immunity is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and supported by our history" 2 Ante, at 17. The
decision thus has all the earmarks of a constitutional pronouncement-absolute immunity for the President's office is
mandated by the Constitution. Although the Court appears
to disclaim this, ante at n. 27, it is difficult to read the opinion
coherently as standing for any narrower proposition: Attempts to subject the President to liability either by Congress through a statutory action or by the courts through a

l

2
Although the majority opinion initially claims that its conclusion is \
based substantially on "our history," hi ~ cal analysis in fact plays virtually no part in the analysis that follows. U,n a footnote, the majority refers
to the "unden;able paudty of documentary aouroe.." Ant•, at n'
~

~~-ta
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Bh·e11s proceeding \Yould Yiolate the separation of powers. :
Such a generalized absolute immunity cannot be su~tained
when examined in the traditional manner and in light of the
traditional judicial sources.
The petitioner and the Solicitor General, as amicus; rel~·
principally on t\YO arguments to support the claim of absolute
immunity for the President from ciYil liabilit~·: absolute immunit~· is an "incidental pmYer" of the Presidency, historicall~· recognized as implicit in the Constitution. and absolute
immunit~· is required b~· the separation of po\Yers doctrine.
I will address each of these contentions.
A

The Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I. ~ 6, guarantees ab~o
lute immunity to members of Con~n·ess: nowhere, howeYer.
does the Constitution directl~· address the issue of presidential immunit~·. 0 Petitioner nevertheless argues that the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the early histor~·
of constitutional interpretation demonstrate an implicit assumption of absolute presidential immunity. In support of
this position, petitioner relies primaril~· on three separate
items: First, preratification remarks made during the discussion of presidential impeachment at the Convention and in
The Fedem list; second, remarks made during the meeting of
the first Senate: and third, the views of Justice Story.
The debate at the C01wention on \Yhether or not the President should be impeachable did touch on the potential dan' On this point. I am in agTeement \Yith the concurring memorandum of
THE CHIEF Jt:STICE.

' The Solicitor General relie!:' entirely upon the brief filed

Kissi11ga

Y.

b~· hi ~

office in

Halpai11, suprcr.

·, In fact. in!:'ofar a;: the Con;;titution addres~es the issue of Pre~idential
its approach i!:' Yer~· different from that taken in the Speech or Debate Clause. The po!:'sibilit~· of impeachment assures that the President
can be held accountable to the other branches of GoYernment for hi,- action s: the Constitution further states that impeachment does not bar criminal prosecution.

liabilit~· .
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gers of subjecting the President to the control of another
branch, the Legislature.'· GoYernor Morris, for example.
complained of the potential for dependency and argued that
"[the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutor,;
who ma~· be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 7 Col. Mason responded to this b~· asking if "an~· man [shall] be aboYe Justice" and argued that this \Yas least appropriate for the man
"\Yho can commit the most extensiYe injustice." · Madison
agreed that "it [is] indispensable that some proYision should
be made for defending the Community against the incapacit~·.
negligence or perfid~· of the chief Magistrate."~ Pinkne~· responded on the other side. belieYing that if granted the
power, the Legislature \YOuld hold impeachment "as a rocl
oYer the Executi,·e and b~· that means effectuall~· destro~· his
independence."'"
Petitioner concludes from this that the delegates meant impeachment to be the exclusiYe means of holding the President
personally responsible for his misdeeds, outside of electoral
politics. This conclusion, howeYer, is harcll~· supported by
the debate. Although some of the deleg·ates expressed concern oYer limiting presidential independence, the delegates
Yoted eight to two in faYor of impeachment. WhateYer the
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently
shared, to insulate the President from politicalliabilit~· in the
impeachment process.
MoreoYer, the ConYention debate did not focus on wrongs
the President might commit against indiYiduals, but rather
'' The debate is recorded in 2 l\1. Fan·ancl. Record:- of the Federal Convention of litli. 6-1-ml OH3-1 !.
: /d .. at 6-1 .
' Jd .. at 65.
"Ibid .
,.. lei .. at 66.
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on whether there should be a method of holding him accountable for what might be termed v.Tongs against the state. 11
Thus, examples of the abuses that concerned delegates were
betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the delegates feared that
the alternative to an impeachment mechanism would be "tumults and insurrections" by the people in response to such
abuses. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this
debate are that the independence of the Executive was not
understood to require a total lack of accountability to the
other branches and that there was no general desire to insulate the President from the consequences of his improper
acts. 12

\

t

h"

\

_/

If""-

rl/

';,tJ"'

9

t;

.-. .J~

~r

"In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton described impeachable offenses as follows: "They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the
society itself."
12
The majority's use of the historical record is in line with its other arguments: It puts the burden on respondent to demonstrate no presidential
immunity, rather than on petititoner to prove the appropriateness of this
defense. Thus, while noting that the doubts of some of the Framers were
not sufficient to prevent the adoption of the Impeachment Clause, the majority nevertheless states that "nothing in [the] debates suggests an expectation that the President wou d be subjected to civil damages tio
"
3
om t 1s the ourt conclu es that
e ebates of the
ramers accord with our conclusions," and that the "best historical evie supports" its position. Ibid.
ans er o the maJ
cu ation that litigation of this kind
"may have been unthinkable in the era of the Constitutional Convention" is
that such speculation ignores the documentary evidence. Not only was
such litigation discussed at some of the state ratifying conventions, infra,
but it was also discussed in the first major defense of the Constitution published in the United States. In his essays on the Constitution, published
in the Independent Gazetteer in September 1787, Tench Coxe included the
folio-wing statement in his description of the limited power of the proposed
office of the President: "His person is 1wt so much protected as that of a
nwmber of the House of Representatives; for he m{ly be proceeded against
like any other 111{11! in the ordinary course of law." Quoted in II The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 141 (1976) (emphasis in original).

.
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Much the same can be said in response to petitioner's reliance on The Federalist No. 77. In that essay, Hamilton
asked whether the presidency combines "the requisites to
safety in the republican sense-a due dependence on the people-a due responsibility." He answered that the constitutional plan met this test because it subjected the President to
both the electoral process and the possibility of impeachment,
including subsequent criminal prosecution. Petitioner concludes from this that these were intended to be the exclusive
means of restraining presidential abuses. This, by no means
follows. Hamilton was concerned in Federalist No. 77, as
were the delegates at the Convention, with the larger political abuses,-"wrongs against the state"-that a President
might commit. He did not consider what legal means might
be available for redress of individualized grievances.
That omission should not be taken to imply exclusion in
these circumstances is well illustrated by comparing some of
the remarks made in the state ratifying conventions ·with
Hamilton's discussion in No. 77. In the North Carolina ratifying convention, for example, there was a discussion of the
adequacy of the impeachment mechanism for holding executive officers accountable for their misdeeds. Governor Johnson defended the constitutional plan by distinguishing three
legal mechanisms of accountability:
"If an officer commits an offence against an individual,
he is amenable to the courts of law. If he commits
crimes against the state, he may be indicted and punished. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and
misdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public." 13
Governor Johnson surely did not contemplate that the availability of an impeachment mechanism necessarily implied the
exclusion of other forms of legal accountability; rather, the
method of accountability was to be a function of the character
'

3

4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 43.
\

'
\

\
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of the wrong. Mr. Maclaine, another delegate to the North
Carolina Convention, clearly believed that the courts would
remain open to individual citizens seeking redress from injuries caused by presidential acts:
"The President is the superior officer, who is to see the
laws put in execution. He is amenable for any maladministration in his office. Were it possible to suppose
that the President should give wrong instructions to his
deputies, whereby the citizens would be distressed, they
would have redress in the ordinary courts of common
law." 14
A similar distinction between different possible forms of
presidential accountability was drawn by Mr. Wilson at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
"(The President] is placed high, and is possessed of
power far from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above
the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character
as a citizen, and in his public character by
impeachment." 15
There is no more reason to respect the views of Hamilton
than those of Wilson: both were members of the constitutional convention; both were instrumental in securing the
ratification of the Constitution. But more importantly,
there is simply no express contradiction in their statements.
Petitioner relies on an inference drawn from silence to create
this contradiction. The surrounding history simply does not
support this inference.
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petitioner
is an exchange at the first meeting of the Senate, involving
Vice-President Adams and Senators Ellsworth and MacClay.
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi"Id., at 47.
"2 Elliot 480.
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dent" should be included at the beginning of Federal writs,
similar to the manner in which English writs ran in the King's
name. Senator MacClay thought that this would improperly
combine the executive and judicial branches. This, in turn,
led to a discussion of the proper relation between the two.
Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President Adams defended the
proposition that
"the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought
against him; was above the power of judges, justices,
&c. For [that] would put it in the power of a common
justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the
whole machine of government." 16

\

In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive
form of process available against the President. Senator
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a
President committing "murder in the street." In his view,
in such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the
exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather,
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 1; In his view,
Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully comprehended the difference in the political position of the American
President and that of the British monarch. Again, nothing
more can be concluded from this than that the proper scope of
presidential accountability, including the questiu;1 whether
the President should be subject to judicial process, was no
clearer then than it is now.
The final item cited by petitioner clearly supports his position, but is of such late date that it contributes little to under16
W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United
States in 1789-1791, 152 (1969).

17
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standing the original intent. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described the
"incidental powers" of the President:
"Among these must necessarily be included the po\Yer to
perform [his functions] without any obstruction or
impediment whatsoeYer. The President cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention.
\Yhile he is in the discharge of the duties of his office: ancl
for this purpose his person must be deemed. in ciYil cases
at least, to possess an official inviolabilit~·. In the exercise of his political powers he is to use his own discretion,
and he is accountable only to his country and to his own
conscience. His decision in relation to these powers is
subject to no control. and his discretion, when exercised,
is conclusiYe." ,,
While Justice Story rna~· have been firmly committed to
this view in 1833, Senator Pinckney, a delegate to the Convention, was as firm!~· committed to the opposite view in
1800. ~~·
Senator Pinckne~·, arguing on the floor of the Senate, conti·asted the privileges extended to members of Congress b~·
the Constitution \Yith the lack of an~· such privileges extended to the President. 2" He argued that this was a de lib,. 2 J. Stor~·. Commentaries on the Con!>titution 372 0873).
,.. It is not possible to determine \\·hether this is the same Pinckne~· that
l\1aclison recorded as Pinkne~·. " ·ho objected at the ConYention to granting
a ]lO\Yer of impeachment to the Legi!>lature. T\\'O Charle!> Pinckne~·s attended the ConYention. Both \\'ere from South Carolina. See 3 l\1.
Farrand, Sllpi'CI. at 559.
'" Senator Pinckney's comment!> are recorded at 10 Annals of Congre~i'
69-83. Petitioner contends that these remarks are not releYant because
they concerned only the authority of Congress to inquire into the origin of
an alle11:edly libelous ne,,·spaper article. Rep!~· Brief for Petitioner. at 7.
Although this \\'as the occasion for the remarks, Pinckney did di;:;cus~ the
immunit~· of member;; of Cong-re;;:s as a priYileg-e embodied in the Speech or
Debate Clause: "our Constitution suppo;;:es no man ... to be infallible. but
con::iders them all as mere men. to be subject to all the passions and frail-
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erate choice of the delegates to the ConYention. \Yho "well
kne\Y ho\Y oppressiYel~· the power of undefined priYileges had
been exercised in Great Britain. and \Yere determined no
such authorit~· should eYer be exercised here." Therefore.
"[n]o pri,·ilege of this kind was intended for ~-our ExecutiYe.
nor an~· except that ... for ~·our Legislature." ~~
In pre\·ious immunit~· cases the Court has emphasized the
ties. and crimes. that men genera]]~· are. and according!~· proYide~ for tlw
trial of such as ought to be trif:'d. and leaye;; the member;; of till.' Legi,.:lature, for their proceedings. to be amenable to their constituent" and to
public opinion .... " This. then. wa::: one of the priYile12:e;;. of Congre;:.~ that
he was contrasting " ·ith those extended (or not exten ~lei! l to the Pre~idc>nt .
1
' The ma.iorit~· cites one additional piece of histor~ eYidence. a letter
by President Jefferson. which it contend;: demonstrate;: "that Jeffc>rson belieYed the President not to be sub.iect to .iudicial proce;;.~." 1\
Thomas Jefferson's Yie\\·s on the relation of the President to the .iudicial
process are. howeYer. not quite so clear as the ma,iorit~· suggests. J efferson took a Yariety of positions on the proper relation of executiYe and ,iudicial authorit~·, at different points in his career. It would be suprising- if
President J effer;:on had not argued strong]~· for such immunit~· from ,iudicial process, particularly in a confrontation "·itll Chief Justice 1\lar;:.llall.
Jefferson's Yie\\·s on this issue before he became President "·ould be of a
good deal more sig-nificance. In thi:< regard. it is significant that in Jefferson's second and third drafts of the \'irginia Constitution. which al;;o proposed a separation of the po"·er;: of g-owrnment into three separate
branches. he specificall~· proposed that the ExecutiYe be subject to ,iudicial
process: "he shall be liable to action. tho' not to per;;onal restraint for priYate duties or \\Tong-s." I Papl.'r:< of Thomas Jefferson 351!. 360. Also significant is the fact that \Yllen Jeffer><on's follo\Yers tried to impeach Justiel.'
Chase in 180.J-180:J. one of tlw grounds of their attack on him " ·as that he
had refused to subpoena President Adams durinrr the trial of Dr. Cooper
for sedition. See ConYin. "The Pre;;.ident: Offil'e and Po\Yers" 11:). FinaJJ~· . it is worth noting that eYen in the middle of the debate OYer Chief
Justice 1\Iar:<llall'" po"·er to subpoena the Pre,-ident during the Burr trial.
Jefferson looked to a legislatiYe ;;.olution of the confrontation: "I hope llmYeYer that ... at the ensuing ses;;ion of the legislature !the Chief Justiee)
ma~· haYe means proYided for giYing to indiYiduab the benefit of the testimon~· of the [Executiw] functionaries in proper cases ."
X Work;;. of
Thomas Jefferson . .JUi n. (P. Ford Eel. IHU.)l (quotin!! a letter from Pre;;ident Jeffer;;on to George Ha~· . Cnited State;:. Di,.:trict Attorne~· for
\'irginiaL
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importance of the immunit~· afforded the particular goYernment official at common la\Y. See l111/JIN Y. PocllfiiiClll, 42-1
U. S. 409. 421 0976). Clearl~· this sort of anal~·sis is not possible when dealing \Yith an office. the presidenc~·. that did not
exist at common la\Y. To the extent that historical inquir~· is
appropriate in this context. it is constitutional histon·. not
common la\Y. that is releYant. From the histor~· discussed
aboYe, ho\YeYer. all that can be concluded is that absolute immunit~· from ciYil liability for the President finds no support \
in constitutional text or history. or in the explanations of the
earliest commentators. This is too weak a ground to support
a declaration by this Court that the President is absolute!~·
immune from ciYil liabilit~·. regardless of the source of liabilit~· or the injur~· for which redress is sought. This much the
majorit~· implicit!~· concedes since histor~· and text. traditional sources of judicial argument. merit only a footnote in
the Court's opinion. A11te. at n. 31.

B
No bright line can be dra\m between arguments for absolute immunit~· based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers and arguments based on \Yhat the Court refers
to as "public polic~·." This necessaril~· follows from the
Court's functional interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine:
"[l]n determining \Yhether the Act disrupts the proper
balance bet\Yeen the coordinate branches. the proper inquir~; focuses on the extent to which it pre\·ents the ExecutiYe Branch from accomplishing its constitutionall~·
assigned functions.'' J.\'i.ron , .. Administmtor of Geneml Sen·ices, 433 U. S. 425. 443 (1977).
See also United Stotes Y. };i.ron, 418 U. S. 683, 706-707
(jnl.t b,< <it tllQ of hreYit \' of it;: anal~·sis can the ma,iorit~· plau,:abl~· put
forth the claim that thi;: histor~· pr cmrl~ r~ort for a proposition
that it admit~ to being- demon;:trably untrue one pagela1er:---
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(l~fl-lJ: }'uiiii{J-'doll'l/ Sllccf l.\· Tul)(' Co. Y. SaiC,I/(' 1', 579. 635
0902) (Jack~on. J .. concurring-). Petitioner argues that public polic~- fa,·or~ absolute immunit~· because absent such immunity the Pre~ident's abilit~· to execute his constitutionall~
mandated oblig-ations \\'ill be impaired. The conYergence of
these t\YO lines of arg-ument is superficiall~- apparent from the
Yer~- fact that in both instances the approach of the Court has
been characterized as a "functional" analysis.
The difference is onl~- one of degree. While absolute immunity might maximize executiYe efficienc~· and therefore be
a \Yorthwhile polic~·, lack of such immunity ma~- not so disrupt the functioning of the presidenc~· as to Yiolate the separation of po\Yers doctrine. Insofar as liabilit~· in this case is
of congressional origin. petitioner must demonstrate that
subjecting the President to a priYate damages action \\'ill preYent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionall~· assig-ned
functions." Insofar as liabilit~· is based on a Biz·ens action.
perhaps a lower standard of functional disruption is appropriate. Petitioner has surel~· not met the former burden; I do
not belieYe that he has met the latter standard either.
Taken at face Yalue. the Court's position that as a matter of
constitutional la\Y the President is absolutely immune should
mean that he is immune not onl~- from damages actions but
also from suits for injunctiYe relief. criminal prosecutions
and. indeed , from an~· kind of judicial process. But there i.
no contention that the President is immune from criminal
prosecution in the comts under the criminal laws enacted by
Congress or b~- the states for that matter. Nor \YOuld such a
claim be credible. The Constitution itself proYides that impeachment shall not bar "Indictment. Trial. Judgment. and
Punishment. according· to La\Y." Article I, Section II.
Clause \'II. Similarly. our cases indicate that immunity
from damages actions carries no protection from criminal
prosecution. Sup/'((, at 3.
I\ either can there be a serious claim that the separation of
po\\'ers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial re-
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view or insulates the President from judicial process. No argument is made here that the President. whateYer his liability for money damages, is not subject to the courts' injunctiYe
powers. See, e. g .. l'oll11gst01rn Sheet & Tube Co., supra:
Koremats11 \'. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944): Panama
Refining Co. \'. Rya11, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioner's attempt to draw an analog~· to the Speech or Debate Clause,
Brief, at 45, one purpose of which is "to prevent accountability before a possibl~· hostile judiciar~·." Grat·el \'. United
States, 408 U. S., 606, 617 (1972), breaks down at just this
point. While the Speech or Debate Clause guarantees that
"for any Speech or Debate'' congressmen "shall not be questioned in an~' other Place," and. thus, assures that congressmen, in their official capacit~·, shall not be the subject of the
courts' injunctive powers, no such protection is afforded the
Executive. Indeed, as the cases cited abow indicate, it is
the rule, not the exception. that executive actions-including
those taken at the immediate direction of the President-are
subject to judicial review.~~ Regardless of the possibility of
money damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of the President's actions or their legality under the applicable statutes can and will be subject to revie\\', Indeed.
in this very case, respondent Fitzgerald's dismissal was set
aside b~' the Civil Service Commission as contrar~· to the applicable regulations issued pursuant to authority granted b~·
Congress.
Nor can priYate damages actions be distinguished on the
ground that such claims would involve the President personall~· in the litigation in a wa~· not necessitated b~· suits seeking
declaratory or injunctiYe relief against certain presidential
" The Solicitor General. in fact. argues that the possibility of judicial revie\\" of presidential action~ !'Upport!' the claim of absolute immunity: Judicial re,·ie\\· "serws to contain and correct the unauthorized exercise of the
President's po\\"er." making prh·ate damages actions unnecessary in order
to achieYe the same end. Brief. at 31 (see n. 3).
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actions. The President has been held to be subject to judicial process at least since 1807. Am·o11 Blll'l' case. 25 Feel.
Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice 1\larshall. sitting as circuit justice). B111T "square}~· ruled that a subpoena ma~· be directed
to the President." 1\'i.ron Y. Sil'ica, 487 F. 2d 700. 709 (DC
Cir. 1973). Chief Justice Marshall fl.atl~· rejected any suggestion that all judicial process, in and of itself, constitutes an
unwarranted interference in the Presidency:
"The guard, fumished to this high officer, to protect him
from being harassed by 1'e:mtio11s and mmecessw·y subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after
those subpoenas haYe issued; not in an~· circumstance
which i~ to precede their being issued." 25 Fed. Cas.,
at 3-1.
This position was recently rearticulated by the Court in
United States"· Ni.ron, 418 U. S. 683, 706 (1974):
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the
need for confidentiality ... without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified presidential priYilege of immunit~·
from judicial process under all circumstances."
These tv,·o lines of cases establish then that neither subjecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of their
constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judicial
process violates the separation of powers doctrine. Similarly, neither has been held to be sufficient}~· intrusiYe to justify a judicially declared rule of immunit~· . With respect to
intrusion b~· the judicial process itself on ExecutiYe functions,
subjecting the President to priYate claim~ for money damages inYolYes no more than this. If there is a separation of
powers problem here, it must be found in the nature of the
remedy and not in the p1·ocess inYolYed.
We said in But:: Y. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), that
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official \Yho knows or should
know he is acting outside the la\\'. and ... insisting on an
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awareness of clearl~· established constitutional limits will not
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment." I d.
at 506-507. Today's decision in Harlozc \', Fitzgerald, No.
80-945, makes clear that the President, were he subject to
civil liability, could be held liable only for an action that he
knew, or as an objective matter should have known, was illegal and a clear abuse of his authority and power. In such
circumstances, the question that must be ans\\·ered is \Yho
should bear the cost of the resulting injury-the wrongdoer
or the Yictim.
The principle that should guide the Court in deciding this
question was stated long ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
eYery indiYidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injur~·.'' Marblll'lf \'. Madiso11, 1 Cranch
137, 163 (1803). Much more recently, the Court considered
the role of a damages remed~· in the performance of the
courts' traditional function of enforcing federally guaranteed
rights: "Historicall~·. damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." BiveHs v. Si.r U11kiiOlL'Il Federal Narcotics Age11ts,
403 U. S. 388, 395 (1971). ~l To the extent that the Court denies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim
the right to be made whole and, therefore, denies him "the
protection of the laws."~~
"' See also Justice Harlan·~ discussion of the appropriateness of the damages remedy in order to redress the Yiolation of certain constitutional
rights. Bire118 "· Si.r ['llkiiOit'll Fedeml Xarcotics Age11fs. 403 U. S. 388.
407--HO (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring).
" Contrar~· to the sugp:e:::tion of the majorit~·. a11le, at n. 38. I do not
sugg-est that there mu:::t alway~ be a remedy in ciYil damages for eYer~·
legal wrong or that .l!arbury "· .lladiso11 stands for this proposition.
JJ w·bu l'.lf does. hO\\'eYer, sugg-est the importance of the priYate interests at
stake \\·ithin the b1·oader perspectin• of a political system based on the rule
of law. The functional approach to immunit~· questions, \\·hich \\'e haw
preYiously followed but which the majority toda~· discards. repref'.ented an

~II
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That the President should haYe the same remedial obligations toward those whom he in.iures as an~· other federal officer is not a surpnsmg: proposltlon. The fairness of the remedial principle the Court has so far follo\Yed-that the
wrongdoer. not the Yictim. should ordinarii~· bear the costs of
the injur~·-has been found to be out\Yeighed onl~· in instances where potentialliabilit~· is "thought to injure the goYernmental decisionmaking process." Imbler Y. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 409, 437 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). The argument for immunit~· is that the possibilit~· of a damages action will, or at least should, haYe an effect on the performance
of official responsibilities. That effect should be to deter unconstitutional, or othenYise illegal. behaYior. This ma~·.
how eYer, lead officers to be more careful and "less Yigorous"
in the performance of their duties. Caution, of course, is not
always a Yirtue and undue caution is to be aYoided.
The possibility of liabilit~· ma~·, in some circumstances, distract officials from the performance of their duties and influence the performance of those duties in ways adYerse to the
public interest. But when this "public polic~·" argument in
fa\'01' of absolute immunity is cast in these broad terms, it applies to all officers, both state and federal: All officers should
perform their responsibilities "·ithout regard to those personal interests threatened b~· the possibilit~· of a lawsuit.
See Imbler, Sllpm, at 436 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring).~-.
IneYitably, this reduces the public polic~· argument to nothing more than an expression of judicial inclination as to which
officers should be encouraged to perform their functions with
'\·igor." although "·ith less care.~, ,
appropriate reconciliation of the conflicting- intere~t:> at !:'take.
,., The Court ha:;; newr held that the "public polic~· " conclusion::' it
reaches a!:' to the appropriatenes::' of absolute immunit~· in particular instances are not subject to reYersal throug-h congressional action. Implicit~·. therefore. the Court ha,- ah·ead~· rejected a constitutionally-ba~ed.
separation of po,Yers argument for immunit~· for federal officiab.
,. Sure!~- the fact that officer:< of the court haw been the primar~· benefi-
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The Court's response. until toda~·. to this problem has been
to appl~· the argument to indiYidual functions, not offices. and
to eYaluate the effect of liabilit~· on goYernmental decisionmaking within that function. in light of the substantive ends
that are to be encouraged or discouraged. In this case.
therefore, the Court should examine the functions implicated
b~· the causes of action at issue here and the effect of potential liabilit~· on the performance of those functions.

II
The functional approach to the separation of pO\Yers doctrine and the Court's more recent immunit~· decisions ~: converge on the follo\Ying principle: The scope of immunity is determined b~· function, not office. The \Yholesale claim that
the President is entitled to absolute immunit~· in all of his actions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all
presidential communications are entitled to an absolute priYilege, which was rejected in favor of a functional anal~·sis, b~· a
unanimous Court in United States\', l\'i.ron, supra. Therefore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a broad
immunity in certain areas of executiYe responsibilit~·. "' the
onl~· question that must be answered here is \Yhether the dismissal of emplo~'ees falls \Yithin a constitutionall~· assigned
executive function, the performance of which would be substantia]]~· impaired by the possibilit~· of a priYate action for
damages. I belieYe it does not.
Respondent has so far proceeded in this action on the basis
of three separate causes of action: two federal statutes-5
U. S. C. ~ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. ~ 1505-ancl the First
ciarie>- of this Court's pronounc:emenb of absolute immunit~· giYe>- !'Upport
to this appearance of faYoriti~m.
"See SII}JI'eme Coln·t of \ 'i1·gi11iCI "· Consumel's ['nion of tile ['nited
States. -1-IG U.S. 719 0980}: H11t::. supra. at 511.
,. I " ·ill not speculate on the pre:::idential function~ which ma~· require
absolute immunit~·. but a clear example \Yould be instances in \Yhich the
President participates in prosecutorial decisions.
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Amendment. At this point in the litigation. the aYailability
of these causes of action is not before us. Assuming the correctness of the the lo\Yer court's determination that the two
federal statutes create a priYate right of action, I find the
suggestion that the President is immune from those causes of
action to be unc01wincing. The attempt to found such immunity upon a separation of powers argument is particular!~·
unconvincing.
The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. 7211, states that
"[t]he right of employees ... to ... fumish information to
either House of Congress. or to a committee or a Member
thereof, may not be interfered \Vith or denied." The second.
18 U. S. C. 1505, makes it a crime to obstruct congressional
testimon~·. It does not take much insight to see that at least
one purpose of these statutes is to assure congressional access to information in the possession of the Executive
Branch, which Congress belieYes it requires in order to carry
out its responsibilities. ~!· Insofar as these statutes implicate
a separation of po\vers argument, I \voulcl think it to be just
the opposite of that suggested b~· petitioner and accepted b~·
the majorit~·. In enacting these statutes. Congress sought

*

*

,•. See. e. g .. 48 Cong. Rec. 4G53 (1912) (''During m~· first se!'sion of Congress I ,,·as desirous of learning the needs of the po:::tal serYice and inquiring into the conditions of the emplo~·ees. To m~· surprise I found that
under an ExecutiYe order these ciYil sen·ice employees could not giYe me
an~· information. ''J (remarks of Rep. Calder): id .. at 4656 ("I beliew it i:::
high time that Congress should listen to the appeal. of these men and proYide a \Yay ,,· hereb~· the~· can proper!~· present a petition to the Member::: of
Congress for a redress of grieYances without the fear of losing their official
positions'') (remarks of Rep. Reill~·J: id .. at 5157 ("I haYe al\\· a~·s reque~ted
employees to consult ,,·ith me on matters affecting their interest and belieYe that it is my dut~· to listen to all respectful appeals and complaints.")
(remarks of Rep. EYansJ. Indeed. it is for just this reason that petitioners
in No. 80-9-15 argue that the statutes do not create a priYate right of action:
"5 U. S. C.~ 7211 andl ~ C. S. C.~ 1505 were designed to protect the legislatiYe process. not to giYe one such as Fitzgerald a right to seek damages." Brief for petitioners. at 26. n. 11.
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to preserYe its own constitutionally mandated functions in
the face of a recalcitrant ExecutiYe. ~.. Thus, the separation
of pO\Yers problem addressed b~· these statutes was first of all
presidential behaYior that intruded upon, or burdened, Congress' performance of its 0\m constitutional responsibilities.
It is no response to this to say that such a cause of action
\Yould disrupt the President in the furtherance of his responsibilities. That approach ignores the separation of pO\Yers
problem that lies behind the congressional action: it assumes
that presidential functions are to be \'alued oYer congressional functions.
The argument that b~· proYiding a damages action under
these statutes (as is assumed in this case) Congress has
adopted an unconstitutional means of furthering its ends.
must rest on the premise that presidential control of executh·e emplo~·ment decisions is a constitutional!~· assigned
presidential function with which Congress may not significant!~· interfere.
This is a friYolous contention. In Ull ited
States Y. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 485 (1886), this Court held
that "when Congress. b~- la\Y, Yests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it ma~· limit andrestrict the power of remoYal as it deems best for the public interest." What eYer the rule may be with respect to high
officers, see H 11 mp/1 rey's E.recutor \'. l..:n ited States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935). "·ith respect to those who fill traditional bureaucratic po~itions. restrictions on executiYe authorit~· are
the rule and not the exception. ~ ~ This case itself demonstl·ates, the seYere statutor~· restraints under which the
President operates in this area .

*

... Indeed. the impetu~ for pa,.:~age of "·hat i~ no\\' 5 l'. S. C. 7211 \\'et:'
the impo~ition of "gag rule;:" upon te;;timon~· of ciYi! ;;en·ant,.: before con)!res~ional committee,.:.
See Exet. Order l'\o. 402 (Jan. 2.:>. 1901i): Exec.
Order ~o. 11-1:~ (:\o\'. 2!3. HIOH).
' Tllll:". adn•r;;e action ma~ · general!~· be taken a)!ain~t ci\'il ;;en·ant,.:
on!~· "for ;:uch cau,.:(· a,.: \\'ill promote the efficiency of the ,.:enite...
.J
l'. :'. C. ~~ 7.)11:} . 7.)}:; and 7.)4:3.
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Fitzgerald was a ciYil senice emplo~·ee working in the Office of the Secretar~· of the Air Force. Although hio: position
was such as to fall \Yithin the "excepted" sen·ice. which
\Yould ordinarii~· mean that CiYil Sen·ice rules and regulations applicable to remoYals \Yould not protect him. 5 CFR
Part 6. 6.4. his status as a Yeteran entitled him to special
protections. Veterans are entitled to certain CiYil Senice
benefits afforded to "preference eligibles." 5 U. S. C.
* 2108. These benefits include that set forth in 5 U. S. C.
*7513(a): "An agenc~· may take [adYerse action] against an
emplo~·ee only for such cause as will promote the efficienc~· of
the sen·ice." Similar!~-. his Yeteran status entitled Fitzgerald to the protection of the reduction in force procedures established b~· ciYil sen·ice regulation.
5 U. S. C.
3501-3502. It was precise!~· those procedures that the
Chief Examiner for the CiYil Senice Commission found had
been violated, in his 1973 recommendation that respondent
be reappointed to his old position or to a job of comparable
authority.
This brief re\·ie\\· is enough to illustrate my point: Personnel decisions of the sort inYOlYed in this case are emphaticall~·
not a constitutionall~· as~igned presidential function that will
tolerate no interference b~· either of the other two branches
of goYemment. More important than this "quantitatiYe ''
anal~·sis of the degree of intrusion in presidential decisionmaking permitted in this area. hO\YeYer, is the "qualitatiye"
ana~·lsis suggested in l(B) aboYe.
Absolute immunit~· is appropriate when the threat of liability ma~· bias the decisionmaker in \\·a~·s that are adYerse to
the public interest. But as the Yarious regulations and statutes protecting ciYil sen·ants from arbitrar~· executiYe action
illustrate, this is an area in \Yhich the public interest is demonstrably on the side of encouraging less "yigor" and more
"caution" on the part of decisionmakers. That is, the Yer~·
steps that Congress has taken to assure that executiYe employees "·ill be able freel~· to testify in Congress and to assure

*

**

*
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that the~· will not be subject to arbitrar~· adYerse actions inclicate that those policy arguments that have elsewhere justified absolute immunit~' are not applicable here. Absolute
immunity would be nothing more than a judicial declaration
of policy that directly contradicts the policy of protecting ciYil
servants reflected in the statutes and regulations.
If respondent could, in fact. have proceeded on his t\\·o
statutor~' claims, the Bit•ens action would be superfluous.
Respondent rna~· not collect damages twice, and the same injuries are put forward by respondent a::. the basis for both the
statutory and constitutional claims. As we have said before.
"were Congress to create equal!~· effective alternative remedies, the need for damages relief [direct!~· under the Constitution] might be obviated." Da ris Y. Passmw1, 442 U. S.
228, 248 (1979). Nevertheless, because the majority decides
that the President is absolutely immune from a Birens action
as well, I shall express b~· disagreement with that conclusion.
In Bil'ens v. Si.r Unknow11 Federal l\'arcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971), we held that individuals \Yho have suffered
a compensable injury through a violation of the rights guaranteed them by the Fourth Amendment ma~' invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts in a
suit for damages. That conclusion rested on two principles:
First, "[ t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
la\\·s," 403 U. S., at 397. quoting Marblll'.lf '"· Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 163 (1803): second, "[h]istorically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinar~· remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.'' 403 U. S., at 395. In B11t:: v.
Economo11, 438 U. S. 478 (1977), we rejected the argument
of the federal government that federal officers, including cabinet officers, are absolutely immune from civil liability for
such constitutional violations-a position that we recognized
would substantial!~· undercut our conclusion in Birens. We
held there that although the performance of certain limited
functions will be protected by the shield of absolute immu-
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nity, the general rule is that federal officers, like state officers, have only a qualified immunity. Finally, in Daris v.
Passma 11, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we held that a Congressman
could be held liable for damages in a Bivens-t~·pe suit brought
in federal court alleging a violation of individual rights guaranteed the plaintiff by the Due Process Clause. In my view,
these cases have largely settled the issues raised by the
Bivens apsect of this case.
These cases established the following principles. First, it
is not the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch to
create a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.
In the absence of adequate legislativel~r prescribed remedies,
the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts
permits the courts to create remedies, both legal and equitable, appropriate to the character of the injury. Second, exercise of this "judicial" function does not create a separation
of powers problem: We have held both executive and legislative officers subject to this judicially created cause of action
and in each instance we have rejected separation of powers
arguments. Holding federal officers liable for damages for
constitutional injuries no more violates separation of powers
principles than do the equitable remedies that result from the
traditional function of judicial reviev•. Third, federal officials will generally have a "qualified immunity" from such
suits; absolute immunity will be extended to certain functions
only on the basis of a showing that exposure to liability is inconsistent with the proper performance of the official's duties
and responsibilities. Finally, Congress retains the power to
restrict exposure to liability, and the policy judgments implicit in this decision should properly be made by Congress.
The majority fails to recognize the force of what the Court
has already done in this area. Under the above principles,
the President could not claim that there are no circumstances
under which he would be subject to a Bivens-type action for
violating respondent's constitutional rights. Rather, he
must assert that the absence of absolute immunity will substantially impair his abilit~· to carry out particular functions
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that are his constitutional responsibilit~·. For the reasons I
have presented above, I do not believe that this argument
can be successfully made under the circumstances of this
case.
It is, of course, theoretically possible, that the President
should be held to be absolutely immune because each of the
functions for which he has constitutional responsibilit~· would
be substantially impaired b~· the possibility of civil liabilit~·.
I do not think this argument is valid for the simple reason
that the function iln'olved here does not have this character.
Which side of the line other presidential functions \\'ould fall
on need not be decided in this case.
The majority opinion suggests a variant of this argument.
It argues, not that ever~· presidential function has this character, but that distinguishing the particular functions involved in any given case would be "difficult." Ante, at n.
34. a~ Even if this were true. it would not necessarily follo"·
that the President is entitled to absolute immunit~·: That
would still depend on whether, in those unclear instancec::., it
is likel~: to be the case that one of the functions implicated deserves the protection of abc::.olute immunity. In this particular case, I see no such function. ::
"' The majority also seems to beliew that b~· "function" the Court ha;: in
the past referred to "subjectiYe purpose... See 011le. at n. 34 ("judges frequently ,,·ould need to inquire into the ]Jill'pose for which acts \\·ere
taken."). I do not read our cases that way. In Sl11mp , .. Spcrl'kiiW/1, 435
U. S. 349, 362 09711). we held that the factors determining "·hether a
judge's act \\·as a "judicial action" entitled to absolute immunit~· "relate to
the nature of the act itself. i.e. \\·hether it is a function normall~· performed
b~· a judge. and to the expectations of the parties." :!\either of these factors required any analysis of the purpose the judge ma~· haYe had in carr~·
ing out the particular action. Similar!~· in B11t: \'. Econumo11. 438 U. S.
4711, 512-516 (1977). when we determined that certain executiYe functions
\rere entitled to absolute immunity because the~· shared "enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process." we looked to objectiw qualities and
not subjectiw purpose.
• The majority seems to suggest that responsibilit~· for gO\·emmentalreorganizations is one such function. A11te, at n. 34. I fail to see wh~· this
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I do not belieYe that subjecting the President to a Biz·e11s
action would create separation of po\Yers problems or "public
policy" problems different from those inYolYed in subjecting
the President to a statutor~- cause of action. '1 Rel~·ing upon
the history and text of the Constitution. as well as the analytic method of our prior cases, I conclude that these problems are not sufficient to justify absolute immunity for the
President in general. nor under the circumstances of this case
in particular.
j

III
Because of the importance of this case, it is appropriate to
examine the reasoning of the majorit~· opinion.
The opinion suffers from serious ambiguit~· eYen \Yith respect to the most fundamental point: Ho\\' broad is the immunit~· granted the President?
The opinion sugg·ests that it~
scope is limited by the fact that under none of the as<:.ertecl
causes of action "has Congress taken express legislatiYe action to subject the President to ciYil liabilit~· for his official
acts.'' A11te, at 16. We are neYer told, howeYer. hO\\' or
wh~- Congressional action could make a difference.
It is not
apparent that any of the propositions relied upon b~- the majority to immunize the President would not appl~· equall~- to
such a statutor~· cau<:.e of action: nor does the majority inclicate what new principles would operate to undercut those
propositions.
In the end, the majorit~· seems to oYercome its initial hesitation, for it announces that. "[ w]e consider [absolute] immunit~· a functionall~· mandated incident of the President's
unique office. rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of po\Yers and supported b~· our histor~·." ibid.
should be so.
'" Although our conclusion~ differ. the majorit~· opinion reflect:> a similar
,·ie\Y as to the relationship bet\\'een the t\\'O sources of the cau::;es of action
in this case: It does not belieYe it necessary to differentiate in its O\\'n analysis bet\\'een the statutor~· and constitutional causes of action.
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See also id., at 24 ("A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for
misconduct on the part of the chief executive."). 35 While the
majority opinion recognizes that "[i]t is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States," it bases
its conclusion, at least in part, on a suggestion that there is a
special jurisprudence of the presidency. Ante, at 22-23. 36
But in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), we upheld the power of a federal district court to issue a subpoena
duces tecum against the President. In other cases we have
enjoined executive officials from carrying out presidential
35

THE CHIEF JUSTICE leaves no doubt that he, at least, reads the majority opinion as standing for the broad proposition that the President is absolutely immune under the Constitution:
"I write separately to emphasize that the presidential immunity spelled out
today derives from and is mandated by the Constitution. Absolute immunity for a President is either implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers or it does not exist." Memorandum of Concurrence, at 1.
36
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of whether a court may
compel the President himself to perform ministerial executive functions:
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection,
without expressing any opinion on the broader isseus ... whether, in any
case, the President, ... may be required, by the process of this court, to
perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable , in any case, othen;se than by impeachment for crime."
Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by the
majority, did not indicate that the President could never be subject to judicial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in rejecting the argument
that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional judicial infringement upon the Executive Branch:
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general
in the discharage of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act ,
which neither he nor the president had any authority to deny or control."
ld., at 610.
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directiYes. See e. g., l'ollngsfolCII Sh eet & Tube Co. v. Sazcyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Not until this case has there ever
been a suggestion that the mere formalism of the name appearing on the complaint was more important in resolving
separation of powers problems than the substantive character of the judicial intrusion upon executive functions.
The majority suggests that the separation of powers doctrine permits exercising jurisdiction over the President only
in those instances where "judicial action is needed to serve
broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers. but to maintain their
proper balance." Ante. at 23. Without explanation, the
majorit~· contends that a "merel~· private suit for damages"
does not sen·e this function.
The suggestion that enforcement of the rule of law-i. e.,
subjecting the President to rules of general applicabilit~·
does not further the separation of powers, but rather is in
derogation of this purpose, is bizarre. At stake in a suit of
this sort, to the extent that it is based upon a statutoril~· created cause of action, is the ability of Congress to assert legal
restraints upon the Executive and of the courts to perform
their function of providing redress for legal harm. Regardless of what the Court might think of the merits of Mr. Fitzgerald's claim, the idea that pursuit of legal redress offends
the doctrine of separation of powers is a frivolous contention
passing as legal argument.
Similarly, the majority implies that the assertion of a constitutional cause of action-the whole point of which is to assure that an officer does not transgress the constutitionallimits on his authority-may offend separation of powers
concerns. This is surel~· a perverse approach to the Constitution: Whatever the arguments in favor of absolute immunit~· may be, it is untenable to argue that subjecting the President to constitutional restrictions will undercut his "unique"
role in our system of government. It cannot be seriousl~· argued that the President must be placed beyond the law and
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beyond judicial enforcement of constitutional restraints upon
executive officers in order to implement the principle of separation of powers.
Focusing on the actual arguments the majority offers for
its holding of absolute immunity for the President, one finds
suprisingly little. As I read the relevant section of the
Court's opinion, I find just three contentions from which the
majority draws this conclusion. Each of them is little more
than a makeweight; together they hardly suffice to justify the
wholesale disregard of our traditional approach to immunity
questions.
First, the majority informs us that the President occupies
a "unique position in the constitutional scheme," including
responsibilities for the administration of justice, foreign affairs, and management of the Executive Branch. Ante, at
17-18. True as this may be, it says nothing about why a
"unique" rule of immunity should apply to the President.
The President's unique role may indeed encompass functions
for which he is entitled to a claim of absolute immunity. It
does not follow from that, however, that he is entitled to absolute immunity either in general or in this case in particular.
For some reason, the majority believes that this uniqueness of the President shifts the burden to respondent to
prove that a rule of absolute immunity does not apply. The
respondent has failed in this effort, the Court suggests, because the President's uniqueness makes "inapposite" any
analogy to our cases dealing with other executive officers.
Ante, at 18. Even if this were true, it would not follow that
the President is entitled to absolute immunity; it would only
mean that a particular argument is out of place. But the fact
is that it is not true. There is nothing in the President's
unique role that makes the arguments used in those other
cases inappropriate.
Second, the majority contends that because the President's
"visibility" makes him particularly vulnerable to suits for civil
damages, ante, at 20, a rule of absolute immunity is required.

l
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The force of this argument is surely undercut by the majority's admission that "there is no historical record of numerous
suits against the President." I d, at n. 33. Even granting
that a Bivens cause of action did not becomes available until
1971, in the eleven years since then there have been only a
handful of suits. Many of these are frivolous and dealt with
in a routine manner by the courts and the Justice Department. There is no reason to think that, in the future, the
protection afforded by summary judgment procedures would
not be adequate to protect the President, as they currently
protect other executive officers from unfounded litigation.
Indeed, given the decision today in Harlow & Butterfield v.
Fitzgerald, No. 8~945, there is even more reason to believe
that frivolous claims ·will not intrude upon the President's
time. Even if judicial procedures were found not to be sufficient, Congress remains free to address this problem if and
when it develops.
Finally, the Court suggests that potential liability "fre- \
quently could distract a President from his public duties."
Ante, at 20. Unless one assumes that the President himself
makes the countless high level executive decisions required
in the administration of government, this rule will not do
much to insulate such decisions from the threat of liability.
The logic of the proposition cannot be limited to the President; its extension, however, has been uniformly rejected by
this Court. See Butz, supra; Harlow & Butterfield, supra.
Furthermore, in no instance have we previously held legal
accountability in itself to be an unjustifiable cost. The availability of the courts to vindicate .constitutional and statutory
wrongs has been perceived and protected as one of the virtues of our system of delegated and limited powers. As I argued in §I, our concern in fashioning absolute immunity rules
has been that liability may pervert the decisionmaking process in a particular function by undercutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. Except for the empty general- \
ity that the President should have "'the maximum ability to
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deal fearlessly and impartially ·with' the duties of his office," \
ante at 20, the majority nowhere suggests a particular, disadvantageous effect on a specific presidential function. The
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas
that may intrude on individuals' legally protected rights has
never before been counted as a cost.
IV
The majority may be correct in its conclusion that "a rule of
absolute immunity will not leave the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the part of the chief executive." Ante, at 24. Such a rule will, however, leave Mr.
Fitzgerald without an adequate remedy for the harms that he
may have suffered. More importantly, it will leave future
plaintiffs without a remedy, regardless of the substantiality
of their claims. The remedies in which the Court finds comfort were never designed to afford relief for individual harms.
Rather, they were designed as political safety-valves. Politics and history, however, are not the domain of the courts;
the courts exist to assure each individual that he, as an individual, has enforcable rights that he may pursue to achieve a
peaceful redress of his legitimate grievances.
I find it ironic, as well as tragic, that the Court would so
casually discard its own role of assuring "the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws," Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), in the name of protecting
the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I
dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional .testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm. , 91st Cong. , 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116,
App., at 177-179.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
retention by the Defense Department.
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi'App. 228.
5
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973).
9
I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra,
App., at 83:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
not a case of some person down the line deciding he
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]."
10
See CSC Decision, App., at 61.
11
See id., at 83-84.
12
See ibid.
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should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable
civil service regulations. App. 86--87. 15 The Examiner
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motiApp. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
14
App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id. , at 220. It was after this
conversation that the retraction was ordered.
15
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F . 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App. , at 63-64. In Hampton , however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
13
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and
that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." I d., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide AlexThe Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision,
App., at 8fH37. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,"
id., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
16
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ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. ld., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
•• The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6.
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally
20
See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp.
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Neither is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order"
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit.
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemental Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980).
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this· Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.

A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi21

See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ...
28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement,
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling'' decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac23
There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
24
Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."

Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials--notably judges and prosecutors--required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495.
25
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a consistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial making,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are
... competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See,
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other decisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause),

79--1738-0PINION
NIXON v. FITZGERALD

16

or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional language and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S.
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a congressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v.
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 50~17. Nonetheless, at
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on consideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have examined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to particular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
421 (1976).
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common
law.
At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials.
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from entering public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages liability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529--530 (1977).
26
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IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject t}w President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public
policy.
A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
administration of justice-it is the President who is charged
constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in which the
Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable that
courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information
27
We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious constitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case.
28
U. S. Const., Art II, § 3.
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properly held secret"; 29 and management of the personnel of
the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
80
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
31
Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... "
32
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers affirmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace petitioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
branch).
29

333
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's powers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a President must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest
public interest in providing the President "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even disloyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages actions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating lawsuits against the President, the President and his advisers
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy,
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability.
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties,
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35
ss Cf.

J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,

§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.):

"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department,
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are
confided to it. Among these , must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest,
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability."
34
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
36
Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance
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In deference to the President's singular constitutional mandate, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a selective approach.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken.
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman,
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official
responsibility.
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
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never has held that courts may compel the President to perform even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
36
Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity
of the President from judicial orders. In M is sis sippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S.
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching
power."
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluctance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress,
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since otherwise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W.
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the President, however, we have recognized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon,
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon,
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance,
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974).
37
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States,
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
3IJ See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323--324 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
39
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
40
See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's
official acts, we hold it is not. 41

v
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the
part of the chief executive. 42 There remains first the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, Presi41
It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950):
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative."
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360,
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision).
2
' The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
"'The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
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dents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after they leave
office. Moreover, there are informal checks on Presidential
action that do not apply with equal force to other executive
officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by
Congress and by the press. The vigilance of these institutions may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well
as to make credible the threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his
historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
44
Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly takenliuring the former President's
tenure in office. The issue be?ore us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116,
App., at 177-179.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
retention by the Defense Department.
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi'App. 228.
3
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973).
9
I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra,
App., at 83:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F . 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
not a case of some person down the line deciding he
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. "
10
See CSC Decision, App. , at 61.
11
See id. , at 83-84.
12
See ibid.

79-1738-0PINION
NIXON v. FITZGERALD

5

should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable
civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 The Examiner
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact moti13
App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of J!m. 31, 1973).
14
App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this
conversation that the retraction was ordered.
'~ Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and
that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." I d., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex16
The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision,
App., at 86--87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,"
id., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
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ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. Id., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. '9 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
19
The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6.
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally
20
See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5
U. S. C. § 7211 and -18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp.
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Neither is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order"
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit.
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemental Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980).
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.

A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Bene.fi21

See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree .. . .
28 u. s. c. § 1254.
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 54~547. As an additional requirement,
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se. rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23

B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to ac23

There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co .,
437 U.S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
" Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for da.@age~ based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognitiOn of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously crippl~ the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."

Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for t~ benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of ~blic
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualifie immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
2S Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S. , at 493-495.
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a
straight line of doctrinal development.
onetheless, a consistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial making,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 50~. Our decisions of course have been guided
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See,
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other decisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause),
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional language and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S.
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a congressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v.
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on consideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have examined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to particular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
421 (1976).
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common
law.
2\; At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials.
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from entering public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages liability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977).

79-173~0PINION

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

17

IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. -n
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
§tates, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public
policy.
A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is \
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable ·
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in27
We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious constitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case.
28
U. S. Const., Art II, §3.
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formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
personnel of the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in
their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32
29

333
30

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,

u. s.

103, 111 (1948).

Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).

31
Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... "
32
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers affirmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace petitioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
branch).
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's powers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a President must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest
public interest in providing the President "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even disloyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages actions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating lawsuits against the President, the President and his advisers
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy,
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability.
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties,
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35
"'Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.):

"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department,
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest,
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability."
34
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
35
Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance
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B
In deference to the President's singular constitutional mandate, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
501H517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a selective approach.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken.
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is
enough to render the privilege applicable.... "); Stump v. Sparkman,
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official
responsibility.
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
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never has held that courts may compel the President to perform even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
36
Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S.
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching
power."
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluctance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress,
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since otherwise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W.
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the President, however, we have recognized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon,
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon,
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance,
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974).
37
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States,
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
38
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
39
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
""See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra,-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's
official acts, we hold it is not. 41

v
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 42 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, there are
"It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA21949),
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950):
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative."
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a
lesser public interest in· actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360,
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision).
42
The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
"'The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
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formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter
Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
.... Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." Id., at 115-116,
App. , at 177-179.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
retention by the Defense Department.
1
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi' App. 228.
5
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H. R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973).
9
I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]. " Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra,
App., at 83:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton , 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had · received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege. " 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dis.missal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
.not a case of some person down the line deciding he
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. "
'" See CSC Decision, App. , at 61.
" See id. , at 83--84.
12
See ibid.
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should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, App., at 60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable
civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15 The Examiner
based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motiApp. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
14
App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this
conversation that the retraction was ordered.
15
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
75~768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
13
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vated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at
86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and
that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." Id., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alex16
The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision,
App., at 86-87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was
not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,"
id., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent
for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
CSC Decision, App., at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he
therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).

79-1738-0PINION
NIXON v. FITZGERALD

7

ander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
9

The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6.
'
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally
20

See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp.
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Neither is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme . . . judicially created remedies . . . might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388,
396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order''
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit.
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemental Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980).
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.2' We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Benefi21
See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ...

28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 54&-547. As an additional requirement,
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 54 7. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283--1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling'' decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to acThere can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
" Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
23
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."
Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
I d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
z:, Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493--495.
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a consistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial making,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See,
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other decisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause),
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional language and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S.
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a congressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v.
Economou , supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on consideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have examined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to particular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
421 (1976).
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core
of our inquiry involving those considerations of "public policy
and convenience" traditionally weighed by courts at common
law.
At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials.
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from entering public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages liability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F . 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert. denied , 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev . 526, 529-530 (1977).
26
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IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public
policy.
A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the \
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on in27
We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious constitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case.
28
U. S. Const., Art II , §3.
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formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
personnel of the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in
their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp .,
u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
30
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
31
Under the "good faith" standard, as it has been formulated in such
cases as Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be
held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury .... "
32
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers affirmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace petitioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
branch).
29

333
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's powers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a President must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. 8., at 554.
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest
public interest in providing the President "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even disloyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages actions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating lawsuits against the President, the President and his advisers
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy,
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability.
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties,
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35
33

Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,

§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.):

"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department,
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest,
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability."
34
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
ao Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance
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In deference to the President's singular constitutional mandate, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a selective approach.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken.
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is
enough to render the privilege applicable .... "); Stump v. Sparkman,
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions
based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official
responsibility.
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has
granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
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never has held that courts may compel the President to perform even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
36
Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S.
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching
power."
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluctance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress,
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought
against him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since otherwise a court could "stop the whole machine of Government." 167 W.
Maclay, Journal ofW. Maclay (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered
a similar argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the President, however, we have recognized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon,
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon,
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance,
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 321}-325 (1974).
37
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States,
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
38
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 32~24 (DDC 1966), aff'd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
39
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
"'See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439
(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
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cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's
official acts, we hold it is not. 41

v
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave ~
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 42 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, there are
" It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950):
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative."
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360,
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision).
2
' The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
43
The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
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formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter
Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
""'Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of
the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to

...

-.• .-

.,t·

'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I d. , at 11fr-116.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White
retention by the Defense Department.
' App. 228.
5
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
' See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix).
• I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the
Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished." But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83.
10
!d., at 61.
" See id., at 83--84.
2
' See ibid.
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job,
App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13,
the Pbesident again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal.
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered.
15
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
13
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13,
1968." !d., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offiThe Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87.
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action"
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures,
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
" The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought
an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
16
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. ld., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
19

The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint 6.
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
. ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
20
See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The cor•
rectness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under {
0 II"'\ ·, GS1fJ ~
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infm, this case is
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980).
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement,
21

See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and
we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree. . . .
28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re23
There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
u Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'"
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240--241 (1937).

III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."

Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
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fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
/d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
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stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." /d., at 508.
20

Spalding v. Vilas , supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493--495.
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In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B

Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at
498. 26
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries
into history and policy, though mandated independently by
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not
exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a
26

Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assumptions of our scheme of government.
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system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
The Court previously has suggested that separation-of-powers concerns might make it inappropriate for a court to "infer" a Bivens cause of
action against an official of the President's constitutional stature. See
Carlson v. Green, supra, at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against officials with independent status in our constitutional scheme . .. judicially
created remedies ... might be inappropriate"); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, supra, at 396 (inference of a constitutional damages remedy would be inappropriate in a case involving "special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress").
Similar concerns, discussed in text infra, counsel hesitation in concluding
that Congress intended a statute of general reference to subject the President to damages liability for his official acts. We know of no instance in
which Congress explicitly has undertaken to expose the President to damages liability, and we have no occasion to consider the serious constitutional issues that would arise if Congress should do so.
Whether Congress intended a statute to create a damages remedy
against the President is by definition a question of congressional intent.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,-- U. S.
- - (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287 (1981).
Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, this Court must
assume that causes of action may be inferred at least against some officials
under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. See note 20 supra. But
it does not follow that we must-in interpreting a statute in light of immunity doctrine-infer an intent to impose damages liability on the President
of the United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)
(construing a federal statute not to have imposed damages liability on legislators, for whom "history and reason" supported immunity from suit, "by
covert inclusion in .. . general language").
Citing the purpose and legislative history of the two statutes in issue,
21
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Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immuthe dissenting opinion appears to argue that Congress did intend them to
create a cause of action against the President. See post, at 20-21. The
evidence, however, is overwhelmingly to the contrary. The pertinent legislative history principally involves the enactment of Section 6 of the Post
Office Appropriations Act of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539. The predecessor
of 5 U. S. C. § 7211, this legislation was passed by Congress partly to override "gag rules" imposed by executive orders prior to that time. In terms,
the statute provided that civil service employees had a right to report to
Congress and that they should not be punished for doing so. Yet there is
no indication on the face of the statute that Congress intended to impose
damages liability on the President. And, in the historical context, it is implausible that Congress in 1912 could have intended to create a damages
remedy against the President by mere implication. Only a few years earlier, in 1896, this Court had held that the Postmaster General was absolutely immune from civil suits arising from "action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or
supervision." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896). The rationale
of Spalding, see id., at 498--499, would have applied to the President a fortiori. Because "our evaluation of congressional action ... must take into
account its contemporary legal context," Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677, 69~99 (1979), any argument that Congress intended its
general language to impose liability on the President must fail in the
absence of further evidence. Nor does such support emerge from the legislative debates. On the contrary, these suggest that congressional oversight-not a remedy in damages from the President-would be the principal enforcement mechanism. See 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) ("Supervisory
officials will hesitate to trump up charges . . . , as all cases of removals and
reductions will be submitted to Congress each year, and if an employee can
produce satisfactory evidence that he has not received the protection afforded in this bill his case can be made the subject of a special inquiry if
Congress so decides.") (remarks of Rep. Calder); id., at 4656 ("Men in official position will hesitate to trump up charges against an employee . . . , as
all the cases of removals and reductions will be submitted to Congress each
year.... ")(Remarks of Rep. Reilly).
The other section from which respondent would infer a cause of action
against the President is a criminal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, originally
enacted in 1940. It of course does not refer expressly to the President.
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and consistent with our history. Justice Story's analysis remains generally persuasive:
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it.
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore,
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability." Cf. J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.):
A

The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on inAnd even the respondent fails to argue that the legislative history suggests
any intent to create a damages remedy enforceable against the President
on the basis of his official acts.
ZB U. S. Const., Art II, § 3.
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formation properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." :ro
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31
Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges-for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President
29

333
30

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,

u. s.

103, 111 (1948).

Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).

Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers affirmatively assumed Presidential immunity to have been established by the
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace petitioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
Branch).
31
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34
32
Among the most powerful reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
33
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
3-1 In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S.,
at 508-517; cf. Imblerv. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S. , at 430-431. But the
Court also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would
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B
Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. This Court never has held
support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege
extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough
to render the privilege applicable ... .");Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435
U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate
to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions based on acts
within the "outer perimeter" of the area of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job,
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions,
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbid-
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that courts may compel the President to perform even ministerial functions of his office, 35 much less subject a President to
damages liability for action taken within the scope of his office. 35 By contrast, injunctions compelling action by other ofden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts Jay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
35
See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are fully /
satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President
in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be
received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) ("The /
executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.").
36
Strong historical evidence supports judicial restraint with respect to
any action against a President. At the time of the first Congress, Vice
President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut,
were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject
to any process whatever; could have no action whatever brought against
him; and above the power of all judges, justices, etc." since otherwise a
court could "stop the whole machine of Government." W. Maclay, Journal
of W. Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story offered a similar
argument somewhat later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
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ficials long have been upheld. 37 A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court to cases in which various
officials have claimed an evidentiary privilege. The courts
generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the
President, however, we have recognized that Presidential
immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708
(1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does

not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon,
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974).
37
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States ,
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
:lll See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6--7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss , Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
"" Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343
U. S. , at 583.
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branch. See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433
U. S. 425, 439 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683
(1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public
interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance,
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra--the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's
official acts, we hold it is not. 40
40
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there
is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360,
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity
may impose a regrettable cost on individuals whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, it is not true that
our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every
legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally
against absolute immunity for any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity recognized for judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, supm; Sea Clammers, supra;
California v. Sierra Club, supra. The dissent does not refer to the jurisprudence of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no
discussion of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that
that there would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents,
supra, 403 U. S., at 396; Carlson v. Green, supra, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our
constitutional scheme . . . judicially created remedies . . . might be
inappropriate").
Even the case on which the dissent places principal reliance, Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil lib-
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 41 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 42 In addition, there are
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant-oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 43 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
erty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet Marbury does
not establish that the individual's protection must come in the form of a
particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost his case in
the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that
he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it was clear at
least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See supra, at 4-6
and n. 17.
"The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
2
' The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
Canst., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
-13 Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
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The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." 44 For the President, as for judges and
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance
compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered .

.... The dissent's contrary argument that our decision places the President
"above the law," ante, at 3-4, is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified.
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judgment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a prosecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is simple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular
remedy is not available against him.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of
the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost:-oveiTUns on the C-5A
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1~1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's

79-1738-0PINION
NIXON v. FITZGERALD

3

look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White
retention by the Defense Department.
.
'App. 22&.
~See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix).
9
Id., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the
Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83.
10
I d., at 61.
11
See id., at 83-84.
12
See ibid.

;:
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job,
App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13,
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal.
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered.
16
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63--64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
13
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13,
1968." ld., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised .essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offiThe Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86--87.
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team
player' and 'not on the Air Force team."' App. 83. Without deciding
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action"
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures,
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought
an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
16
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. !d., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute or' limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
19

The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint 6.
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II

Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
20
See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first , 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied. " The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under \
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980).
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.2' We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to review "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement,
21

See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and
we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree ....
28 u. s. c. § 1254.
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
23
There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
24
Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
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"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'"
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."
!d., at 498.

79-173~PINION

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

13

Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
ld., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
u Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495.
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B

Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at
498. 26
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries
into history and policy, though mandated independently by
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not
exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
26
Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assumptions of our scheme of government.
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policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be con, sidered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a
system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immuIn the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied"
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order'' doctrine, see
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that p ivate causes of action
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (construing§ 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity]
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the President IS a so ute y
· from civil damages liability; in the absence of
explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide onl/lhis constitutional
issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before us.
27
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice
Story's analysis remains persuasive:
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it.
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore,
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.).
A

The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States. . . ." This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost d acretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re28

21

333

U. S. Const., Art II, § 3.
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc . v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,

u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Econorrwu, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This \
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 511-512; see Imblerv. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed concern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens. Litigation of this kind simply may have been unthinkable in the era of the Constitutional Convention.
Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and VicePresident John Adams-both delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever. . . . For
[that] would put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole machine of government." W. Maclay,
Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890). And Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the separation of powers that the President
30

31
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Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judgesmust be permitted to discharge his duties undistracted by private lawsuits.
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,§ 1563, at
418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted supra).
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974).
Attempting to minimize the significance of this evidence, the dissent
claims that the historical support for absolute Presidential immunity is not
"firm." Post, at 13. Although it cites some ambiguous comments made
at two state ratifying Conventions, the dissent's chief argument appears to
be that the documentary materials are too fragmentary to be conclusive.
Our view is not wholly to the contrary. In light of the undeniable paucity
of documentary sources, we think the most compelling arguments for absolute Presidential immunity arise from the separation of powers and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But
our reliance on those factors should not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence supports the Presidential immunity we have upheld. Not
only do the debates of the Framers accord with our conclusions; other powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits against the
President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with this Court's
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for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President
must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34
1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action ever were \
filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to judgment
on the merits.
32
Among the most powerful reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
38
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
34
In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held
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Courts traditionally have recognized the President's con-~ .
stitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S.,
at 508-517; cf.lmblerv. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the
Court also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would
support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege
extends to all matters "committed by law to (an official's] control or supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough
to render the privilege applicable ... .");Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435
U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate
to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions based on acts
within the "outer perimeter'' of the area of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job,
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions,
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 36 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See,
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction,
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose: Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
36
This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history.
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.").
36
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
37
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
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served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers,
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstoum Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v.
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38
38

The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371--373 (1980); cf. United States v.
Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special
importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as
raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been
denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of
the dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's objections on
this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for any official.
Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity recognized for
judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran,-- U.S.-- (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U. S. 287 (1981). The dissent does not refer to the jurisprudence of
implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion of
cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, supra, 403 U. S.,
at 396; Carlson v. Green, supra, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional

I
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid misconactions against officials with ''independent status in our constitutional
scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate").
Even the case on which the dissent places principal reliance, Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury." /d., at 163. Yet Marbury does
not establish that the individual's protection must come in the form of a
particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost his case in
the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that
he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it was clear at
least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See supra, at 4-6
and n. 17.
1111
The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E . g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
40
The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
41
Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeach-
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duct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." 42 For the President, as for judges and'
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance
compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court. of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

ment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
42
The dissent's contrary argument that our decision places the President
"above the law," ante, at 3-4, is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified.
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judgment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a prosecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is simple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular
remedy is not available against him.
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JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of
the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissatz The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
'See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (196&-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
' See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzger·ald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I d., at 115-116.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White
retention by the Defense Department.
'App. 228.
"See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
; Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
' Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix).
• I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the
Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " App. 83.
10
!d., at 61.
" See i d., at 83-84.
12
See i bi d.
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. App. 86-87. 15
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job,
App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
"App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13,
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal.
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered.
'"Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
75&-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
13

-----------·-

~-

---
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his
position was abolished and that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13,
1968." !d., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi16
The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87.
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team
player' and 'not on the Air Force team."' App. 83. Without deciding
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action"
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures,
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
"The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought
an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
9

The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint 6.
'
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certio-:
rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II

Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
:ro See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to "infer'' a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally
that "The right of employees ... to . . . furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is
here under the "collateral order'' doctrine, for review of the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980).
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.

A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 54~547. As an additional requirement,
21

See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and
we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree ....
28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283--1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely , 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974) , we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B

Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary re"' There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g. , Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
24
Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).

III
A

This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint." ld., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
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fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examil).ing § 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
I d., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a § 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.' " I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." Id., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of§ 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officet:s Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
~ Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978).
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." !d., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B

Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court necessarily also .has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at
498. 25
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries
into history and policy, though mandated independently by
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not
exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
26
Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assumptions of our scheme of government.

A congressional tternpt to impose ~
would present a

8

rious constitutional issue that we

have no occasion .o consider in this case.

· --·· ·-·
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a
system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
IV

Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's

I

I(

27
In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied"
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (construing § 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity]
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only this constitutional
issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before us~

~

/A
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unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice
Story's analysis remains persuasive:
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it.
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore,
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he
is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.).
A

The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
28
U. S. Canst., Art II, § 3.
"' Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
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the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31
90

Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 511-512; see Imblerv. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed concern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Fan nd, Records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens. Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adamsboth delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E.
Maclay ed. 1890). And Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in
the separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge
his duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on
31

,

.
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Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judgesthe Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted
supra).
Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a
President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the
proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320--325 (1974).
JUSTICE WHITE's di 3ent intimates that the significance of this historical
evidence somehow is minimized by its location in a footnote, rather than in
text. See, post, at 6 n. 2, and at 15. We had not supposed that the merit
either of argument or of documentation depends upon its location in a
Court opinion. In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials reflecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most
compelling arguments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers
and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text
supra. But our primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial
precedent should not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence
clearly supports the Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice
White's dissent cites some other materials, including ambiguous comments
made at state ratifying conventions and the remarks of a single publicist.
But historical evidence must be weighed as well as cited. When the
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for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President
must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 34

I
I

weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on
the contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and
Oliver Ellsworth. Other powerful support derives from the actual history
of private lawsuits against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion
commencing with this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of
damages action ever were filed against the President. None appears to
have proceeded to judgment on the merits.
32
Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
33
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
34
In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has
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B

Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts

I

recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court
also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support.
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege
applicable ... .");Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding"). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of the
area of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job,
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions,
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 36 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separa-....
- - -'f"T
tion of powers under the Constitution." united States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See,
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also \
have ~ed tpat a court, before exercising jurisdiction,
~alance th constitutional weight of the interest to be

@

of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose; Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
'"' This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history.
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.").
36
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
37
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
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served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers,
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v.
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 38
38

f

I

t

The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of JusTICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity
recognized for judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, - - U. S. - - (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JuSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U. S., at 396;
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judi-
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid miscon-

I

cially created remedies ... might be inappropriate").
Even the case on which JusTICE WHITE places principal reliance,
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17.
39
The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
40
The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
- Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
''Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
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The dissent, reaching for authority to support

I

its position, cites a current edition of Time magazine to

p~~ ?-(... 2 .I p '-i.
the effect that "no President is above the law"./\ With due
respect to this prominent publication, we have not
heretofore considered it a citable authority in a Court
opinion on constitutional law.

Nor indeed was the

magazine article referring at all to private damage suit
liability.

Rather, its statement reflected the judgment

of this Court in the Nixon tapes case and the impreachment
resolution of the House Judiciary Committee.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v.
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of
the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
1

See Economics of Militaty Pmcurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Con g., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Befot·e the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White
retention by the Defense Department.
'App. 228.
5
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146-147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgemld (CSC Decision), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix).
' I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost ovelTUns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the
Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished.'' But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]." App. 83.
10
!d., at 61.
" See id., at 83-84.
12
See ibid.
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 11
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgemld, as reprinted in App., at
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. App. 8&--87. 15
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job,
13
App. 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
1
' App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13,
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal.
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered.
1
" Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. F itzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 1' The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his
position was abolished and that he vvas separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13,
1968." Id., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offiThe Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87.
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action"
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," 'id., at
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures,
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
App. 87-88. Despite the Commission's order, respondent avers that he
"has still not obtained reinstatement to a position equivalent to his former
one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that he therefore has brought
an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
16
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
19

The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint 6.
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Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
"" See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980).
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the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[ c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement,
21
See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and
we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree ....

28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
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Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B

Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary reThere can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
"' Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
23
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lief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins . Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240--241 (1937).
III
A

This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint." Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the de-
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fense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
"'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. 8., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
20
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978).
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B

Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at
498. 26
This. case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries
into history and policy, though mandated independently by
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not
exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
26

Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assumptions of our scheme of government.
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a
system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
IV

Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu27

In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied"
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see
supra, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Bmndhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (construing§ 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity]
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in
the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only
this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before
us.

l
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice
Story's analysis remains persuasive:
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it.
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them. . . . The president cannot, therefore, be
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is
in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 eel.).
A

The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re"" U.S. Const., Art II, §3.

""Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333

u. s.

103, 111 (1948).
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31
Because of the singular importance of the President's du"" Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
31
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bmdley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed concern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens. And Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adamsboth delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E.
Maclay eel. 1890). Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the
separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge his
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ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judgesfor whom absolute immunity now is established-a President
duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 eel.) (quoted
supra). Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not intended to be subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held
in United States v. Burr, 25 Feel. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces
tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary
and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974).
In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials reflecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most compelling arguments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But our
primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should
not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the
Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice White's dissent cites some
other materials, including ambiguous comments made at state ratifying
conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. But historical evidence
must be weighed as well as cited. When the weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on the contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth. Other
powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits
against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supTa, 386 U. 8., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. 8. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. 31
this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action
ever were filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to
judgment on the merits.
'"' Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
'~' These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
""' In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has
recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to
the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held
that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at
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Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
judicial deference and restraint. 35 For example, while courts
508-517; cf. Imble?· v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court
also has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support.
See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the
outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege
applicable ... .");Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding"). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damages actions based on acts within the "outer perimeter" of
the area of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for
example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job,
an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the
"functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Thus, in
order to administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions,
judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts
were taken. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside
the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent
39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues , no federal official could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard
of proof in prescribed statutory proceedings.
This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial
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generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 36 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See,
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 37 But our cases also
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction,
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General
on every allegation that an allegedly tortious action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute
immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
35
This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history.
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President: and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.").
w See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stifhmg v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 323-324 (DDC 1966), affcl, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
37
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343
U.S., at 583.
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Services Administration, 433 U. 8. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. 8. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers,
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v.
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. as
"' The Comt has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of JusTICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity
recognized for judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a clamages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran,-- U. S. - - (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JUSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fedeml Agents, 403 U. S., at 396;
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate").
Even the case on which JUSTICE WHITE places principal reliance,
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A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 39 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 40 In addition, there are
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 41 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id., at 163. Yet
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek lost wages before the
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17.
a9 The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428--429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
0
' The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690--706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
1
' Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
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maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." 42 For the President, as for judges and
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance
compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

"The argument of the dissenting opinions, that our decision places the
President "above the law," is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified.
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judgment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a prosecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is simple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular
remedy is not available against him.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1738

RICHARD NIXON, PETITIONER v . .
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us
is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of
the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national .
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of De-
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fense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209-211
(Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among
these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the new Nixon
administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on N ovember 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force
upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
'See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." !d., at 115-116.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." App.
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
1
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look into the matter.~ Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. i In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a
top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks
in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game." 8
Butterfield therefore recommended that "We should let him
bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evidence of White
retention by the Defense Department.
' App. 228.
5
See App. 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); App. 137- 141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. App. 275.
6
See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See App. 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); App. 146--147 (Deposition of James Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), reprinted in App., at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973). (Page citations to
the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix).
9
I d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the
Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (CADC 1972), public
hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings
again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he
denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for
congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be
more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]. " App. 83.
10
!d., at 61.
" See id., at 83--84.
12
See ibid.
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." ~
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App., at
60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. App. 8&-87. 15
The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job,
1

1
A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon re" App. 185.
peated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. App. 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973).
1
' App. 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra note 13,
the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal.
When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." App. 218 (recorded
conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered.
15
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, App., at 63-64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.
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though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d., at 86. As this was an impermissible basis
for a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding
that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to
Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence in
the record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his
position was abolished and that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13,
1968." Id., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi16
The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. App. 86-87.
Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team
player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" App. 83. Without deciding
whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse action"
against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee," id., at
86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures,
current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air Force to
employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons "personal to" him. App. 87.
17
The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
App. 87-88. Following the Commission's order, respondent was offered a
new position with the Defense Department, but not one that he regarded
as equivalent to his former employment. Fitzgerald accordingly filed an
enforcement action in the District Court. This litigation ultimately culminated in a settlement agreement. Under its terms the United States Air
Force agreed to reassign Fitzgerald to his former position as Management
Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, effective
June 21, 1982. See Settlement Agreement in Fitzgerald v. Hampton, et· .
al., Civ. No. 76-1486 (DDC June 15, 1982).
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. I d., at 225, 229.
Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974).
19
The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint 6.
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and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had
stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and
the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The Court also
ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally
divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
20
See Cert. App. 1-2. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C.
§ 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first , 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally
that "The right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either
House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal
statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action could be "implied" under
these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is
here under the "collateral order" doctrine, for review of the District
Court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that
respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common law cause of
action. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 2 (May 14, 1980).
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II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.

A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing
the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision,
respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an
appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
21
See Brief for Respondent in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has
not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and
we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Gases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . . ..

28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.
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from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, at 546-547. As an additional requirement, Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order
must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 58-60 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), affd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals ·appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
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691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "se-

rious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U.S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
24
Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
23
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we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U.S.--,-- (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. !d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint." ld., at 498.
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Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
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discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U. S., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. E conomou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
zs Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the
ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a constitutional-cause of action. See Butz, v.
E conomou, 438 U. S. 478, 493-495 (1978).
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"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." I d., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.

B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the
Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at
least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional
guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the
common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at
498. 26
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries
into history and policy, though mandated independently by
our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not
exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our
constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry
thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
26
Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the
requisite inquiry as one of "public policy," the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the "inherent" or "structural" assumptions of our scheme of government.
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This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a
system structured to achieve effective government under a
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In
neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immu7

In the present case we therefore are presented only with "implied"
causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question
as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action
against the President of the United States. This approach accords with
this Court's settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional
issues. Reviewing this case under the "collateral order" doctrine, see
supr-a, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action
may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on
which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must-in considering a Bivens remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity
doctrine-assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the
United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove , 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (construing § 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept
"that Congress ... would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity]
so well grounded in history and reason by convert inclusion in the general
language before us," and therefore would not address issues that would
arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute
immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in
the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only
this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before
us.
'
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nity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice
Story's analysis remains persuasive:
"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from
the nature of the functions, which are confided to it.
Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them. . . . The president cannot, therefore, be
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is
in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this
purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability." J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.).

A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States. . . . " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
enforcement of federal law-it is the President who is
charged constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in
which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"; 29 and management of the
Executive Branch-a task for which "imperative reasons re28

U. S. Const., Art II, §3.

"" Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
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quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478; Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31
Because of the singular importance of the President's duMyers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. This
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S. , at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman ,
supra (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed concern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his
capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (1934), at 64 (remarks of Gouvernor
Morris); id., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course
did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens. And Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice-President John Adamsboth delegates to the Convention-that "the President, personally, was not
subject to any process whatever. . . . For [that] would put it in the power
of a common justice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the whole
machine of government." W. Maclay, Journal of W. Maclay 167 (E.
Maclay eel. 1890). Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the
separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge his
30

31
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ties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of
government. As is the case with prosecutors and judgesfor whom absolute immunity now is established-a President
duties undistracted by private lawsuits. J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, § 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.) (quoted
supra). Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not intended to be subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held
in United States v. Burr, 25 Feel. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces
tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the J ucliciary
and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works ofThomasJefferson 404. (P. Ford eel. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 32()....325 (1974).
In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials reflecting the Framers' intent, we do think that the most compelling arguments arise from the Constitution's separation of powers and the judiciary's historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But our
primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should
not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the
Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice White's dissent cites some
other materials, including ambiguous comments made at state ratifying
conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. But historical evidence
must be weighed as well as cited. When the weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on the contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth. Other
powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits
against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with
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must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most
intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such
cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). This concern is
compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under
our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence
of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility
of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people,
the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits
for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties,
to the detriment not only of the President and his office but
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve.
B

Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counselling
this Court's 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages action
ever were filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to
judgment on the merits.
32
Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the
prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in
the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert denied, 339 U. S.
949 (1950), "[t]he justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of trial and the danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute .... "
33
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
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judicial deference and restraint. 34 For example, while courts
generally have looked to the common law to determine the
scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 30 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974). It is settled law that the
separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See,
e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr,
25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). 36 But our cases also
have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction,
must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. General
Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703-713 (1974). When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests-as when
the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers,
but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet &
34
This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history.
See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475, 501 (1866), ("[W]e are
fully satisfied that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to
be received by us."); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.").
35
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, &-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 32:>--324 (DDC 1966), affd, 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
36
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v.
Nixon, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages
based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 37
The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in
actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See
United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals
whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of JusTICE WHITE's dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent's objections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for
any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity
recognized for judges and prosecutors.
Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in
which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases
establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal
court in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran,-- U. S. - - (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U. S. 287 (1981). JuSTICE WHITE does not refer to the jurisprudence
of implied rights of action. Finally, the dissent undertakes no discussion
of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that that there
would be no damages relief in circumstances "counselling hesitation" by the
judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U. S., at 396;
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19 (in direct constitutional actions against
officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate").
Even the case on which JUSTICE WHITE places principal reliance,
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at
best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that "The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of the individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." !d., at 163. Yet
Marbury does not establish that the individual's protection must come in
the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost
37
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c
In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this
Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action
must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes.
Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute
immunity should extend only to acts in performance of par- \
ticular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438
U. S., at 508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at
430--431. But the Court also has refused to draw lines finer
than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters
"committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision");
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here
taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of
duty is enough to render the privilege applicable . . . . ");
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial
privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal
attributes of a judicial proceeding''). In view of the special
nature of the President's constitutional office and functions,
we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter'' of his official responsibility.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the
President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety
of areas, many of them highly sensitive. In many cases it
would be difficult to determine which Presidential "function"
encompassed a particular action. In this case, for example,
respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his
testimony to Congress-a violation of 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and
his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it
was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek a remedy before the
Civil Service Commission-a remedy of which he availed himself. See- .
supra, at 4-6 and n. 17.
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18 U. S. C. § 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed
that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that the petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an
inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided
under the kind of "functional" theory asserted both by re- I
0
spondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be
highly intrusive.
Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have
acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering
the discharge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5
U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could,
within the outer perimeter of his authority, cause Fitzgerald
to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed
statutory proceedings.
This construction would subject the President to trial on
virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was
taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction
thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's constitutional and statu- \
tory authority to "prescribe" the manner in which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. See 10 \
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate must include the
authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in
force, we conclude that petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay
well within the outm: perimeter of his authority.

v
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct
on the part of the chief executive. 38 There remains the con-,.
38

The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in

m

i ss'• c?V\
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stitutional remedy of impeachment. 39 In addition, there are
formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not
apply with equal force to other executive officials. The
President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press.
Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the
threat of impeachment. 40 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the need to
maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and
a President's traditional concern for his historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." 41 For the President, as for judges and
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
39
The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
Canst., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
40
Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).
" The argument of the dissenting opinions, that our decision places the
President "above the law," is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified.
The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a
damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for
official misbehavior, that does not lift him "above" the law. The dissent
does not suggest that a judge is "above" the law when he enters a judgment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a prosecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is
above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is simple error to characterize an official as "above the law" because a particular
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prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance
compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

remedy is not available against him.

January 29, 1982

5

No. 79-1738
FIRST DRAFT
10

The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil
damages from a former President of the United States.

The

claim rests on actions allegedly taken during the former
President's tenure in office.
scope of the

The issue before us is the

15

immunity possessed by the President of the

United States.
I

In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald
lost his job as a management analyst with the Department
of the Air Force.

Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the

20

r

2.

context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in
force, in which his job was eliminated.

In announcing the

reorganization, the the Air Force characterized the action
as

taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed

25

forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress

and

in

the

press.

Fitzgerald

had

attained

national prominence approximately one year earlier, during
the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.
On

November

13,

1968,

Fitzgerald

Subcommittee

for

Economy

in

appeared

Government

of

before
the

Economic Committee of the United States Congress.

30

the

Joint
To the

apparent embarrassment of his superiors in the Department
of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the
C-5A

transport

plane could

approximate

$2

billion. 1

He

lsee Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201 (19681969).
It
is not disputed
that officials
in
the
Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by
Fitzgerald's testimony.
Within less than two months of
respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared
a memorandum for the outgoing Secretary of the Air Force,
Harold Brown, listing three ways in which Fitzgerald might
be removed from his position. See Joint Appendix (JA), at
209-211 (Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6,
1969) • Among these was a "reduction in force" --the means
by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's
successor in office under the new Nixon administration.

35

3.

also revealed

that unexpected technical difficulties had

arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned

that

retaliation

for

Subcommittee

on

Fitzgerald

his

might

congressional

Economy

in

those

hearings

announcement

prominently,

of

his

impending

Department of Defense.
8,

1969,

President

Fitzgerald's
service. 3

The

it

convened

The

the

press

reported

the

earlier

had

separation

Richard

President

Nixon

was

separation

from

responded

queried

from

the

about

government

by promising

to

look

Evidence in the record establishes that

2 see The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the
Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Econom
in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 9lst
Cong. , 1st Sess. (1969) . Some 6 Mem er s of Congress also
signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action."
Ibid., at 115, JA, at 177-179.
3 A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had
been prepared by White House staff in anticipation of a
possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference.
Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced the view
that the Air Force was "firing .•. a good public servant."
JA, at 269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard
Nixon, December 5, 1969).
The memorandum suggested that
the President order Fitzgerald's retention by the Defense
Department.

4 JA, at 228.

40

public

At a news conference on December

impending

into the matter. 4

as

suffered

testimony,

Government

hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal. 2

have

45

4.

this pledge was kept.
the

President

asked

Shortly after the news conference
White

House

Chief

of

Staff

50

H.R.

Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another
job within the Administration. 5
President

suggested

It also appears that the

to Budget Director

Robert Mayo that

Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of

55

the Budget.6
Fitzgerald's
resistance
memordandum

proposed

reassignment

Administration. 7

within

the

of

January

20,

1970,

In

White

encountered
an

internal

House

aide

Alexander Butterfield reported to chief-of staff Haldeman
that "Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but
he must be given very low marks in loyalty; and after all,

5 see JA, at 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman,
February
7,
1980);
JA,
at
137-141
(Deposition
of
petitioner Richard Nixon, October 2-3, 1979). Haldeman's
deposed testimony was based on his handwritten notes of
December 12, 1969. JA, at 275.
6 see JA, at 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at
141 (Deposition of Richard Nixon).
7 Both Mayo
and
his
deputy,
James
Schlesinger,
appear to have resisted at least partly due to a suspicion
that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty to Executive
policies and that he spoke too freely in communications
with friends on Capitol Hill.
Both also stated that high
level positions were presently unavailable within the
Bureau of the Budget.
See JA, at 126 (Deposition of
Robert Mayo);
JA,
at 146-147
(Deposition 1 of James
Schlesinger).

60
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loyalty is the name of the game." 8

Butterfield therefore

recommended that "We should let him bleed, for a while at
least." 9

There is no evidence of White House efforts to

reemploy

Fitzgerald

subsequent

to

the

65

Butterfield

memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment,
Fitzgerald
(CSC) .
his

complained

the

Civil

Service

Commission

In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that

separation

truthful

to

represented

testomony

before

unlawful
a

retaliation

congressional

for

his

committee. 10

8 Quoted in Decision of Civil Service Commission
--~----~~~~~~~------~----~~~--~
Chief Appeals Examiner
(CSC Decision), JA, at 60, 84
(September 18, 1973).
9 Id., at 85.
The memorandum added that "We owe
'first-choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and
others who tried so hard to make him a hero [for exposing
the cost overruns]."
Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the
White House and in the Defense Department.
According to
the CSC Decision, supra, JA, at 83:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was
'Senator Proxmire 's boy in the Air Force,' and
he may honestly believe it,
we find this
statement difficult to accept.
It is evident
that the top officials in the Air Force, without
specifically saying so, considered him to be
just that .... We also note that upon leaving the
Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a
consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that
Senator Proxmire appeared at the Commission
hearing
as
a
character
witness
for
[Fitzgerald]."
10 see CSC Decision, JA, at 61.
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The

esc

convened
on

a

4,

hearing

on

Fitzgerald's

Fitzgerald,

however,

preferred to present his grievances in public.

After he

allegations

May

closed

1971.

75

had won a judicial injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467
F.2d 755
1973.

(1972), public hearings commenced on January 26,

The hearings again generated publicity, much of it

devoted

to

the

testimony of Air

Force

Secretary Robert

Seamans.

Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his

position

in

retaliation

for

congressional

80

testimony,

Seamans testified that he had discussed Fitzgerald's loss
of employment with one or more White House officials . 11
But

the

Secretary

responded

to

declined

several

to

be

more

specific.

questions

by

invoking

He

"executive

85

privilege." 12
At

a

President
Nixon

news
was

took

conference

on

asked

about

Mr.

the

opportunity

January

31,

Seamans'
to

testimony.
assume

responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:

llsee ibid., JA, at 83-84.
12 see id.

1973,

the
Mr.

personal
90

7.

"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would
be fired or discharged or asked to resign.
I
approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been
talking to someone who had discussed the matter
with me. No, this was not a case of some person
down the line deciding he should go.
It was a
decision that was :fJibmi tted to me.
I made it
and I stick by it."

95

100
A day later, however, the White House press office issued
a retraction of the President's statement.
press

spokesman,

the

President

had

confused

with another former executive employee.
President,

ha~

"put

According to a

On behalf of the

the spokesman asserted that Mr.
before

decision

him

the

over

4,000

Fitzgerald

~

Nixon d-i-d not

concerning

105

Mr.

Fitzgerald. "14
After
chief

hearing

examiner

for

the

esc

pages

issued

Fitzgerald case on September , 18,

civil

his

1973.

Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, JA,
held

of

testimony,

the

in

the

decision

Decision on the

at 60.

The Examiner

that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable
service

regulations.

Ibid.,

JA,

at

86-87.

The

13 JA, at 185.
14 JA, at 196 (transcription of statement of White
House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973).
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Examiner

based

this

conclusion

on

a

finding

that

the

Departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his

115

job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure,
was

in

fact

respondent.

motivated
Id.

reduction

in

by

"reasons

purely

personal

to"

As this was an impermissible basis for a
force, 15

the

Examiner

recommended

Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job
of

comparable

explicitly

authority.

distinguished

this

The

Examiner,

narrow

conclusion

120

however,
from

a

suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation
for

testimony

his

Commission,

to

Congress.

As

found

by

the

"the evidence in the record does not support

[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished
and

that

he

was

separated

in

retaliation

for

his

15 The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was
dismissed because of his superiors' dissatisfaction with
his job performance.
CSC Decision, JA, at 86-87.
Their
attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a
'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team. '"
Ibid. ,
JA, at 83. Without deciding whether this would have been
an
adequate
basis
for
an
"adverse
action"
against
Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,"
ibid., at 68, the Examiner held that the CSC's adverse
act1on procedures, current version codified at 5 C.F.R. §
752,
implicitly forbade
the Air Force to employ a
"reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent
for reasons "personal to" him.
Ibid., JA, at 87. As the
Air Force had used this forbidden means of securing
Fitzgerald's separation from the service, he was found
entitled to reinstatement.
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1'

having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before
the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968."

Ibid., at

81.

130
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed

a suit for damages in the district court.
essentially the

same claims

defendants

he

named

eight

Department,

White House

aide

In it he raised

presented to the

csc. 16

officials

of

the

Alexander

Butterfield,

As

Defense
and

135

"one or More" unnamed "White House Aides" styled only as
"John Does."
The

District

Court

dismissed

the

action

under

the

District of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations,
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and
the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant,
White

House

aide

Alexander

Seamans,

553 F.2d 220

reasoned

that Fitzgerald had

Butterfield,

(CADC 1977).

Fitzgerald

v.

The Court of Appeals

no reason to suspect White

16 The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to
deprive him of his
job and
sully his
reputation.
Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued
through the esc hearings and remained in existence at the
initiation of the lawsuit.
See Fitzgerald v. Seamans,
supra, 384 F. Supp., at 690-691.
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House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973.
that year,
notably

reasonable ~r

in

which

145

suspicion had arisen, most

through publication of

memorandum

In

the

Butterfield

internal White House
had

recommended

that

Fitzgerald at least should be made to "bleed for a while"
before
553

being offered another

F.2d,

illegal
the

at

225,

229.

activity would

Court

of

in

Holding

toll

Appeals

job

the

the Administration.
that

concealment

statute of

remanded

the

150

of

limitations,

action

against

Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following

the

remand

and

discovery

extensive

155

thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in
the

District

amended
first

Court

on

July

complaint--more

complained

Commission--that

of

his

than

Nixon as a party defendant. 17

Th

1978.

eight

discharge

Fitzgerald

---r--~
17

5,

first

It

years
to

the

named

was

in

this

after

he

Civil

Service

the

had

petitioner

Also included as defendants

general allegations of the complaint remained
In averring Nixon's participation in
the alleged conspiracy against him, the complaint quoted
petitioner's press conference statement that he was
"totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's
dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6.

~unchanged.
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were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of
the
By

Nixon
March

administration.
1980,

petitioner
Harlow

only

Richard

Additional

three

Nixon

discovery

defendants

and

White

and Alexander Butterfield.

ensued.

remained:

House

aides

the
Bryce

Denying a motion

165

for

summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action
must proceed to trial.

Its order of March 26 held that

Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under
two

federal

statutes

Constitution. 18

and

the

First

Amendment

to

~

the

170

The Court also ruled that petitioner was

not entitled to claim absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner

took a collateral appeal of the immunity

18 see Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at la-2a.
The District Court held that respondent was entitled to
"infer" a cause of action under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 (Supp. III
1979) and 18 u.s.c. § 1505.
Neither expressly confers a
private right to sue for relief in damages.
The first, 5
U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides generally that
"The right of employees ... to •.• provide information to
either House of Congress, or a committee or a Member
thereof shall not be interfered with or denied."
The
second, 18 u.s.c. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it
a
crime
to
obstruct
congressional
testimony.
The
correctness of the decision that a cause of action could
be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before
us.
s explained infra, this case is here under the
"colla eral order" doctrine, for review of the District
Court 1 s denial of petitioner 1 s motion to dismiss on the
ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit.
The Di trict Court also held that respondent had stated a
claim nder the common law of the District of Columbia
espondent subsequently abandoned his common law claim?
owever
and we are not presented with any issue of (
mmunity~ nder the co~mon law of District of Columbia • . _,J

:;;~
~

b...._r

~ nJ~r~i~~~~
,y~
·f!J!J.

~

p~

~~~

0

~

t' ~
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decision

to

Columbia

the

Court

Circuit.

summarily.

of

The

Appeals
Court

for

of

the

District

Appeals

of

dismissed

175

It apparently did so on the ground that its

recent decision

in Halper in v.

Kissinger,

606 F. 2d 1192

u.s.

(CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided vote,

____ (1981), had decisively rejected this claimed immunity
defense and that the appeal therefore failed to present a

180

substantial question under the law of the Circuit.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity
available to a President of the United States, we granted
certiori

to decide

this

important

----u.s.

issue.

185

(1981).

II
Before
consider

two

opposition
argued

addressing

that

the merits of this case, we must

challenges

to

the

the

E""'fA"~' r;,.,~

our

jurisdiction.

petition

for

certiorari,

~lot,. t

+h.....

f-t i1 h o ~., .,-s,

ct~,· d·•'t.) ""'J

this Court. 19

his

respondent

190

tJt llf

Co""-<t

~ I~

l-,C\o( ~

f f'-4' "'-I

~r J-,rt_

..fn the absence crt-a fin-al -j-udqme ~

i..., ~ r/o t.r••d-o 7

contended that there was no "case1_ ~

0

In

District Court had not yet entered any

~ ...t

appealable..,. order.

r;A,·~"""", ss. ~J

to

h.e_

C•

c.

ripe

L I ~I

~~t;;:;~=~~~~bi.

We also must consider an argument that an

Footnote(s) 19 will appear on following pages.

-
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agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.
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A

Petitioner

I

I

under

invokes

28 U.S. C.

authority to

§

the
for

a

jurisdiction
statute

review~s~he

·~~===~)')~...,.=·....-~J

appeal

1254,

the

.) s C)"'~ ~t

that

Court

invests us with

~~

~ ...... ., ,._ k d~Je."'" to rr ~
dismissed pe'oiH:r:-C: Y~ ~

~ P· shltio-

lack

this

Court of Appeals. 20

' ( ~· ~.,..;

Court of Appeals

of

of

tJ-f

Ct>wrfl
.-<t
Emphasizing
~~

'1

~

the ~

~

~

e Court of Appeals' decision,
~
AL Y
' +- lo n• .... ~ ~

.......,,......

thi' s

'

,., .I

4-z:?l-

,,.

~,

~.

~~~~""a. ~~ill;~

caset\~

never/( in" the

~
II

Court

of

Appeals

juris

within

rev ew

This

the

meaning

of

§

1254.

As

a

...._.....,~.~. . ..,.~-..p;_;__::t::~;_~

the

• +-.....i.......

ac..,... ~on

is without merit.

of

~~~
iue

ol..ts. ~ e>

19 see Brief for Respondent in Opposition, at 2.
Although respondent has not repeated this argument in his
brief on the merits, the challenge was jurisdictional. As
jurisdictional questions cannot be waived by the parties,
we think it appropriate to discuss the issue raised at
that stage of the litigation.
20 The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the
petition of any party to any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or
decree ••.•
28

u.s.c.

§

1254.

,~

14.

Under

the

"collateral

order"

Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
small

class

of

interlocutory

doctrine
337 U.S.

orders

appealable to the courts of appeals.

of

Cohen v.

541

(1949), a

are

immediately

210

This class embraces

orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question,
resolve

an

important

issue completely separate

merits of the action, and
on

appeal

Livesay,

u.s.,

from
437

a

u.s.

final
463,

at 546-547.

[are]

the

effectively unreviewable

judgment."
464

from

(1978);

Cooper

&

Lybrand v.

215

see Cohen, supra, 337

At least twice before this Court has

held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are
appealable under these criteria.
442 U.S.

500

(1979)

v.

See Helstoski

(claim of immunity under

Meanor,

the Speech

220

and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651
(1977)

(claim of

Because

the

immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause).

denial

of

petitioner's

claim

of

immunity

represented a collateral order appealable under the Cohen
doctrine,

this case was "in" the Court of Appeals within

the meaning of the statute and is currently ripe for our
review. 21

Footnote(s) 21 will appear on following pages.
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B

Shortly after
ceriorari

in

petitioner had filed his petition for

this

respondent

had

entered

his

230

opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate
damages. 22
respondent

Under its terms, the petitioner Nixon paid the

of

Fitzgerald

consideration,

Fitzgerald

agreed

to

$142,000.
accept

In

liquidated

damages in the sum of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court

that

petitioner

immunity.

In case of a decision upholding petitioner's

235

was not entitled to absolute

.
.
.
1mmun1ty
c 1a1m,
no f urt h er payments wou

ld k~.
~.

The limited agreement between the parties left both
petitioner

and

respondent

with

a

considerable

financial

2 1There can be no serious doubt concerning our power
to review a court of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction--a power we have exercised routinely.
See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437
U.S. 478
(1978).
If we lacked authority to do so,
decisions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction would be
insulated entirely from review by this Court.
22 Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the
Clerk of this Court on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to
his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of Morton, Ina, David,
Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other Relief.
On June 10, 1980--pr ior to the Court's action on the
petition for certiorari, counsel to the parties had
advised the Court that their clients had reached an
agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy.
Counsel did not include a copy of the
agreement in their initial submission.
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stake in the resolution of the question presented in this
Court.

As

similar

contract,

pursuit

of monetary

and

we

concrete,

having

adverse

recently concluded
"Given

legal

case

respondents'

relief,

touching

in a

this case

the

legal

interests.'"

involving

continued
remains

relations

a

active

'definite

of

parties

Havens Realty Co.

245

v.

Coleman, draft op., at 6, quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

u.s.

Haworth, 300

227, 240-241 (1937).
III

This

Court

consistently

has

recognized

that

250

government officials are entitled to some form of immunity
from suits for civil damages.

u.s.

483

(1896),

the

Court

In Spalding v. Vilas, 161
considered

the

immunity

available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages
based upon his official acts.
cases

at

common

law,

the

Relying heavily on English

Court

concluded

that

255

"[t]he

interests of the people," id., at 498, required a grant of
absolute immunity to public officers.
immunity,

the

hesitate

to

"injuriously

Court

reasoned,

exercise
affect[ing]

their
the

In the absence of

executive

officials would

discretion
claims

of

in

a

way

particular

260

17.

individuals,"

id., at 499, even when the public interest

required bold and unhesitating action.
"public

policy

and

convenience"

judicial recognition of

Considerations of

therefore

compelled

a

immunity from suits arising from

265

official acts.
"In exerc1s1ng the functions of his office, the
head of an Executive Department, keeping within
the limits of his authority, should not be under
an apprehension that the motives that control
his official conduct may, at any time, become
the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages.
It would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs
as entrusted to the executive branch of the
government, if he were subject to any such
restraint."

270

275

Id., at 498.
Decisions
defense
law.
the

of

subsequent

immunity

to

to

Spalding

actions

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
passage

of

r

u.s.c.

42

VV1 W\

&.t "' ,

§

have

besides

u.s.

1983

those

at

decision

in

not

abrogated

affirmed

absolute

immunity

the

f..y

Pierson

similarly

280

common

common-law !H!'ivix-f!)e accorded to state legislators.
the

the

(1951), held that

367

had

extended

the

v.

Ray,

extension

386

u.s.

under

§

547
1983

And

(1967)'

of

285

the

~o.~+e.Df
historically

~to

judges.

Pierson also held that police officers possess a qualified
immunity

protecting

them

from

suit

cts are performed in "good faith."

when

their

Id., at 556.

official
290

~,--y,.._c_ ~r ~ 7
~1-fT
~(V..

,4

/}u.lt_ . .

k

u.s.

In

232

18.

(1974), the Court

considered the immunity properly afforded state executive

d

officials

in

I

a

of

suit

rights.

In

alleging
that

the

case

violation

we

rejected

of
the

claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine

Spalding

officials

1983

§

constitutional
officials'

/;

v.

Vilas,

possessed

holding

only

a

"good

that

state

faith"

295

executive

immunity

from

suits alleging constitutional violations.
The approach adopted

in Scheuer and subsequent cases

arguably narrowed the "official acts" doctrine recognized
in Spalding v.
Scheuer
defenses.

To

qualified
varied

functions

a

most

two-tiered
executive

immunity.

in

-t

As consrued by subsequent cases,

Vilas.

mandated

For

proportion
and

the

300

them

to

range

the
of

division

officers
the

decisions

immunity

Scheuer

scope

nature

of

of

of

the

their
that

accorded
defense
official

305

conceivably

might be taken in "good faith": "[S]ince the options which
a

chief

executive

consider are

J

far

and

broader

his
and

principal

subordinates

far more subtle

must

than those
~

made by officials with less responsibility,
discf retion must be comparably broad."

the rf..._nge of

This "functional"

310

19.

approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the
especially sensitive functions of a few officials--notably
judges and prosecutors--required the continued recognition
of absolute immunity.

u.s.

409

immunity

(1976)
with

See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

(state

respect

prosecutions)~

Stump

prosecutors

to
v.

the

possess

initiation

Sparkman,

and

u.s.

435

315

absolute

pursuit of
349

(1978)

(state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial
acts) .

320

In Butz v. Economou,
considered

for

the

438

first

u.s.

time

478
the

(1978), the Court
kind

of

immunity

possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for
constitutional violations.
argument,
charged

In Butz, the Court rejected an

based on decisions
with

officials

common

should

law

be

involving federal officials

torts,

accorded

constitutional damage actions.

that

all

absolute

high

325

federal

immunity

from

Concluding that a blanket

grant of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive
officials,
the

438

u.s.'

protection

-

at 504,

provided

and

"would seriously erode

by

basic

constitutional

330

20.

guarantees,"

id.,

at

immunity questions

508,

we

extended

that we had applied

state officials

in cases

under

§

reaffirmed

holdings

that

some

judges

our

and

requir [ing]
508.

In

prosecutors,
a

Butz

the

full

itself

we

In so doing we

officials,

liability."

accorded

absolute

notably

Id.,

at

immunity

to

administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to
those of judges and prosecutors.
the

~

;:;.::::~ ~~er

Id.

federal

335

functions

"special

from

to

in suits against

198 3.

have

exemption

approach

340

We also left open

~ show

officials

~

jd. a_f-

that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope."

-

-

This case now presents the claim that pnhlic;: pol ipy

~~~abs~11 te i~the

re<jYi«••

President of the united

345

State~ ~~~~

~ ~ ~ d4~4..Ctlt.~~~
IV

In addressing claims of entitlement to immunity, this
Court

has

defense
has

1

that

"the

law

of

privilege

as

a

to damage actions against officers of Government

in

large

Economou,
Matteo,

recognized

part

supra,

360

u.s.

been of

438
564,

u.s.,
569

j ud ic ial making.
at

501-502,

(1959);

1

"

quoting

Doe v.

But z v.
Barr

McMillan,

v.
412

350

21.

u.s.

306,

318

(1973).

This

is

not

to

say

that

our

decisions have not been rooted in federal statutes or the
Constitution.
involved

Our

eneFei~es

cases

under

1983

§

formally

ttYs tatutory construction.

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341

u.s.

367 (1951).

355

have

See, e.g. ,

Other decisions

-r~s~

have

Foote ~ ither

beeR

~nstitution. ,

-

506

(1969)

Speech

the

literal

text

e.g., Powell v. McCormack,

(recognizing

and

~n

Debate

immunity

Clause),

of

u.s.

395

Congressmen

On

or

the

of

486,

360

under
of

inferences

constitutional purpose drawn from constitutional language
and structure, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 606, 418
(extending

(1972)

congressional

aide,

congressional

immunity

in

"implement

order

to

fundamental purpose" of the Speech and Debate
Butz

v.

Economou,

Nonetheless,

at

least

supra,
in

the

438

u.s. ,

absence

of

to

a

[the]

Clause)~

at

cf.

508-517.

4f2~f
~

A.

guidance

from the Congress, in deciding immunity questions we have
followed

365

in the tradition of common law courts by freely

weighing considerations of public policy. 23

As a second

23 Four basic rationales support immunity for public
officials.
First, the prospect of damages liability may
Footnote continued on next page.
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element of our

immunity

the

the

scope

of

inquiries we also have examined

immunity

historically

particular officials at common law.
supra, 438

u.s.,

afforded

to

See Butz v. Economou,

at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

u.s.

375

409,

421 (1976).
In the case of the President the . _ historical and
policy inquiries tend to converge.
did not exist through most of

Because the presidency

the development of commC?n

law, any historical analysis must draw its
our

380

evide~

Ro~ loo
~o\ottf-'J
4 ~~~
2
4
constitutional A heritage •
( "l'he r e lev ant pi s ~e •Y <!'

dc..u..

1

render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their
public responsibilities.
See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.
2 d 5 7 9 , 5 81 (CA 2 19 4 9 ) , c e r t • denied , 3 3 9 U . S • 9 4 9 (19 50 ) .
Second, competent and responsible individuals may be
deterred from entering public service in the first place.
Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties
by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. Finally, as this
case illustrates, there is a danger of unfairness when
officials face personal liability for decisions made in
areas of legal uncertainty that are reviewed by courts
years
later,
under
evolving
legal
standards.
See
generally
Freed,
Executive
Official
Immunity
for
Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72
Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977).
24
,j
d'fitd>..
~~
Although there ha~ ' been some
over this
issue,
it generally
is agreed
that
igh executive
officials enjoyed absolute immunity at common law.
See,
e.g., Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55
Mich. L. Rev. 201, 202 (1959) ; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1210
n.l21 (1977); but cf. A. Dicey, Introduction to the Study
of the Law of the Constitution 193 (lOth ed. 1959) {prime
Minister of Great Britain historically liable for official
misconduct); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for
Positive Government Wrongs, 44 u. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 14-21,
52 (1972) (executives in 19th century America subject to
"draconian" liability, but this was a departure from the
traditional common law rule).

~~v ~ ~~~~~~:z.
~~~~~
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of powers among the branches of
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policy.

J The
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re~~isie ~

importance

of

inquiry

,..._..t;.-3 ~

individual

rights also identifies a powerful policy concern in suits
arising

under

the

Constitution

and

laws of

the United

~,.,..,., <t'" /-./

But we consistently have held

that JJg~e·~

of . . . . , ""'e,ho., .. f

policy justify the immunity of some officials even from
suits of

390

~-~~ kind.

In

this

case

a

former

President

~55 f! t .S

immunity

from civil damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as
. a d'1rect act1on
.
.
, ---; an d
a d e f en d ant 1n
un d er t h e Const1tut1on
two

statutory

applicability
legislative

actions

under

federal

laws

of

general

In neither case has Congress taken express

action

to

subject

the

President

to

civil

*

liability for his official acts.
Applying

the principles of our cases to claims of

this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President
of

395

the United States,

is entitled to absolute

immunity

from damages liability predicated on his acts in office.
We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident

I

24.

/

(

of

the

President's

doctrine

of

the

position, 25

unique

separation

of

rooted

in

the

justified

by

entitled only

to

relies on cases

in

powers

and

405

considerations of public policy.

v
A

In

arguing

qualified

that

the

President

immunity, 26

the

respondent

is

which we have granted immunity of this scope to governors
and

cabinet

inapposite.

officers.27

we

find

these

cases

to

be

Article II of the Constitution provides that

25 Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States,§ 1563, at 418-419 (1833 ed.):
"There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to
the executive department, which are necessarily
implied from the nature of the functions, which
are
confided
to
it.
Among
these,
must
necessarily be included the power to perform
them • • • • The president cannot, therefore, be
liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention,
while he is in the discharge of the duties of
his office~ and for this purpose his person must
be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess
an official inviolability."
26 under the "good faith" standard, an official will
be held immune from damages liability unless "he knew or
reasonably should have know that the action he took within
his
sphere
of
official
responsibility"
was
unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury .... " wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 322
(1975).
27 E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

478

(1978)

~

410

25.

"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United

States .•.. "

This

grant of

authority

establishes

415

the President as the chief constitutional officer of the
Executive

branch. 28

distinguishes
Further,

the

him

The
from

President's
other

President's

executive

supervisory

responsibilities encompass areas of
authority.
it

is

the

"take care

unique

status

officials.
and

policy

utmost discretionary

420

These include the administration of justice-President who
that

the

is

charged

constitutionally

laws be faithfully executed" ; 29

to
the

~~~

\/

28 Noting
that
the
"Speech
Debate
Clause"
provides a textual basis for co gressional immunity,
respondent argues that the Framers
st be assumed to have
rejected
any
the
propriety
of
Executive
immunity.
Petitione , on the other hand, offe s historical arguments
that
the
Framers
affirmatively
assumed
presidential
immunity to have been established by the adoption of the
constitutional scheme.
Althoug
we need not embrace
petitioner's argument in order t
decide this case, we do
~~
reject respondent's sugsQetioR that the constitutional~~
text S'?!(ehow prohibit;( a judicia recognition of absolute
it?muni ty;...a S""-± ~et ~e--. abc..e~ ef;: a c=~~~ ~~Ag~=~:io~a.l -....
~~ :::::::: ~ contr~:::-,~ orde L ~ ~:r=~~e!at1on -

'- ;:;f::>:;i£e:eti% ~~;;;__ ~&~ th;~e-tT~~;~;iOf\ar O.aeF~

_5?
'

~ There

are two difficulties with respondent's argument.
First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a
prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision
expressly confers judicial immunity.
Yet the immunity of
judges is well settled. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13
_wa-il{J5 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra.
Second, this
Cour
has established that 1\ irnrnuni ty may be extended to ~
cert in officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v.
Economou, supra, 438 u.s., at 511-512; see Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra,
(extending immunity to prosecutorial
officials within the Executive branch).
29 u.s. Canst., Art II, § 3.

.

26.

conduct of foreign affairs--a realm in which the Court has
recognized

that

"It

without

relevant

nullify

actions

would

be

information,
of

the

intolerable
should

Executive

that

courts,

review and

perhaps

taken

on

425

information

properly held secret"; 30 and management of the personnel
of

the

Executive

branch--a

task

for

which

"imperative

reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President]

430

to remove the most important of his subordinates in their
most important duties." 31
B

In

deference

constitutional

to

mandate,

exercised their

the
the

President's

courts

singular

traditionally

jurisdiction over him with

~

have

caution

~
This Court has never held that courts may

and restraint.

1\
compel

the

functions. 32

President

to

By contrast,

perform

even

ministerial

injunctions compelling action

30 chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.
Steamship Corp., 333 u.s. 103, 111 (1948).

v.

31Myers
(1926).

52,

v.

United

States,

272

u.s.

Waterman
134-135

32 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by
the Court, there have been strong statements in previous
opinions asserting the immunity of the President from
judicial orders.
In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 u.s. 475,
501 (1866), the Court stated:
"we are fully satisfied
Footnote continued on next page.
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27.

by other

.... _~~ ,.
wv·-

~

~

w-

tA.~~

r":-

9 ·tl:~.;,../
~Y.

l

~

~
~

long

have

been

upheld. 33

A similar

that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enJOin
the President in the performance of his official duties;
and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (18 38) , it is
stated:
"The executive power is vested in a President;
and as far as his powers are derived from the consitution,
he is beyond the reach of any other department, e~ cept in
the mode prescribed by the constitution through the
impeaching power.") .
m
u .
,
. 2d 587, 616 (1974) (concluding tha
court possesses .the "authority to mandamus the. Presiden
o perform the ministerial duty" of effectuating a pay
aise).
.
ven in United States v. Nixon, the court held that
Presidential conversations and correspondence enjoy a
"presumptive privilege" that is "inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers."
418 u.s., at 708.
we
suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when
matters of diplomacy or national security are involved.
Id., at 706, 710-711.
Strong
historical
considerations
support
the

r ..~r~ ~~=~~~!~~~1 j:tdict~~l ~:;~ct~~c\h~o :;~~tin c~~~!~~s~y vi~:

;v-: -,

J
v1

officials

J./ ,H

tA

President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from
were reported as stating that "the President,
personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could
have no action, whatever, brought against him; and above
the power of all judge, justices, etc." since otherwise a
court could "stop the whole machinery of government."
2
W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the
United States 152
(Harris ed. 1880).
Justice Story
offered a similar argument somewhat later See 3 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Staets §
1563, at 418-519 (1st ed. 1833).
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the
President not to be subject to judicial process.
When
Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 25
Fed. Cas. 30 (1807) , that a subpoena duces tecum can be
issued to a President, Jefferson protested srongly, and
stated his broader view of the proper relationship between
the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the
independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary
of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the
judiciary.
But would the executive be independent of the
judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the
latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him
constantly trudging from north to south & east to west,
and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties?
The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should
be independent of the others, is further manifested by the
means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from
enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 33 will appear on following pages.
Connecticut~
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.l~

•

28 •

I

distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court to
cases

in

which

various

evidentiary privilege.

officials

have

claimed

an

The courts generally have looked

to the common law to determine the scope of an official's
privilege. 34

In

~~ ims

by

President,

the

445

however, we have recognized that presidential immunity is
"rooted

in

the

Constitution."

separation

of

powers

under

the

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708

(1974).

~~
The separation of powers of course does not bar every
1\
exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United
States.
States

See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United
v.

Burr,

25

Fed.

Youngstown

Sheet

& Tube

Cases
Co.

v.

191,

196

Sawyer,

(1807);
343

u.s.

cf.
579

than to the executive." 10 The works of Thomas Jefferson
404n.
(P.
Ford ed.
1905)
(quoting
a letter from
President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial)
(emphasis in the original).
See also 5 D. Malone,
Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320-325
(1974).

J

,./

33 see Youn1stwon Sheet & Tile Co. v. Sawyer, 343
u.s. 579 (1952
(injunction directed to Secretary of
Commerce) ' Kendall v. United States, supra (mandamus to
enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
3 4 see united States v. Reynolds, 345 u.s. 1, 6-7
(1952)
(Secretary of Defense); carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 323-324 (D.D.C.
1966) ' aff I a 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC) ' cert denied' 389 u.s.
952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).

450

29.

(1952). 35

But

exercising

jurisdiction, must

it

does

mandate

that

balance

a

court,

before

455

the constitutional

weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of
intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch. 36

In cases in which judicial action is needed to

serve broad public interests--as when the court acts, not

......

~ 460

in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain
their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, supra--the exercise of jurisdiction has been held
warranted.
damages

In

the

case

of

a

merely

private

suit

for

based on a President's official acts, 37 we hold

465

35 Although the President was not a party, the Court
enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct
presidential order. See 343 u.s., at 583.
36 see Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433
U.S. 425, 433 (1977): United States v. Nixon, 418 u.s. 683
(1974).
37 Even in the case of officials possessing absolute
immunity, this Court sometimes has held that this immunity
extends
only
to
acts
in performance of
particular
functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S., at 508517: cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S., at 430-431.
In the case of the President, however, powerful prudential
reasons counsel our rejection of this selective approach.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States
~ the President has discretionary respousibilities in a
~~u.RiEJt~e VtH'"". i:-et}
ef sensitjue arQas.
His constitutional
~
~
mandate 5'tlns- ~/\ civil and criminal litigation policy, ~
national security, and organization and assignment of
~
Executive personnel.
In many cases it would be difficult:
~ vf
to determine which presidential "function" encompassed a
~
particular
action.
Thus,
in
order
to
administer
functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges
frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for
~~
which acts were taken.
Inquiries of this kind would be
~ · .
Footnote continued on next page.
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~ it is not. 38

c~
~e•~~}as intrusive

as inquiries into the possible malice
of the President under a standard of qualified immunity.
In determining the proper scope of an absolute
privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines
finer than concerns of policy would support.
See, e.g.,
Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 u.s., at 498 (privilege
extends
to
all
matters
"committed
by
law
to
[an
official's] superv1s1on or control"); Barr v. Matteo,
supra, 360 u.s., at 575 (fact "that the action taken here
was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of
duty is enough to render the privilege applicable •.•• ");
Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 u.s., at 363 & n. 12
(judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside
"the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"). In view
of the special nature of the President's constitutional
office, we think it appropriate to extend to him absolute
immunity from damage actions based on acts with in the
"outer perimeter" ot~ area o7A official responsibility.
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon
would have acted outside the perimeter of his duties by
ordering the discharge of respondent Fitzgerald, who was
lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 u.s.c. §
7512 (a).
Because Congress has granted this legislative
protection, petitioner argues, no federal official could,
within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed
without
satisfying
this
standard
of
proof.
This
construction of the President's authority would subject
him to trial on every allegation of tortious illegality
and thereby deprive absolute immunity o,f its intended
effect. It clearly is within the Presidentr's to "prescribe" ~~
the manner in which the Secretary wil h "conduct the
business" of the Air Force. 10 u.s.c. § 8012(b). Because
this
grant
includes
the
authority
to
prescribe
reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's
alleged wrongful acts layA( within the outer perimeter of
his authority.
.
"--- ~
38 It \ne~
imposed a ~ ~~~t~9Te
have been violated.
Gregoire v. Biddle,
denied, 339 u.s. 949

been denied that absolute immunity,('~
cost on the individuals whose rights
As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
177 F. 2d 5 79, 581 (CA2 1949) , cer t
(1950):

"It does indeed go without saying that an
oficial, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
any personal motive not connected with the
public good, should not escape liability for the
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were
possible in practice to confine such complaints
to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny
recovery.
The justification for
[denying
recovery] is that it is impossible to know
Footnote continued on next page.
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even

an

pnwanted
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hesitancy

personnel,
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to

remove

-

enforc~ the

ws against groups or individuals prone to litigation, or

pursue efficiencies disadvantageous to those benefited
prevailing

poliq:i:e~. 3f

Exposure of

~

the President to

whether the claim is well founded until the case
has been tried, and to submit all officials, the
innoncent as well as the guilty, to the burden
of trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute •..• As is so often the case, the
answer must be found in a balance between the
evils inevitable in either alternative."
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has
found that there is a lesser public interest in actions
for
civil
damages
than,
for
example,
in
criminal
prosecutions, United States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct. 1185,
1193 (1980); see United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S.,
at 711-712 and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance
of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil
actions as raising different questions not presented for
decision).
~ ~
39

~h/argument

lawsuit~

that
frivolous
can be
has only limited force.~) Lawsuits)
'nvolving- a qual-ified-immunity sta1)"'Ct~r!"d enercrr1y require
ourts to inquire in~ the mot±v~ of the defendants, anq / '
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action ~ valse

decisionmaking .at

the

branch.

Anticipating

advisers

naturally

could

distort

highest

levels

lawsuits,

the

would

~

~

an

'1

the
of

process
the

executive

President
incentive

of

and
to
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his

devote

scarce energy, not to performance of their public duties,
but to compilation of a record insulating the President
against subsequent liability.
VI

such matters are difficult to resolve short of prolonged
discovery or trial.
This case itself has been in the
courts since 1974.
As Judge Gesell stated in his
concurring opinion in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra:
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that
with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction
and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing
suits
seeking
damage
awards
against
high
government
officials
in
their
personal
capacities
based
on
alleged
constitutional
torts. Each such suit almost invariably results
in these officials and their colleagues being
subjected
to
extensive
discovery
into
traditionally
protected
areas....
Such
discovery is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and
not without considerable cost to the officials
involved.
It is not difficult for ingenious
plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue
of fact on some element of the immunity defense
where subtle questions of constitutional law and
a
decision
maker's
mental
processes
are
involved... . In short, if these standards are
those to be followed in these cases, trial
judges will almost automatically have to send
such cases to full trials on the merits. 11 606
F.2d, at 1214.
These dangers are significant even though there is no
historical record of numerous suits against the President,
since a right to sue federal officials for damages for
constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388
(1971).
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33.

A rule of absolute
not

leave

the

misconduct on

Nation

immunity for
without

the President will

sufficient

remedies

the part of the chief executive. 40

for
There

remains first the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 41

490

In addition, Presidents may be prosecuted criminally, at
least

after

informal

they

checks

on

leave

office.

Moreover,

Presidential misconduct

there
that

do not

apply with equal force to other executive officials.
President
and

by

is

the

subjected
press.

are

The

to constant scrutiny by Congress

Their

vigilance

may

serve

495

to deter

Presidential misconduct, as well as to make credible the
threat

of

impeachment.

Other

incentives

to

avoid

misconduct may include a desire to earn re-election, the
need

to maintain prestige as an element of presidential

influence, and a President's traditional concern for his

40 The presence of alternative remedies has played an
important role in our previous decisions in the area of
official immunity.
E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at
428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors
from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish tha
which occurs.")
41 The same remedy plays a central role with respect
to the misconduct of federal judges, who also possess
absolute
immunity.
See
Kaufman,
Chilling
Judicial
Independence,
88
Yale
L.J.
681,
690-706
(1979)/
Congressman may be removed from office by a vote of their
colleagues. u.s. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.

500

'

...

34.

historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents
clearly establishes that absolute immunity will not place
the President "above the law."

For the President, as for

505

judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes

~f~~~
k, remedy

a particular

~~

for 1\ misconduct

in order

to advance

compelling public ends.
VII
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded
for action consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.
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NIXONl SALLY-POW
Note to Dick:

In addition to adding "in his official

capacity" in the third line of our opinion, consider a
footnote keyed to the end of the first paragraph on page
1:

We consider only the scope of a President's
immunity in a civil suit seeking to impose a damages
liability for an official act claimed to have violated the
statutory or constitutional rights of a person.

We are

not concerned, as one might infer from language in the
dissenting opinion, with violation of criminal laws by a
President or with tortuous conduct not within the scope of
a President's authority.

lfp/ss 05/15/82

Rider A, p.

(Nixon)

NIXONB SALLY-POW
The dissent argues that the "scope of immunity
is determined by function, not office".
seq.

Ante, at 19, et

The distinction between "function" and "office" can

be relevant - indeed controlling in many situations.

We

long have recognized, however, that the distinction does
not exist where certain officers act within the scope of
their authority.

For example, the "office" all that is

required for a judicial officer to be protected by
absolute immunity when he performs a judicial act.

He is

immune without regard to whether he "knows his conduct
violates a statute or tramples on the constitutional
rights of those who are injured." (see dissenting opinion,
at 1).

u.s.

Writing for the Court in Stumpf v. Sparkman, 435

349, 355, 356, Justice White quoted with approval the

often cited language from Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,
351 (1872) that judges "are not liable to civil actions
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess
of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done
maliciously or corruptly".

Similarly, the absolute

2.

immunity of a prosecuting attorney is not forfeited even
when he institutes a prosecution for political purposes,
and the result is imprisonment of an innocent person.
(Cite Imbler)

Again, a member of Congress, who by virtue

of his office introduces legislation for the purpose of
destroying the reputation of a private citizen, retains
absolute immunity.

A President, vested by the

Constitution with "the executive power" of the United
States, likewise should be absolutely immune from civil
danage liability for executive action taken within the
scope of his authority.

Th. i.s
(' ~ vi 5 ,· 0

f'he

~vto.. ly 1-t'c~ I
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l~st

...,

0 ("0\..f+ Yf 1
In

a

consistent

line of

decisions,

this

Court

has

recognized that when governmental officials are sued for
damages arising from alleged violations of constitutional
rights,
order

they

are

to shield

entitled

to

some

them from undue

form of

u.s.

341

367

{1951},

in

interference with their

duties and excessive exposure to liability.
Brandhove,

immunity

In Tenney v.

the Court held that the

passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had not abrogated the commonlaw

privilege

within their
v.

Ray,

suit

u.s.

547

a

state

against

common

law
held

to

state

legislative roles.

386

validity of

also

accorded

{1967},

for
that

acts

acts

The decision in Pierson

the

continued

immunity accorded to

judges at

within

police

for

involving a constitutional

judge,

the absolute

legislators

the

recognized

judicial

officers

role.

possess

a

qualified

them from suits when

their official

acts

in

at

performed

qualified

immunity

good

was

faith.

Id.,

extended

to

officals in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

u.s.

state

1

Pierson

immunity protecting
are

1

556.

This

executive

232 {1974}, where

2

2.

we held that the immunity varied in scope, "the variation
being

dependent

upon

the

scope

of

discretion

and

responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on

25

which liability is sought to be based," id., at 237.
The

functional

differing

approach

adopted

in

results when the Court held

officials

possess

Strickland,

only

u.s.

420

qualified

308

(1975),

Scheuer

to

that school-board

immunity,
but

led

state

wood

v.

prosecutors

30

possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation
and pursuit of prosecutions, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
409

(1976) •

(1975)

See also 0' Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563

(qualified

superintendent);

immunity);

held

accorded
v.

to

Navarette,

administrators

state
434

accorded

hospital

u.s.

555

35

qualified

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,

u.s.
involving

immunity
Procunier

(prison

(1978)

u.s.

(1980)

rules

immune

from

(in

governing
suit

for

suit

for

lawyers,

relief

declaratory
state

supreme

legislative actions,

court

but not

immune from challenges to enforcement activities): Dennis
v. Sparks, __ U.S. __ (1980)

(no immunity accorded to

40

3.

private

parties

who

conspire

with

an

immune

judge

to

Butz

v.

deprive others of civil rights).
This

approach

was

reviewed

in

detail

in

45

Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978), where we considered for the
first

time

the

kind

of

executive officials who,
for

constitutional

immunity

possessed

by

federal

like petitioners here, are sued

violations. 1

In

Butz,

the

Court

rejected an argument, based on several decisions involving

50

federal officials charged with common-law torts, 2 that all
high

federal

officials

should

be

accorded

immunity from constitutional damage suits.
we

concluded

immunity would

that
be

such

a

anomalous

blanket
in

absolute

In so holding,

grant

light of

of

the

absolute
qualified-

immunity standard applied to state officials, 438 U.S., at
504, and "would seriously erode the protection provided by

basic

constitutional

Nevertheless,

we

noted

guarantees."
that

under

id.,
our

at

decisions

505.

some

1 such suits are based, not on § 1983, but on general
federal-question jurisdiction and the remedial powers of
the federal courts.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388 (1971).

2 Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s.
Vilas, 161 u.s. 483 (1896).

564

(1959);

Spalding

v.

55

4.

officials,
functions
Id.,

notably judges and prosecutors, have
requir [ ing]

at 508.

officials

We

may

a

full

exemption

from

"special

liability."

therefore recognized that some federal

show

that

"public

exemption from liability."

policy

requires

an

Id., at 508.

This case now presents the claim that the President
of the United States falls
officials

who

60

should be

65

into the category of federal

accorded absolute

immunity from

damage suits based on constitutional violations.
IV

Our

decision

in

Scheuer,

supra,

discussing

the

70

qualified immunity possessed by state executive officials,
recognized

that

the

extent

of

protection

afforded

an

official may vary with the responsibilities and discretion
of his office.
"range

of

u.s.,

416

decisions

executive official

and

is

at 247.

We explained that the

choices"

"virtually

required

infinite,"

of
yet

a

high

75

such an

official often must act quickly lest "action deferred will
be

futile

or

Id., at 246.

constitute

virtual

abdication

of

office."

In addition, these officials must "rely on

traditional sources for

the factual information on which

80

5.

they decide and act,"

~ay

make

decisions

~biguity,

short,"

ibid., and,
in

an

in times of emergency,

"atmosphere

and swiftly moving events,"

we

concluded,

"since

the

of

confusion,

id., at 247.

options

which

a

"In
chief

executive and his principal subordinates must consider are
far

broader

officials

and

far

with

more

less

subtle

than

responsibility,

discretion must be comparably broad."
decision

applying

qualified

those
the

range

Ibid.

immunity

to

made

by
of

In the Butz
high

federal

executive officials, we noted that, as compared with the
opportunities for
"greater

power

We

did

90

abuses by lower federal employees, the
of

such

officials

affords

potential for a regime of lawless conduct."
506.

85

not,

however,

reject

a
438

Scheuer's

greater

u.s.,

at

perception

that such higher officials will receive greater protection

95

under a good-faith standard because of their broader range
of responsibilities and choices.
applied

the

"governing

Scheuer

to

special

functions

federal

principles,"

officials,
of

Indeed, the Butz opinion

some

and

id.,

at

recognized

officials

require

503,
that

of
the

absolute

immunity,, id., at 508-517. 3

Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.
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6.

When applied to the office of President of the United
States, these principles require due consideration of the
characteristics

~ecisions

of

that

unique

office.

Our

prior

require a protective shield around presidential

105

decision-making that is commensurate with the unequalled
breadth and gravity of the President's duties.
ignore the fact

that he

we cannot

is the official required by the

Constitution to play a major role in nearly all aspects of
the governance of the Nation, and is called upon daily to

110

make critical decisions, some of which implicate the very

I

survival of

I

\

\

the

(

procedural
\

the Nation.

President

instead,

does

avenues,
he

is

In performing

not

work

such

as

entrusted

with

solely
the

these

functions,

thorugh

lawmaking

responsibility

formal
process.
for

the

3 Four basic rationales support immunity for public
officials.
First, the prospect of damages liability may
render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their
public responsibilities.
See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.
2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 u.s. 949 (1950).
Second, competent and responsible individuals may be
deterred from entering public service in the first place.
Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties
by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. Finally, as this
case illustrates, there is a danger of unfairness when
officials face personal liability for decisions made in
areas of legal uncertainty that are reviewed by courts
years
later,
under
evolving
legal
standards.
See
generally
Freed,
Executive
Official
Immunity
for
Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72
Nw . L • Rev • 52 6 , 52 9- 5 3 0 ( 19 7 7 ) •
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7.

*arious informal aspects of governing - with discretion to
act

on

(

result

)

short,

his
that

I

I

when

cannot

the President

"executive"

I

own

functions

the
be

national

legislated

interest
or

is responsible for
which

he

cannot

adjudicated.

a
In

a vast array of
avoid

expose him to countless potential damage suits.
as the natural focal point for

requires

but

which

Moreover,

so many of the perceived

grievances against the Federal Government, he is unlikely
to be overlooked as a potential defendant. 4

4 The
likelihood
that
Presidents
will
face
large
numbers of constitutional damage suits creates a risk that
Presidential
decisionmaking
will
be
interfered
with
unduly.
Presidents may be daunted by their exposure to
huge
damage
recoveries,
including
some
that
are
disproportionate
responses
to
perceived
grievances.
Courts and juries, after all, may tend to judge emergency
executive
decisions
harshly
in the clear
light of
hindsight.
Moreover,
leaving
aside
the
risk
of
substantial judgments, a sitting President may be diverted
from the pressing duties of his office by the requirements
of defending numerous lawsuits - including the answering
of interrogatories and giving of testimony. The argument
that frivolous lawsuits can be handled summarily has only
limited force.
Lawsuits involving a qualified-immunity
standard generally require courts to inquire into the
motives of the defendants, and such matters are difficult
to resolve short of prolonged discovery or trial.
This
case itself has been in the courts since 1973. As Judge
Gesell stated in his concurring opinion below:
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that
with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction
and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing
suits
seeking
damage
awards
against
high
government
officials
in
their
personal
capacities
based
on
alleged
constitutional
torts. Each such suit almost invariably results
in these officials and their colleagues being
subjected
to
extensive
discovery
into
traditionally
protected
areas....
Such
discovery is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and
Footnote continued on next page.

120

8.

v
The

unique

established
immunity
official. 5

by

higher
The

nature
our

of

125

the

presidential

Constitution,

than

that

President

is

requires

of

any

the

head

office,

as

level

of

a

other
of

the

executive
Executive

not without considerable cost to the officials
involved.
It is not difficult for ingenious
plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue
of fact on some element of the immunity defense
where subtle questions of constitutional law and
a
decision
maker's
mental
processes
are
involved.... In short, if these standards are
those to be followed in these cases, trial
judges will almost automatically have to send
such cases to full trials on the merits."
U.S. App. D.C., at ___, 606 F.2d, at 1214.
These dangers are significant even though there is no
historical record of numerous suits against the President,
since a right to sue federal officials for damages for
constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388
~1971).

There are prudential reasons as well for rejecting a
selective
approach
differentiating
among
various
presidential functions.
In many cases, it would be
difficult to determine which area encompassed a particular
action.
In this sense, a President is quite different
from a prosecutor, whose functions fall relatively easily
into
categories
investigation,
initiation
of
a
prosecution, presentation of a case, etc.
Any similar
line-drawing in the area of Presidential action would
necessarily require an inquiry into the purpose of an
action.
Such an inquiry by a court would be nearly as
intrusive as an inquiry into the possible malice of the
President under a qualified-immunity standard. Indeed, it
has been argued that even prosecutors should be given
absolute immunity regardless of the particular function
involved, because of the intrusiveness of an inquiry into
intent.
See Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecutorial
Immunity from § 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 173,
200 {1977).
For similar reasons, I would not adopt a rule
granting absolute immunity only where the President has
acted in order to furtehr the national interest - i.e.,
except where he has acted to further purely personal
interests. Such a rule also would require an inquiry into
motive.
Here, for example, it might require a remand for
a determination whether the wiretap remained a matter of
national security throughout its duration.

9.

Branch in whom are invested all of the powers specified by
Article II of the Constitution. 6

130

As his status, duties,

and responsibilities therefore are qualitatively different
from other officials, it is proper to accord him absolute
immunity

from

damage

suit

liability

for

all

of

his

official acts.
Such
structure
prevailed

135

a

rule

and

is

is

mandated

faithful

since

the

to

by

the

founding

our

constitutional

assumptions
of

the

that

Nation.

have
The

Constitution itself is silent on this question, while it
exempts Members of Congress explicitly under the Speech or
Debate

Clause.

historical

U.S.

reasons

adoption of Art.
of

the

long

England.

See

structure

for

I, - §6.

struggle
e.g.,

169, 177-182 {1966).
exist with

Cons t.
the

Art.

I,

concern

§ 6.

that

there are

prompted

the

The Founding Fathers were aware
for

United

parliamentary
States

v.

privilege

Johnson,

383

in

u.s.

A similar reason for concern did not

respect to the chief of state.
of

But

140

Although

the

the Constitution was carefully designed by

6 U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1 {"The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States.").

145

10.

the

checks

and

balances of

the

separation of powers to

prevent an imperial President, the importance of the role

150

of the chief executive officer of the Nation was clearly
recognized and preserved.

Indeed, the Founders gave the

President, as an individual official, a separate and equal
footing with Congress and this Court as corporate bodies.
The omission of

an

explicit

exemption of

the

President

155

from personal damages suits may be explained by a general
understanding at the time that no explicit exemption was
necessry.
One

reflection

of

the

prevailing

historical

assumption is the general reluctance on the part of the
courts

to

exercise

personally.

power

against

Although the President may,

circumstances,
materials

their

be

subpoenaed

compelled
for

use

by

a

the

President

in some limited

court

to

produce

in a criminal prosecution,

United States v. Nixon, supra, this Court has never held
that courts may compel

160

the President himself to perform

even ministerial executive functions, 7 and statements from

7 Although this issue has not been faced squarely by
the Court, there have been strong statements in previous
Footnote continued on next page.
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the early days of the Republic support such a limitation
on

judicial

power. 8

This

reluctance

to

enjoin

opinions asserting the immunity of the President from
judicial orders.
In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 u.s. 475,
501 (1866), the Court stated:
"we are fully satisfied
that this court has no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties;
and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is
stated:
"The executive power is vested in a President;
and as far as his powers are derived from the consitution,
he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in
the mode prescribed by the constitution through the
impeaching power.").
But see National Treasury Em~loyees
Union v. Nixon,
u.s. App. D.C.
,
, 492 F. d 587,
616
(1974)
(concluding
that a -court possesses
the
"authority to mandamus the President to perform the
ministerial duty" of effectuating a pay raise).
Even in United States v. Nixon, the court held that
Presidential conversations and correspondence enjoy a
"presumptive privilege" that is "inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers."
418 u.s., at 708.
we
suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when
matters of diplomacy or national security are involved.
Id., at 706, 710-711.
8 At the time of the first Congress, Vice President
John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut,
were reported as stating that "the President, personally,
was not subject to any process whatever; could have no
action, whatever, brought against him; and above the power
of all judge, justices, etc." since otherwise a court
could "stop the whole machinery of government."
2 W.
Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the
United States 152
(Harris ed. 1880).
Justice Story
offered a similar argument somewhat later See 3 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Staets §
1563, at 418-519 (1st ed. 1833).
Few
historical
facts
are
clearer
than
Thomas
Jefferson's view that the President was not subject to
judicial process.
When Chief Justice Marshall held in
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a
subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a President,
Jefferson protested srongly, and stated his broader view
of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the
President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the
independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary
of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the
judiciary.
But would the executive be independent of the
judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the
latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him
constantly trudging from north to south & east to west,
and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties?
Footnote continued on next page.
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Presidential

action

contrasts

markedly

with

the
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acceptance of court orders compelling action on the part
of

other

executive

officials.9

A

similar

distinction

between Presidents and their subordinates has been drawn
by

some commentators with

respect to the possibility of

criminal prosecutions while in office. 10
The

threat

of

damages

requirements

of

litigating

could

a

significant

have

performance

in office.
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suits,

such

suits

effect

This fact

along
while

on

a

with

the

in office,
President's

is one of the reasons

for providing such a remedy, as well as one of the major

The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should
be independent of the others, is further manifested by the
means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from
enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means
than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson
404n.
{P. Ford ed. 1905)
{quoting
a letter from
President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial)
{emphasis in the original).
See also 5 D. Malone,
Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 320-325
{1974).
The statements quoted here concerning a President's
amenability to process apply only to sitting Presidents,
and may not accord with present views of jujdicial power,
but they do indicate the historical recognition given to
the President's special constitutional status.
9 see Youngstwon Sheet & Tile Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u.s.
579 {1952) {injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce)'
Kendall v. United States, supra {mandamus to enforce
ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
10 see Bickel,
The Constitutional Tangle,
The New
Republic, October 6, 1973, at 14; P. Kurland, watergate
and The Constitution 135 {1978).
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throughout
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determinative factor.
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of
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It simply is inconsistent with our
Presidents

exposed

to

open-ended

litigation by every disgruntled citizen and to potentially
devastating

liability

in damages,

imposed by order of a

separate branch of government.
A rule of absolute
not

leave

the

misconduct on
remains,

Nation

immunity for
without

the President will

sufficient

remedies

the part of the chief executive • 11

first of all,

additiion,
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Presidents

for
There

the remedy of impeachment. 12
may

be

prosecuted

criminally,

In
at

11 The presence of alternative remedies has played an
important role in our previous decisions in teh area of
official immunity.
E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at
428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors
from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public power less to deter misconduct or to punish tha
which occurs.")
12 The same remedy plays a central role with respect to
the misconduct of federal
judges, who also possess
absolute
immunity.
See
Kaufman,
Chilling
Judicial
Independence,
88
Yale
L.J.
681,
690-706
(1979)/
Congressman may be removed from office by a vote of their
colleagues. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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least

after

they

leave office.

The

existence of

these

alternative remedies is not alone, determinative because
they also apply to numerous executive officials who are
accorded
Butz v.

only

qualified

Economou,

immunity

supra.

Yet

under

the

our

decision

balance of

in

competing
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considerations is different with respect to the President
than it is for any other executive official.

In addition,

there

Presidential

are

various

less

formal

misconduct

that do

not apply with equal

executive

officials.

The

checks

on

force

President

to other
subjected

is
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constantly to intense public and congressional scrutiny.
Such scrutiny may serve to deter Presidential misconduct,
as well

as

threat.

to make

The

misconduct

his

over

traditional
these

President

concern

factors

make

other

impeachment
incentives

a

to

real
avoid

from his possible desire to seek

need

other

sanction of
has

that result

re-election,
influence

the

to

maintain

governmental

for

his

clear

place
that

his

prestige

officials,
in

history.

absolute

and
All
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and
his
of

Preaidential

immunity will not place the President "above the law. nl3

Footnote(s) 13 will appear on following pages.
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Instead, such a rule merely rejects a particular remedy of
misconduct in order to further the broader public good. 14

13 As Judge Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 581 (CA 2 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950), "to submit all officials, the innocent as well as
the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the
unflinching
discharge
of
their
duties....
In
this
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation."
14 The idea that some governmental officials should be
shielded absolutely from 1 iabili ty in damages is hardly
new or unusual.
Under our decisions, absolute immunity
from suit extends to judges, Pierson v. Ray, supra,
prosecutors
Imbler
v.
Pachtman,
supra,
and
state
legislators, Tenney v. Brandhove, supra.
In addition,
such immunity covers a large number of administrative
officials under our decision in Butz v. Economou, supra.
In Butz, we held that federal agency "officials who are
respons1ble for the decision to initiate or continue [an
administrative] proceeding subject to agency adjudication
are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability
for their parts in that decision."
438 u.s., at 516.
Butz also accorded absolute immunity to the lawyers who
prosecute and the administrative law judges who hear them.
Id., at 514-517.
There are at least 30 federal agencies
and
departments
with
authority
to
initiate
such
proceedings.
Although the number of immunized officials
and lawyers is unknown, there were 1,146 law judges
serving these agencies in 1980, Administrative Conference
of the United States, Federal Administrative Law Judge
Hearings: Statistical Report for 1976-1978, p. 21 (1980).
Moreover, in 1978, 216843 new agency proceedings were
begun, id, at 33, although these include cases that were
not initiated by the government and thus cannot be viewed
as "prosecutorial."
In granting this immunity to numerous administrative
officials, we reasoned that they performed Eunctions
analgous to those of prosecutors and judges.
But unlike
judges, publicly appointed or elected prosecutors, and
legislators, many of these officials are unkown and often
may be difficult to identify.
Many of the informal
constraints
applicable
to
highly
visible
judges,
prosecutors and legislators are far less likely to apply
to these individuals.
Yet, it is argued here that the
President of the United States should have less immunity.
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A. ERNEST FITZGERALD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[March - , 1982]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages
from a former President of the United States. The claim
rests on actions allegedly taken during the former President's
tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.
I
In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost
his job as a management analyst with the Department of the
Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of
a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in
which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the armed forces.
Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in
Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national
prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee of the United States Congress. To the apparent
embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A
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transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.
Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation
for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's
dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently,
as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being
eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was
queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from government service. 3 The President responded by promising to
See Economics of Military Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed
that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald's testimony. Within less than two months of respondent's congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the
outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in
which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See Joint Appendix
(JA), at 209-211 (Memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6,
1969). Among these was a "reduction in force"-the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown's successor in office under the
new Nixon administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly
on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the
Air Force upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970.
2
See The Dismissal of A . Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economy in Government of the
Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members
of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the "firing of
this dedicated public servant" as a "punitive action." I bid., at 115-116,
JA, at 177-179.
3
A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared
by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced
the view that the Air Force was "firing ... a good public servant." JA, at
269 (Memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, December 5,
1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's
retention by the Defense Department.
1
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look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the
petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman
to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within
the Administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald
might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6
Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the Administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander
Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low
marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the
game." 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "We
should let him bleed, for a while at least." 9 There is no evi'JA, at 228.
• See JA, at 109-112 (Deposition of H.R. Haldeman); JA, at 137-141 (Deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman's deposed testimony was
based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. JA, at 275.
• See JA, at 126 (Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at 141 (Deposition of
Richard Nixon).
7
Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted
at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty
to Executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with
friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high level positions were
presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See JA, at 126
(Deposition of Robert Mayo); JA, at 146-147 (Deposition of James
Schlesinger).
8
Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (CSC Decision), JA, at 60, 84 (September 18, 1973).
' !d., at 85. The memorandum added that "We owe 'first choice on Fitzgerald' to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a
hero [for exposing the cost overruns]." Suspicion of Fitzgerald's assumed
loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House
and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra,
JA, at 83:
"While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was 'Senator Proxmire's boy in
the Air Force,' and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without
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dence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.
Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a
congressional committee. 10 The Commission convened a
closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971.
Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in
public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction,
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F. 2d 755 (1972), public hearings
commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air
Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that
Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received
"some advice" from the White House before Fitzgerald's job
was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President
was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took
the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:
"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be
fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it
and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone
who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was
specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note
that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at
the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald]."
10
See CSC Decision, JA, at 61.
"See ibid., JA, at 83--84.
12
See id.
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not a case of some person down the line deciding he
should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me.
I made it and I stick by it." 13
A day later, however, the White House press office issued a
retraction of the President's statement. According to a
press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with
another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had
"put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14
After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision
in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on
the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, JA, at 60. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable
civil service regulations. Ibid., JA, at 86-87. 15 The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental
18

JA, at 185. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered
Fitzgerald's firing. JA., at 214-215 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31,
1973).
1
'JA, at 196 (transcription of statement of White House press secretary
Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John
Ehrlichman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see supra
note 13, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal. When Ehrlichman corrected him on several details, however, the
President concluded that he was "thinkin' of another case." JA, at 218 (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220. It was after this
conversation that the retraction was ordered.
15
Fitzgerald's position in the Air Force was in the "excepted service" and
therefore not covered by civil service rules at:~d regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton , 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (CADC 1972); see
CSC Decision, JA, at 63--64. In Hampton, however, the court held that
Fitzgerald's employment nonetheless was under "legislative protection,"
since he was a "preference eligible" veteran entitled to various statutory
protections under the Veterans Preference Act. See 467 F. 2d, at
758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction in force procedures established by civil service regulation. See 467 F. 2d, at 758.

79-1738-0PINION
6

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact
motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. I d.,
at 86. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in
force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17
The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow
conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by
the Commission, "the evidence in the record does not support
[Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and
that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." Ibid., at 81.
Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a
suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it
he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil
Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight offi16
The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of
his superiors' dissatisfaction with his job performance. CSC Decision, JA,
at 86-87. Their attitude was evidenced by "statements that he was not a
'team player' and 'not on the Air Force team.'" Ibid., JA, at 83. Without
deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an "adverse
action" against Fitzgerald as an "inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,"
ibid., at 86, the Examiner held that the Commission's adverse action procedures, current version codified at 5 CFR § 752, implicitly forbade the Air
Force to employ a "reduction in force" as a means of dismissing respondent
for reasons "personal to" him. JA, at 87.
"The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive back pay.
CSC Decision, at 20-21, JA, at 87-88. Despite the Commission's order,
respondent avers that he "has still not obtained reinstatement to a position
equivalent to his former one," Brief for Respondent, at 11, n. 17, and that
he therefore has brought an enforcement action in the District Court.
18
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his
job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission
hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, supra, 384 F. Supp., at 690-692.
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cials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House
Aides" styled only as "John Does."
The District Court dismissed the action under the District
of Columbia's three-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v.
Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), and the Court of
Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House
aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553
F. 2d 220 (CADC 1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned
that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dimissal at least until 1973. In that year,
reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably
through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald
at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being
offered another job in the Administration. 553 F. 2d, at 225,
229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll
the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the
action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.
Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter,
Fitzgerald filed a Second Amended Complaint in the District
Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaintmore than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission-that Fitzgerald first
named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow
and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional
discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides
19
The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon's participation in the alleged conspiracy
against him, the complaint quoted petitioner's press conference statement
that he was "totally aware" of and in fact "approved" Fitzgerald's dismissal. Second Amended Complaint, at 6.
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Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Denying a motion
for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that
Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20
The Court also ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim
absolute presidential immunity.
Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently
did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F. 2d 1192 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally
"'See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 1a-2a. The District Court
held that respondent was entitled to "infer" a cause of action under 5
U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp.
III 1979), provides generally that "The right of employees .. . to ... furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18
U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action
could be "implied" under these statutes is not currently before us. Neither is the question whether the courts, under the direct authority of the
First Amendment, may recognize a private action against the President for
relief in damages. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct
constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme ... judicially created remedies ... might be inappropriate."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.
388, 396 (1971) (upholding judicial recognition of a nonstatutory damages
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in cases "involv[ing] no special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"). As explained infra, this case is here under the "collateral order"
doctrine, for review of the District Court's denial of petitioner's motion to
dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit.
The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the
common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently
abandoned his common law cause of action. See Respondent's Supplemental Brief, at 2 (May 14, 1980).
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divided vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed
immunity defense.
As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).
II
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to
the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court
is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which
the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.

A
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority toreview "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Emphasizing the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, respondent argued that the District Court's
order was not an appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of
Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.
Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. BenefiSee Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, at
2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it.
22
The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . ...
21

28

u. s. c.

§ 1254.

79-1738-0PINION
10

NIXON v. FITZGERALD

cial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small
class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to
the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen,
supra, 337 U. S., at 546-547. As an additional requirement,
Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory
order must "present[] a serious and unsettled question." 337
U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that
orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable
under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442
U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977)
(claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as
appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F. 2d
10, 5~0 (CADC 1977) (Wilkey, J., writing separately for
the Court on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en
bane, 553 F. 2d 1277, 128~1284 n. 18 (1976), cert dismissed
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978).
In "dismissing'' the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay
outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and
unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by
the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss
on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin
v. Kissinger, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that
petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and
unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had
ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not en-
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titled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held.
And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this
Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light
of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened
breach of essential presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23
B
Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for ceriorari
in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the
parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under
its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald
a sum of $142,000. In consideration Fitzgerald agreed to acThere can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court
of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this
Court.
Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to
the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question
is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals' now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented.
"' Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court
on August 24, 1981, as an appendix to his Brief in Opposition to a Motion of
Morton, Ina, David, Mark and Gary Halperin to Intervene and for Other
Relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court's action on the petition for
certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients
had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a
live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their
initial submission.
23
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cept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by
this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity
claim, no further payments would be made.
The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in
the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As
we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract,
"Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."'
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227,
240-241 (1937).
III
A
This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for
civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896),
the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts.
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that "(t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to
public officers. I d., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the
Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise
their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled
a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.
"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an
Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his
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authority, should not be under an apprehension that the
motives that control his official conduct may, at any
time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to
the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint."

Id., at 498.
Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which
made no express provision for immunity for any official, had
abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining§ 1983 in
light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our
heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible
"that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason" without some indication of
intent more explicit than the general language of the statute.
Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386
· U. S. 547 (1967), involving a§ 1983 suit against a state judge,
recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine
" 'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is
that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.'" I d.,
at 554, quoting, Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223
(1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The
Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a
qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." I d., at 557.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a
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§ 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In
that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that
state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity
from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public
policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based." /d., at 247.
As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a
two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To
most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity.
For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the
nature of their official functions and the range of decisions
that conceivably might be taken in "good faith". This "ftmctional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at
which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute
immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state
judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).
This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first
time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz
the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving
federal officials charged with common law torts, that all high
25

Spalding v. Vilas, supra, was distinguished on the ground that the
suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common law-and not a
constitutional-eause of action. See Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 493-495.
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federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damage actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of
the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, 438 U. S., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our
holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors,
"because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id.,
at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508.
In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those
of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the
question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." I d., at 506.
B
Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damage liability arguably have not defined a
straight line of doctrinal development. Nonetheless, a consistent approach has run throughout. In addressing claims
of entitlement to immunity, this Court has recognized that
"the law of privilege as a defense to damage actions against
officers of Government has 'in large part been of judicial making,"' Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 501-502, quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973), and that the "federal courts are
. . . competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity" of state and federal officials, Butz v. Economou, supra,
438 U. S., at 503. Our decisions of course have been guided
by federal statutes and the Constitution. Our cases under
§ 1983 formally have involved statutory construction. See,
e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Other decisions rest either on the literal text of the Constitution, e. g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 506 (1969) (recognizing
immunity of Congressmen under Speech and Debate Clause),
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or on inferences of purpose drawn from constitutional language and structure, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S.
606, 618 (1972) (extending congressional immunity to a congressional aide, in order to "implement [the] fundamental
purpose" of the Speech and Debate Clause). Cf. Butz v.
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-517. Nonetheless, at
least in the absence of explicit guidance from the Congress, in
deciding immunity questions we have relied explicitly on consideration of public policy comparable to those traditionally
recognized by courts at common law. 26 We also have examined the scope of the immunity historically afforded to particular officials at common law. See Butz v. Economou,
supra, 438 U. S., at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409,
421 (1976).
This case now presents the claim that the President of the
United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil
damages liability. In the case of the President the historical
and policy inquiries tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional structure and heritage. From
both sources the relevant evidence involves an ongoing effort
to identify the appropriate separation of powers among the
branches of government-a concern that also forms the core
of our inquiry involving those considerations of public policy
traditionally weighed by courts at common law.
26
At least three basic rationales support immunity for public officials.
First, competent and responsible individuals may be deterred from entering public service in the first place. Second, the prospect of damages liability may render officials unduly cautious in the discharge of their public
responsibilities. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). Third, public servants may be distracted from their duties by the need to defend frequent lawsuits. See
generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. Rev. 526, 529-530 (1977).
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IV
Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil
damage claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant
in a direct action under the Constitution and two statutory
actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to
subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. <a
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United
States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's
unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and justified by considerations of public
policy.
A
The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II of the Constitution provides that
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... " This grant of authority establishes the
President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive
branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the
administration of justice-it is the President who is charged
constitutionally to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs-a realm in which the
Court has recognized that "It would be intolerable that
courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information
27
We know of no instance in the history of our country in which Congress
has given serious consideration to imposing civil damage suit liability on a
President. A congressional attempt to do so would present a serious constitutional issue that we have no occasion to consider in this case.
28
U. S. Const., Art II, § 3.
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properly held secret"; 29 and management of the personnel of
the Executive branch-a task for which "imperative reasons
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove
the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30
In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified
immunity, 31 the respondent relies on cases in which we have
recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet
officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, supra; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. We find these cases to be inapposite. The
President's unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials. 32
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
u. s. 103, 111 (1948).
ao Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926).
31
Under the "good faith" standard, as formulated in such cases as Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 322 (1975), an official would be held immune
from damages liability unless "he knew or reasonably should have known
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or "he took the action with malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. ... "
32
Noting that the "Speech and Debate Clause" provides a textual basis
for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of Executive immunity. Petitioner, on the other hand, offers historical arguments that the Framers affirmatively assumed presidential immunity to have been established by the
adoption of the constitutional scheme. Although we need not embrace petitioner's argument in order to decide this case, we do reject respondent's
contention that the constitutional text and structure somehow prohibit a
judicial recognition of absolute immunity. There are two difficulties with
respondent's argument. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, supra. Second, this Court already has established that absolute
immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman,
supra, (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive
branch).
29

333
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Similarly, the importance and scope of the President's powers and duties render him particularly vulnerable to suits for
civil damages. 33 In view of the special prominence of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target of damage actions
by disgruntled citizens. 34 The matters with which a President must concern himself are likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U. S., at 554.
Yet it is precisely in such cases that there exists the greatest
public interest in providing the President "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his
office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979) (footnote omitted). For example, it would be intolerable to instill
in the President a hesitancy to remove inefficient or even disloyal personnel. Exposure of the President to damages actions also could distort the process of decisionmaking at the
highest levels of the executive branch. Anticipating lawsuits against the President, the President and his advisers
naturally would have an incentive to devote scarce energy,
not to performance of their public duties, but to compilation
of a record insulating the President from subsequent liability.
In view of the singular importance of the President's duties,
the threatened diversion of his energies by private lawsuits
would raise unique risks to public policy. 35
33

Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,

§ 1563, at 418--419 (1833 ed.):

"There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department,
which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are
confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to
perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest,
imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at
least, to possess an official inviolability."
34
These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record
of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents , 403 U. S. 388 (1971).
35
Even in the case of officials possessing absolute immunity, this Court
generally has held that this immunity extends only to acts in performance
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B
In deference to the President's singular constitutional mandate, the courts traditionally have asserted their jurisdiction
over him with respectful caution and restraint. This Court
of particular functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at
508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 430-431. In the
case of the President, however, powerful reasons counsel rejection of a selective approach.
Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has
discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of which are
highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which
Presidential "function" encompassed a particular action. Thus, in order to
administer functional distinctions among Presidential actions, judges frequently would need to inquire into the purpose for which acts were taken.
Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.
In determining the proper scope of an absolute privilege, this Court repeatedly has refused to draw lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or
supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, supra, 360 U. S., at 575 (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is
enough to render the privilege applicable.... "); Stump v. Sparkman,
supra, 435 U. S., at 363 and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts
occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"). In
view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office, we think
it appropriate to extend to him absolute immunity from damage actions
based on acts within the "outer perimeter'' of the area of his official
responsibility.
In this case respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted
outside the perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of respondent
Fitzgerald, who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Brief for Respondent, at 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has
granted this legislative protection, petitioner argues, no federal official
could, within his authority, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard of proof. This construction of the President's authority would subject him to trial on every allegation that an allegedly tortious
action was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction
thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect.
It clearly is within the President's authority to "prescribe" the manner in
which the Secretary will "conduct the business" of the Air Force. 10
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never has held that courts may compel the President to perform even ministerial functions. 36 By contrast, injunctions
compelling action by other officials long have been upheld. 37
A similar distinction is reflected in the approach of this Court
U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate includes the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.
36
Although this issue has not been faced squarely by the Court, there
have been strong statements in previous opinions asserting the immunity
of the President from judicial orders. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S.
475, 501 (1866), the Court stated: "we are fully satisfied that this court has
no jurisidiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us." And in
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838), it is stated: "The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived
from the consitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching
power."
Even in United States v. Nixon, the court held that Presidential conversations and correspondence enjoy a "presumptive privilege" that is "inextricably rooted in the separation of powers." 418 U. S., at 708. We
suggested that this privilege may be more absolute when matters of diplomacy or national security are involved. /d., at 706, 710-711.
Strong historical considerations support the traditional judicial reluctance to enjoin action by the President. At the time of the first Congress,
Vice President John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, were reported as stating that "the President, personally, was not subject to any process whatever; could have no action, whatever, brought
against him; and above the power of all judge, justices, etc." since otherwise a court could "stop the whole machinery of government." 2 W.
Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United States 152
(Harris ed. 1880). Justice Story offered a similar argument somewhat
later. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 1563, at 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).
It also is clear that Thomas Jefferson believed the President not to be
subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be
issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader
view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President:
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of
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to cases in which various officials have claimed an evidentiary
privilege. The courts generally have looked to the common
law to determine the scope of an official's privilege. 38 In considering claims by the President, however, we have recognized that Presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon,
418 u. s. 683, 708 (1974).
It is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does
not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon,
supra; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases 191, 196 (1807);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952). 39 But our cases also have recognized that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the executive
branch. 40 When judicial action is needed to serve broad pubthe judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to
west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the
others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive." 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404n. (P. Forded. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time:
Jefferson the President 32~25 (1974).
37
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952) (injunction directed to Secretary of Commerce); Kendall v. United States,
supra (mandamus to enforce ministerial duty of the Postmaster General).
38
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of
the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 32~24 (DDC 1966), aff'd 384 F. 2d 979 (CADC), cert denied, 389
U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials).
39
Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct presidential order. See 343
U. S., at 583.
40
See Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 439
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lie interests-as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the
separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance,
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra-the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of
this merely private suit for damages based on a President's
official acts, we hold it is not. 41

v
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave
the Nation without sufficient remedies for misconduct on the
part of the chief executive. 42 There remains first the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 43 In addition, Presi(1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
41
It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a serious
cost on the individuals whose rights have been violated. As Judge
Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949),
cert denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950):
"It does indeed go without saying that an oficial, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for ... [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit ali officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of trial and
to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of ali but
the most resolute. . . . As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative."
In weighing the balance of advantages, this Court has found that there is a
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360,
371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U. S., at 711-712
and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal
trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision).
42
The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in
our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, supra, 424 U. S., at 428-429 ("We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.").
43
The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of
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dents may be prosecuted criminally, at least after they leave
office. Moreover, there are informal checks on Presidential
action that do not apply with equal force to other executive
officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by
Congress and by the press. The vigilance of these institutions may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well
as to make credible the threat of impeachment. 44 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his
historical stature.
The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President
"above the law." For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends.
VI
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for action consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
j

federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 690--706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
"'Prior to petitioner Nixon's resignation from office, the House Judiciary
Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon President of the United States, H.R. Rep. No.
93-1305 (1974).

